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(I) 
The purpose of our atud7 condah d.n a critical analyaia of 
Professor A, C, Pigou'e welfare coneS?• and propositions in the 
light of ideas held b,y hia predeceeaora as vall as the concept of 
economic welfare as developed 'b7 lahr economiata, Much of the 
controver8T on the subJect, after publication of the first edition 
of Pigou'e famous treatiae in 1920, centered round concepts which 
according to critica were ~oad the scope of any scientific etud7. 
More light has been thrown on it in aubsequent y-ears and it is nov 
generally agreed that the deficien~y of the concepts did not lie 
so mnch in a lack of scie~tific content as in their vaguenesR due 
to the absence of rigorous and unambignous defin1t1one, One can, 
vi th some force, argile that llaJIT of our economlaho and Pigou 1s no 
exception, have formed their ldeae without pay-ing mnch attention 
to their baeic assumptions, I~ consAqueaceo there are numerous 
propositions in economic literature, including the field of welfare 
economics, which would have been at least diff&rently worded, had 
the writers been conscious of their hidden assumptions, Post-Pigovian 
literature on welfare economics baa been highly usetul at least in 
one respect, that is, in giving a sharper edge to the basic postulates 
and leying emphaah on their aignificance, Considered in this 
11 perepect1ve, the scope of the present eesq 1s not limited to the 
1
1 exclusive consideration of Pigou 1 a ideas on welfare but extends to 
'-'"'=----:::..c::::..:_~.::::_:.:':.=--~::...-===--="'--=-==-=-..::-...:::...-c=....:.=.=·.-~=--=.:..==..-;::::..::..;-__ .:_ .: .·.:....::..:c .. _-:-_.,_. __ : . .:-...=.--:-.-... -:::=··-
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the appraisal of his work in the light of a comparative approach base& 
on a discussion of various hypotheses at issue, 
Pigou's ideas on welfare first appeared in a book called WEALTH 
AND WELFARE in 1912, Containing essentially the same materials, but 
with some major changes, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE was published in 
1920. Three subsequent revised editions appeared in the years 1924, 
1929 and 1931. We shall C.ee~ with Pigou 1 s welfare economics as 
presented in the latest edition (1931), unless otherwise mentioned, 
Pigou's treatise in a sense occupies a unique place in the 
history of welfare economics. Many of the classicists, though not 
without exceptions, hailed laissez faire and free competition as 
unmixed boons to society, Maximum welfare was supposed to be the 
result of the working of an invisible hand without any conscious effort 
on the part of individuals striving their way toward it, We shall 
notice that all classicists were not optimists; there were pessimists 
too. But probably before Pigou 1 s treatise on welfare was published. 
there had not been any systematic treatment of the rationale of free 
competition. Pigou showed that free competition would maximese 
welfare, if there were no divergences between marginal private and 
marginal social net products. But there were ample instances under 
a regime of free competition (let alone monopoly) which signified 
departures from optimum allocation or maximum welfare. Th!!l'e was a 
lot of scope for improvement in a laitaez faire economy. But 
individuals could not be relied upon to accomplish that improvement; 
the intervention of the state was essential for the correction of 
!1 maladjustmenv s. In fact, 
_ .0=-·;r-~·----~~~o--~~~--·- _,_ .. , ___ --
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Ricardo, Many social problems emerged on the wake of the industrial 
revolution which also brought tremendous material prosperity, An 
economist writing at that time could not but feel, to some extent, 
sceptic about the benefits of free competition. Pigou•s treatise was 
a fitting testimony to the change in attitude brought about oy social 
changes wh1cn a conscientious thinKer or his calibre could not over-
look, It was not a revolt against the preaching of classieists; while 
remaining within the classicists' fold, Pigou warned against the type 
of loose thinking which makes one extol laissez faire, to the utter 
neglect of its darker aspects, Pigou believed in the efficacy of free 
competition, but not without qualifications, He pointed out that there 
were spheres of maladjustment between private and social good where 
the state could profitably operate in ~he general interest. 
This explains why Pigou could not be satisfied with a formal 
statement of welfare propositions, He maintained throughout an 
uncommon practical interest and avoided abstraction of the magnitude 
characteristic of a few preceding and many succeding economists. In 
factual contents, his book excelled any other work on welfare economics, 
Apart from a consideration of welfare propositions. on a theoretical 
level, Pigou discussed the practical problems raised by labor and also 
the various ways in which distribution of national divi4end could be 
geared toward more equality without destroying incentive, and thus incr 
increase welfare, It will not be possible to discuss all the facets 
of Pigou1 s welfare economics within the short compass of our study. We 
shall maiilly deal with his welfare propositions, specially those 
relati~~ the dis~ri_~t,!()n of resources. No_ attempt _wil} be ma~d::=e==t~o=:,.,! ===== 
,, 
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undertake a thorough going analysis of his practical recommendations, 
which of course, follow from his theoretical analysis. 
In the rest of the Chapter I, a brief presentation of welfare 
economics before Pigou will be made. In Chapters II. III, .and IV, 
we shell deal with Pigou 1 s welfare concept and propositions. In 
Chapters V and VI, the salient features of Post-Pigovian welfare 
economics will be discussed. And in the concluding Chapter VII, it 
is proposed to present an evaluation of Pigou 1 s ideas on welfare 
in the light of those held by his predecessors and successors. 
(II) 
lt is found helpful to consider welfare implications of Pre-
Pigovian economics.under three different groups. namely; 
(1) English classical approach, based on the writings of Adam Smith, 
Jean Baptiste Say, David Ricardo, Thomas Robert Mal thus, and John 
Stuart Mill. 
(2) Continental classical approach, as reflected in the writings of 
Vilfredo Pareto, Leon Walras and E'ftrk.e 8a..,n&. 
(3) Neo-classical approach, preeminently represented by Alfred 
Marshall. 
It is not proposed to go into the details of ideas held by each 
of the above theorists. Our main object is to bring out the signifi-
cant conclusions bearing on welfare as revealed in the writings of 
groups as broadly classified. 
In dealing with classical economics, economists have taken a 
4. 
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classicists is to show that the equilibrium process of the free market 
will lead to a more efficient allocation of resources among different 
industries than ,state interference. The other view is that classicists 
were more concerned with the technical problem of increasing physical 
productivity than with the economic problem of rational allocation of 
resources. while both these trends of thought are traceable to classical 
writings the central principle is provided, Hla Myint1 observes, by 
the technical concept and not the scarcity concept. The scarcity 
concept came into prominence only after the marginal revolution. 
In the WEALTH OF NATIONS, Adam Smith2 refP.rs to t1<o mejor 
determinants of the size of annual produce or national divid.end: (1) 
the skill, dexterity and judgement with which labor is generally 
applied and (2) the proportion between the number of those who are 
not so employed. Extending the area of the market as a result of free 
trade and division of labor are two powerful means by which the 
primitive economy may develop. Both these factors were considered 
primarily in the light of their tecrillical potentialities of increasing 
the size of national dividend. 
"Perhaps one may say," Hla Myint observes, "that the 
difference between the modern concept of free competition 
and Smith's is that the former is a method of tightening 
up the allocative efficiency within a given productive 
framework, while the latter is a method of widening the 
area of the economy. ,J 
It cannot be said, however, that Smith was not aware of the existsoce 
1. Hla Myint, THEORIES OF WELFARE ECONOMICS, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, Mass. p. 2 • 
. 
1 
2. Adam Smith, WEfJI.TH OF NATions, E. Cannan Ed., p. 7 
J, IBID, p. J-4, 
- __ JL-~~-"~~=-=-=. 
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of subjective consumers' gains in the modern sense, In analysing the 
benefits of division of labor, he pointed out that apart from physical 
productivity. there was a further class of gains. "It gives a value 
to their superfluities by exchanging them with something else which 
IDS¥ satisfy a part of their wants and increase their enjoyments. 114 
In extolling the virtues of increased production, Smith evidently 
had in mind the resultant increase in consumers' satisfaction. 
"He seems to assume iinplici tly that under normal 
conditions, i.e., in the absence of shortage or glut, 
the consumer's satisfaction from a commodity may be 
regarded as depending on its value-in-use, e.s determined. 
by its intrinsic physical properties, This amounts to 
assuming that quantities of satisfaction are rougb].y 
proportional to quantities of physical products. n5 
This assumption very well explains why the technical problem of 
increasing productivity and not the allocation concept was the main 
concern of Adam Smith. 
After Smith, J. B, SS¥ and Malthus made important advances in 
the demand approach, Say consistently expounded the view that 
production is creation, not of matter but of utility, and contributed 
to the problem of allocation but it was systematised anly after the 
evolution of the marginalist school, Malthus was interested in the 
influence of total effective demand on the volume of employment. To 
him, wastage due to glut was more important than wastage due to 
maldistribution, With the advent of Ricardo, the physical approach 
in classical economics was reinforced and reached its climax in the 
views expressed oy John Stuart Mill. 
II 
! 54.. Smith, IBID, p. 413-Myint, OP, CIT,, p. 4, --- -~=-- _::_,__ -· =.:::.:_:.-___ :::_-:..-~-~-
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Ricardo centered his attention on the broad problem of distri-
buting resources between consumers' goods and producer~' goods with 
a view to expanding the total volume of econorr.ic activity and arrived 
at conclusions different from those of Adam Smith, According to 
Smith, increase in investment or the proportion of resources used. 
for productive purposes meant an increase in the demand for labor, 
!his would raise wages above the subsistence level and stimulate 
the growth of population. Capital accumulation for Smith was always 
a boon resulting in an increase in population and opening up enormaus 
scope for division of labor with a conseqnent rise in productivity. 
Ricardo did not share Smith's optimism: this is due to his discovery, 
simultaneously with Malthus and a few other economists, of the 
principle of diminishing returns. The prospect of increasing pro-
ductivity with increase in the volume of labor, land remaining 
constant, was to him an unacceptable proposition, Contrary to Smith, 
Ricardo held the idea that under conditions of diminishing returns. 
there would be a determinate limit to which population would expand 
marked by the stationary state. Increased labor applied to marginal 
lands would raise the price of corn. Since real wages could not fall 
below the minimum subsistence level, money wages would rise andlower 
the rate of profit. Stationary state would be reached with a zero 
rate of profit which would destroy all incentive to capital accumula-
tion and expansion of economic activity, "Thus the emphasis was 
shifted from the absolute scale of social production to the social 
net product or the 'net revenue' which increased at a diminishing 
II 
I! 
il 
II 
- ----=~ 
rate as the scale of production is expanded.• 6 From this, it followed 
that the aim of economic policy 181 in increasing the nat social pro-
duct rather than the absolute scale of social output. 
" Another dissident view among the classicists was that of Malthus ,, 
., 
ii 
il who stressed the importa~ce of demand on economic activity. According 
I' 
,! to him, there was no automatic mechanism which equated demand to supply I 
I' ,I and attempt at economic expansion by capital accumulation would result 
!I 
" in a glut long before Ricardo's stationary equilibrium was reached, 
!I 
'] While Ricardo adhered to the physical output approach, Malthus 
ii ,, 
ii 
" 
" i! 
il 
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considered the implications of demand on the economic system. The 
central theme, for both of them, was the dynamic problem of economic 
progress, not the concept of allocation in the static sense. 
With J. S, Mill, technological considerations became predominant 
with a consequent emphasis on the physical approach. Under the heading 
"Production"• technological problems like division of labor, different 
laws of returns in agriculture and industry, relative merits of large 
and small scale production etc. were discussed and distribution and 
exchange were considered as secondary factors whose role was to 
distribute national dividend as determined by immutable physical 
laws according to existing social institutions. The bearing of exchang~ 
on the size of the national dividend was not recognised. To quote his 
own words, 
"The laws and conditions of production of wealth partake 
of the character of physical truths. There is nothing 
optional or arbitrary in them. Whatever mankind produce, 
j, 
:1 b. IBID~, p. 7. 
-~~-~--·~--==~·---····~-- ,.·.-.. -·--.~- " ..... -· ...... ----""··-·- -- -·---n-- --·· . ---- - -- --- -- - -- ~ ~ ~- -- ----- --· --- ···----;, 
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il il 
must be produced in the modes and conditions imposed 
by the constitution of external things and the inherent 
properties of their bodily and mental structure, The 
opinions. the wishes which may exist i~ these matters 
do not control the things themselves,• 
Regarding capital accumulation, Mill argued that the excess of 
production above the physical necessities of producers offered the 
upper limit to savings. The size of national dividend was regarded 
as a determinate function of national capital. 
Mill explicitly formulated the ideas implicit in the minds 
of most of classical economists that quantities of consumers' 
satisfaction might be aes~ed as being roughly proportional to 
quantities of physical products and therefore, a greater quantity of 
physical product or material wealth would be normally more preferable 
to a lesser quantity, 
We shall conelude vbe: classical notion of economic welfare 
with a brief note on the role of free competition in classical 
economics. 
"A purely allocative interpretation of the classical 
theory of free competition,• Hla Myint observes, "is based 
on very selective evidence" and 11 it is only when free compe-
tition is further reinterpreted as an auxiliary instrument 
of dynamic economic progress that it fits in with the 
fundamental classical outlook on the economic problem and 
gives au organic unity to their theoretical system as a 
whole, ntl 
Smith dealt with the concept of free competition as the allocator 
of resources within a given closed economy, He demonstrated how 
free competition in the product market will equate the demand and 
1! '/. Mill, J. S., PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 
~==-~ ~ .. _ ~ -~=-_§,'-~ -~Ji~~_ll~L O~.£I~~-2J.~==•=o~·~ 
Ashley Ed, P 199-200~ 
,, 
9. 
supply of each commodity and eliminate abnormal profits in any 
particular industry. 
"The natural price." S!Rith observes, "is, as it were, 
the central price to which the prices of all commodities 
are continually gravitating. Different accidents mat 
sometimes keep them suspended a good deal above it. But 
whatever may be the obstacles which hinder them from settlil~ 
i. ill this center of repose and continuance. they are constantly 
11 tending towards it."~ 
;i 
!I 
' Smith also discussed monopolies as one of the permanent obstacles ;i 
I 
',, to the attainment of co111petitive eqllilibrium which derange more or 
I 
less the natural distribution of the stock of society. The effect 
of free competition on the factor market was also analysed by him. 
Free entry into industry, Smith observed, would assure the 
allocation of factors among different industries in such a w~ as 
to equate not only money earnings but the whole advantages and dis-
advantages in all these industries. Thus even though Smith's treat-
ment was not logically as stringent as those of the continental 
economists, it cannot be said that he ignored the problem of 
allocation. This does not contradict, however, our central proposition, 
that free competition for the classicists was more an agency of 
dynamic economic progress than an allocator of resources. 
Smith considered competitive equilibrium against the background 
of the secular tendency of the economic system to be in an advancing, 
stationary or declining condition. Thus natural price 
"itself varies with the natural rate of each1of its component 
parts, of wages, profit and~rsnt; in every society this rate 
varies according to their circumstances. according to their 
10. 
==== - - ~- ~~- ~~ ~==-=~~=~ ·-
circumstances, according to their riches and poverty, their 
advancing, stationary or declining condition. 1tlO 
Smith again states that population can be kept increasing by 
maintaining a rising level of wages and advocates an increase in 
the rate of capital accumulation to raise normal wages above the 
minimum subsistence level. Bearing in mind the fact that continuous 
capital accumulation within a country will ultimately lead to the 
exhustion of investment opportunities! Smith writes, 
11 'l'he acquisition of new territory. or new branches 
of trade, m~ sometimes raise the profits of stock 
and with them the interest of money, avenin a country 
fast advancing in the acquistition of riches.nll 
In Book II of the WEALTH OF NATIONS, Smith strongly advocates 
capital accumulation as a oeans of increasing savings and expanding 
the total volume of economic activity. It may not be far from the 
truth to say that free competition as conceived by Adam Smith was 
not a mechanism of allocation of resources, but a widening process 
which facilitates the expansion of economic activity. This is more 
or less true of the other economists of the English classical 
school. Now we proceed to the discussion of the theory of general 
optimum as developed by continental economists. 
(III) 
The continental approach to welfare economics as expressed in 
the writings of Pareto, Walras, Barone and others consists in a 
departure from the ph0rsical level of analysis and a formulation of 
10, IBID., p. 65. :I II 11. IBID •• p. 95. 
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the concept of subjective optimum based on the law of diminishing 
marginal utility. The impact of the theory of marginal utility on 
continental welfare economics is quite clear. It replaced the 
classical economists• first approximation that quantities of consumers' 
satisfaction were proportional to quantities of physical products and 
consequently emphasised the importance of the problem of allocation 
of resourses. 
There were three main gaps in the classical formulation of the 
problem of allocation. Smith demonstrated how right quantities of 
goods would be produced under free competition, but he did not show 
they were to be optimally distributed among the consumers. Secondly, 
Smith had shown hol< right quantities of resources would be allocated 
to different industries, but he did not consider the problem of right 
proportion of didferent factors in the production of a commodity and 
the right output of each individual producer. Thirdly, in English 
classical economics, the relation between the equilibrium in the con-
sumers 1 market and the e(iuili'brium in the producers' market was not 
clearly worked out. These problems were tackled and incorporated 
in the theory of general optilllllm by contillental. economists with the 
twin device of diminishing marginal utility theory and the marginal 
productivity theory. 
Pareto refined the utility theory and consequently the meaning 
·\ of maximisation of consumers' satisfaction, According to older 
i 
•: 
:: conception, utility was regarded as a measurable function of the 
ij 
IJ quantity of a given commodity admitting of the arithlletical properties 
!. 
Pareto chenged this approach by intra- , 
12. 
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ducing the concept of the "index of ophelimite,n or the individual's 
position of preference as determined by the alternative combination 
of different commodities at his choice, Insteaa of accepting the 
--.....,-----
controversial notion of the gum of individual satisfactions, he defined 
the optimum as a situation where no single individual can move to a 
more preferred. position 1Nithout pusring others to less preferred 
positions. 
Pareto observed that competition produces a maximum collective 
utility regardless of the distribution of income ru1d even if the utilities 
of different individuals were not considered to be comparable, lf the 
original position is one of equilibrium under perfect competition, then 
no possible variations, granted the existence of a fixed quantity of 
resources and a given technology, would constitute an improvement, 
In an excellent article, written in 1908, ~. Barone12 developed 
in greater detail Paretian conditions of optimum, specially relating 
to the planning of production under collectivism, 
The Paretian theory of optimum refined by the Italian economist 
Barone is methodologically an improvement over the classical formulation. 
While the English classicists were more concerned with the dynamics 
of economic progress, Pareto started from a given state of arts and 
given resources and deduced optimum conditions of allocation with a 
logical rigor. At the same time, he gave a new connotation to perfect 
competition, Free competition of English classicists as an 
instrumentality of economic progress is not exactly the same as 
13. 
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i! Pareto's perfect competion with its optimum yielding properties demanded 
by the logic of his analysis. 
We shall not attempt here a treatment of Pareto's optimum 
ii ,, 
1i conditions. We shall later see that the new welfare economics developed 
,, 
I 
,I :1 by J. R. Hicks, A. Lerner and others is Paretian in fundamentals. 
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'I Under neoclassical notion of "elfers economics, we shall consider 
the views expressed by its celebrated representative, Alfred Marshall. 
The neo-classical economics was influenced both by the English 
classical tradition and the marginal revolution. While the economists 
belonging to this group accepted the marginal utility analysis, they 
also retained the classical labor theory approach to tl·,e conerete 
content of the economic problem. Thus while accepting the marginal 
utility theory, they would not carry it to its logical conclusion and 
analyse economic activities as directed to the satisfaction of given 
wants. They qualified these wants as those belonging to the material 
aspects of life, capable of being brought into relation with the meaauring 
rod of money. Thus, while there was a definite economic connotation to 
the definition of wants, they were supposed to be variable and not 
fixed. The neo-classicists were aware of the economic problem of 
rational distribution of a given quantity of resources, but their 
interests extenrieri to a discussion of institutional forces which have 
a bearing on the supply of resources, Instead of accepting them as 
data given by exogenous forces, they dealt with the technical aspects 
of production and the problems of ideal supply of labor and capital 
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required in a given state of society, Finally. the partial enalysis 
method with its emphasis on selection and concentration of concrete 
details of particular sectors of the economic system is a typical out-
come of the neo-classical approach, The neo-classicists differed from 
the classical presumption of general economic harmony by pointing out 
concrete cases where laissez faire did not operate toward social 
'' interests. In Pigou's treatment of the problem, this e.pproach reached 
'i; 
its climax, though it cannot be strictly said that he arrived at his 
conclusions on the basis of a partial analysis. 
With this general background about neo-classical economics, we 
can pass on to a discussion of Marshall's ideas on welfare, In 
Marshall's writings is found a fusion of verious trends of thought, 
He was too practical an economist to be preoccupied with a strictly 
static analysis. He dealt with factors which for many continental 
economists were data given by exogenous forces, Marshall's views on 
the progressive nature of man led him not only beyond the classical 
material level of analysis, but also beyond the purely subjective 
level based on the assumption of given wants, 
Coming to Marshall's specific Views on welfare, it should be 
noted that he developed the concept of surplus, He regarded surpluses 
as "the benefit which the individual derives from his opportunities or 
from his environment; or to Eesort to a word that was in common use a 
few generations ago, from his conjuncture.n13 This definition is 
rather vague and as it stands, the surpluses would be in the nature 
of absolute magmitudes. Marshall, however, later used the term to 
15. 
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mean the opportunity to buy a particular commodity at a given price. 
On the basis of this definition, it is possible to analyse the loss or 
gain experienced by the individual due to a movement from one price 
quantity situation to another. There are ample indications that Marshall 
tried to analyse the concept of aggregate surplus, the excess of the 
sum of satisfactions over the sum of dissatisfactions which accrue 
to the community from economic causes, But he did not think it 
practically possible to arrive at an estimate of aggregate surplus and 
had recourse to the idea of partial surplus. The partial surplus 
analysis does not relate to the economic welfare of the community as 
a whole in a given situation; it is concerned with net changes in 
economic well being due to given changes in particular sectors of the 
economic system, the rest of the system being assumed constant, 
Marshall defined consumer's surplus as •the excess of the price 
which he would be willing to pay rather than go without the thing 
over that what he actually does pey-.•14 Consumers' surplus is measured 
on the assumption that marginal utility of money is constant. The 
device of consumers' surplus is used by Marshall to analyse the effects 
of tax or bounty imposed on a commodity. In the case of an industry 
obeying the law of constant returns, he proposed non interference, 
because in the ease of a tax the loss of consumers' surplus and in 
the case of a bounty, the gain in consumers' surplus would be less 
than the amount received as tax or spent on subsidy. By similiar 
reasoning, Marshall showed that imposition of tax on industries 
----- -- ·---·--· -· - --- -
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obeying the law of diminishing returns and subsidising tnose obeying 
the law of increasing returns would increase welfare. 
The obvious defect in this line of reasoning is that Marshall 
ignored the factor of producers' surplus. He, however, was aware 
of the existance of producers' surplus. 
To sum up, classical welfare analysis was mainly based on a 
p~sical level of analysis, with consequent emphasis on increasing 
physical productivity. Pareto and Barone developed the concept of 
subjective optilliUlD based on the pro-blem of rational allocation of a 
given quantit7 of resources. This analysis was considerably influenced 
by the marginal revolution. Neo-classicists steered a middle way while . 
accepting the doctrine of marginal utility, they had a practical 
approach characteristic of the clas•icists, 
Professor Pigou was one of the neo-classical economists. It will 
be clear, es we proceed with a discussion, of his welfare economics, 
that he was influenced both by English classicists and continental 
economists. Without being methodologically rigo:ll.Ous and faithful to 
English tradition, he arrived at the conditions of the general optimum, 
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CHABTER !l 
PIGOU'S CONCEPT OF WELFARE 
(I) 
The central theme of this chapter is Pigou1 s approach to the 
problem of measurement of welfare, Starting from a subjective 
definition of welfare as states of consciousness, Pigou arrives 
t~ough a chain of reasoning to the objective concept of Dational 
dividend. Successive generalisations involving the relationship 
between general welfare and economic welfare, desires and satisfactions, 
are made in course of this analysis. Thus a change in economic wel-
fare is assumed to influence in the same direction general welfare, 
Link is established between economic welfare and national dividend 
through the media of satisfactions, desires. and money demand, Pigou 
is conscious that his generalizations are not based on any logically 
rigorous proof; he uses them as convenient practical approximations, 
The concept of economic welfare is to Pigou of immense practical 
impPrtance. While economists like Pareto and Barone and more 
,! recently J, R, Hicks, Oscar Lange, A.P. Lerner and others approach 
·' I 
the subject without going into a discussion of the controversial 
"' 1 notien of ethical value judgments and foriiJil.late their welfare 
I 
I 
!, propositions in a more or less ethically neutral from, Professor 
:i 
,, Pigou expresses the opinion that the main motive of economic study 
II 
is to help social improvement, 
Pigou distinguishes between two kinds of studies, light-bearing 
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and the object of the other is knowledge for the sake of good things 
to which it leads. At one end of the scale, he s~s. is the most 
general science of all, metaphysics, the science of reality, which is 
principally light-bearing. On the other hand, the fruit-bearing 
aspect is more prominent in the science of biology, human physiology 
and specially the social sciences which deal with groups of men. 
Pigou emphasizes the practical usefulness of the study of economics. 
"When we elect to watch the play of human motives that 
are ordinary--that are sometimes mean and cl.ismal and ignoble-
our impll].se is not the philosopher 1 s impulse, knowledge for 
the sake of knowledge, but rather the physiologist's, knowledge 
for the helping that knowledge m~ help to bring.nl 
From this. ~uer, we should not jump to the conclusion that Pigou 
considers economics to be an art. to enunciate precepts of 
government. He is clear about the scientific content of economics 
when he s~s, "It is a positive science of what is end tends to be, 
not a normative science of what ought to be.•2 The pragmatic 
importance of economic science, again, does not consist in confining 
its enquiry within the bounds of immediately relevant practical pro-
blems. Such a narrow approach is likely to hamper investig&tions 
that might ultimately bear fruit. What is meant is that economists 
should not put on the mantle of pure mathematicians whose funclion 
is to explore implications. On the other side are sciences, such 
as physics, chemistry, and biology which are concerned with actualities~ 
Choice of essential form of economic science should be guided by the 
realistic type of experimental sciences. •we shall endeavour to 
:I 
il 
II 1. Pigou, A. c., ECONOMICS OF WELFARE, 4th ed., Macmillan & co, Ltd, , 
19 
!i 2. IBID, p 5. London, 1932 p. J. 
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elucidate, not any generalised system of possible worlds but the 
actual world of men and women as they are found in experience to 
be.•J 
(II) 
Before undertaking the analysis of the problem involved in 
the measurement of welfare, Pigou distinguishes between welfare in 
general and economic welfare. He l~s down two propositions: First, 
"that the elements of welfare are states of consciousness, and perhaps 
their relations; secondly, that welfare c~ be brought under the 
category of greater and less.•4 The field of economics, he says, 
is restricted to 11 that part of aocial welfare which can be brought 
directly or indirectly into relation with the measuring rod ofmoney, 115 
This is designated as economic welfare, The question may be raised 
about the relationship between economic welfare and welfare as a 
whole. Pigou observes that economic welfare will not serve for a 
barometer or index of total welfare. On the other hand, other 
components of welfare remaining the same, an increase or del3l'ease 
in economic welfare will correspondingly raise or lower welfare as a 
whole, This is, however, based on the ass~ption that there is no 
correlation between economic and non~economic components of welfare, 
which might not be true, Thus Pigou considers the development of 
character and emotionally balanced individuals on the OD.liVhand and 
of skilled personnel on the other. The first is welfare of a 
\i 3. IBID. 
4. IBID., p. 10, 
5. IBID., p. 11. 
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strictly non-economic sort while the latter is economic to the extent 
that it leais to an increased production of goods and services. Pigou 
observes that concentration of efforts upon economic welfare embodied 
in the second may result in an unconscious sacrifice of non-economic 
•I 
!1 welfare embodied in the first. He states two principal cases in which 
:I 
ii economic causes may react on non-economic welfare. First, mode of 
il 
'I 
:j earning income will leave its impact upon non-economic welfare. Thus 
' i! 
!\ it is an interesting intellectual exercise to anayse the comparative 
'I I~ effects of the cottage system and the factory system ushered by 
industrial revolution on economic and non-economic welfare. Secondly, 
the manner in which income is spent will affect non-economic welfare. 
Some acts of consumption have a debasing and some other an elevating 
effect, though they may yield equal satisfaction. Distinction may 
be drawn between the satisfaction produced by literature, art, public 
museums, etc,, and that produced by alcoholic drinks. The first is 
definitely superior from the point of view of total welfare, 
Thus there can be no rigid inference from economic _to tatal 
welfare. On broad considerations, Pigou formulates a proposition 
which may be considered as his first approximation to welfare, The 
~feet of an economic cause on total welfare is nrobably equiYalent 
in direction though not in magnitude , to the effect on economic 
welfare, unless there is any specific evidence to the contrary. If 
the proposition is valid, economic science is likely to furnish a 
pow&rful guide to practice. Since the effects of economic causes are 
likely to be, to some extent, dependent on non-economic circumstances, 
an additional assumption is made. 
Zl. 
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only be laid down subject to the condition that things outside the 
economic sphere either remain constant or, at least, do not vary beyond, 
certain defined limits.•6 
(III) 
To explain the nature of economic welfare. Pigou discusses 
desires and satisfactions. Economic welfare is defined broadly to 
consist 11 in that group of satisfactions and dissatisfactions which 
can be brought into relation with a money measure.•7 But money pay-
ments are not directly associated >rith satisfaction, but indirectly 
through the medium of desires and aversions. Pigou argues that there 
is not necessarily a positive correlation between intensity of desire 
(which is measured by price) or utility and satisfaction. For the 
most part, however, this circumstance is thought to be of minor 
importance. A second proposition about welfare can, then, be 
formulated in terms of desires and satisfactions. 
"The ratio between the &ntensities of desire that an 
individual feels for a pair of goods is approximately equal 
to the ratio between the amoun~s of satisfaction which their 
possession will yield to him." 
Pigou considers this true of a large segment of economic behavior 
and he cites only one important exception. "People distribute their 
resources b.etween the present, the near future and the remote future 
on the basis of a wholly irrational preference."9 Present pleasures 
or satisfactions of given magnitude are preferred to future 
6. IBID, p. 21. 
'(. !:BID, p. 23. 
b. IBID. 
p. IBID, p. 24 • 
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satisfactions of equal magnitude, leading to a distortion in the 
distribution of resources. Pigou suggests that some differentiation 
in favor of saving leading to the creation of capital, would increase 
welfare. 
liV) 
Figou 1 s attempt to find out some category wlcich can serve as a 
quantitative measure of welfare leads him to the discussion of national 
dividend. The t~ concepts of national dividend and economic welfare 
he regards as co-ordinate. The causal nexus is rougr~y as follows: 
(1) increase in national dividend involves the fulfillment of an 
increase in aggregate desire, (2) an increase in satisfaction ~rom 
economic causes results in an enhancement of economic l-telfare, (3) an 
increase in fulfilled desire leaas to increased satisfaction. (4) 
inc~eased economic welfare will serve as an approxima~e index of 
increase in welfare as a whole. We have dealt with the last three 
stages inthe preceding sections and the meaning of the first step as 
expressed here m~ now be elaborated. 
Pigou defines national dividend as •that part of the objective 
income of the community including, of course, income derived from 
abroad, which can be measured in money.nlO He s~s that some arbitrar-
ness is introduced in defining the concept with respect to the money 
measure. $ltlr~:c't!cy- :logically speaking, aational dividend should 
include the whole annual flow of goods and services. But difficulties 
10. IBID, P• 31. 
24. 
ere insuperable in measuring such a national dividend, Pigou. therefore, 
takes a position of compromise: first, national dividend includes all 
" 
goods and services which come under exchange and also the services that : 
a man obtains from a house owned and inhabited by himself, and secondly, 
the standard definttion stated above should not be rigidly interpreted; 
it is modifiable to take account of other factors when conditions demand 
it. 
There ere certain implications in the above definition of national 
dividend. Firsto value of both final goods and intermediate produsts 
should not be included under national dividend. That would involve 
double counting, because value of final goods takes account of the 
value of intermediate products. Gifts against which no service is 
rendered must be excluded. Incomes in the form of old age pensions 
and special war pensionet interest on war loans. income obtained by 
force or fraud, Pigou observes, should not come under national 
dividend. Treasury receipts of income tax and death duties ere not 
to be counted, as they areJeckoned as such in private hands. On the 
other hand, if incomes are counted only after some taxes erepaid, 
depending upon the fiscal system of the country, those taxes should 
be included under national dividend. The essential principle is that 
double counting must be avoided. Finally, Pigou observes, customs and 
excise duties ought to be counted because of thtir effect on prices. 
.i 
They raise prices and unless aggregate money income is also inflated 
Jl 
II give a true picture of the real income of. the country. 
proportionately, aggregate money income divided by prices would not 
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dividend is net capital formation. Since national dividend is the sum 
total of goods and services produce& in a particular period, we have 
to deduct the loss undergone during the process of production by the 
capital equipment inherited from past periods. This loss inherent in 
the productive process includes wear and tear due to use, weathering 
by lapse of time, and other insuperable risks and excludes destruciion 
by •act of God or the king's enemies". Pigou concludes that •the 
maintenance of capital intact requires that all ordinary physical 
deteriorations in the capital stock should be made good.•11 The 
second important point is that replacement may not necessarily be of 
the particular type of capital which has been used up. The loss in-
curred is measureable in terms of money and maintenance implies the 
replacement of value losses--not of all value losses--but replacement 
of such value losses as are caused by physical losses described above, 
After national dividend has been defined, a discussion of the 
relation between national dividend and economic welfare seems to be 
in order, Pigou adopts the Marshallian definition of national dividend. 
as the aggregate of goods and services produced during a period minus 
"the dec~ and demolition that the stock of capital undergoes," 
Professor Irving Fisher, on the other hand, identifies national 
dividend With those goods and services, and those only that come into 
the hands of ultimate consumers. Fishers' definition, says P1gou, is 
~eeful only when we are interested in the comparative amounts of economic 
welfare of a community obtaining over a long series of years. But the. 
25.' 
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~estion he considers germane to his enquiry is the effect on economic 
welfare as a whole produced by economic caused acting on economic 
circumstances. As newly produced capital equipment embodies total 
consumption and total satisfaction, though they may be spread over a 
number of year,, it should be counted as a part of the current national 
dividend. 
The next problem taken up by Pigou is the measurement of changes 
in the size of national dividend as an index of changes in economic 
welfare. First of all, it is postulated that the size of the group 
whose welfare is under study is constant. ·Measurement of national 
dividend by means of a physical reference is impossible when the pro-
duction of some goods is increasing and of some decreasing. We must 
have recourse to money which serves as a common denominator. Provided 
tastes of and distribution of purchasing power among consumers do not 
change, dividend in period II is greater than in period I if the 
aonetary demand for items added to the dividend of the second period 
exceeds the same for items subtracted from the dividend of the first 
period. When tastes and distribution of purchasing power change, a 
situation which is closer to reality, the welfare propositiona stated 
above is valid only in a relative context: it can be formulated in 
terms of either period I or period II taste and distribution of pur-
chasing power. Pigou's third approximation to economic welfare may 
then, be stated as follows: 
"From the point of view of period I, an increase in 
the size of the dividend is a change in its content such 
that if tastes in period II were the same as those pre-
' vailing in period I and if the distribution of purchasing 
26. 
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group would be willing to give more money to conserve 
the items added in period II than they would be willing 
to give to conserve the items that are taken away in 
period II ••••••• From the point of view of period II an 
increase in the dividend is defined in exactly analogous 
ways, From an absolute point of view an increase in the 
size of the dividend is a change which constitutes an 
increase from both the above two points of view. When, 
of two dividends, one is larger from point of view.of one 
period and the other from that of the other, the two are, 
frol!l an absolute point of view, incommensurable, nl2 
Reality does not allow *hat theory demands, Aggregate money 
demand for the things contained in the dividend of any period is an 
unworkable conception, It isvolves the addition of consumers' 
surpluses derived from each commodity. But only quantiiies and 
prices of various sorts of commodities are available in practice. 
Again, those quantities and prices correspond to the tastes and 
distribution of purchasing power of the different periods under 
consideration and we have no means of knowing what price st!'11cture 
would have been obtained if tastes and distribution were constant, 
Hence, the utmost we can hope for is a measure which will be independent 
of the actual taste and distribution of purchasing power during the 
periods under review, but which will be valid provided they are 
constant, 
Let Cl and c2 represent the national dividend (in PhYSical sense 
and not in monetary sense) and 11 and I 2 money income in period 
period II respectively. Let ~ and ~ stand for amounts and pl 
I and 
and 
'P~ for prices, the subscript i (i•l,2,J,,,,,,n) denoting n commodities 
and subscripts 1 and 2 referring to period I and period II respectively, 
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Then, if purchases were arranged in both 
the periods in the form C1 represented by c11 and o12
• where the second 
subscript refer to periods, we have, 
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_bl pl 
(.a/ i i 
"'...1 2 }:.~>j, pi 
,., 
and if purchases were arranged in both periods in the form c2 denoted 
-·--
n. 2 2 I~ pi 
~'I 
The following conclusions m~ be drawn: 
(1) If both 0~2 (:011 (1 and c22 I 021 7 1, an increase in national 
dividend and hence economic welfare is indicated, 
(2) If both ~2 1 ~l <. 1 and c22 I 021 "- 1, a decrease in national 
devidend and economic welfare is indicated, 
(3) If 01 2 I o11 7 1 and o22 I 021 ~ 1, or vice-versa, increase or 
decrease in national dividend is true only in a relative sense, and 
no conclusion can be made in absolute terms, 
In the two algebraic expressions written above, Il• L~ p~ and 
'2 2 I 2 • t. Xi pi so tlmt they can as well be written in the form 
012 I On = I 2 I L,xi Pt 
022 I 021 • rxf PI I Il' and 
In actual practice, quantities and prices of all eommodities produced 
during different periods are not available and hance the measurement 
of changes in national dividend as suggested by the second form is 
Zl), 
i~ssi!J~e •. ·The expression LXI P} I ~~i PL1m~2E Pi I l.xi p2 as i 
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obtained from the first form can, on the one hand, be approEimated 
through the construction of indeK number based upon a representative 
sample of quantities and prices. 
(V) 
We m~ review, at this stage, some of the important ideas involved. 
in Pigou' s concept of welfare, His maitl generalizations, as set forth 
above, can conveniently be summarized as follows: 
(1) Economics js a science of welfare; in other words, the main motive 
of economic study is to help social improvement, 
(2) Change in economic welfare will probably indicate change in the 
same direction of welfare as a whole, 
(3) Price ratios which measure the ratio between intensities of desire 
can be regarded as a rough approximation to the ratio between satisfac-
tions yielded by different commodities. 
(4)·Change in national dividend. as defined, serves the purpose of an 
index of change in economic welfare, 
It seems there are two trends of thought in Pigou's definition of 
economics as a.sciende of welfare, In one sense, it is concerned with 
generalizations about and as such an explanation of economic behavior 
that we experience. This is precisely what Pigou means when he compares 
economics to the other experimental sciences, He discusses the limita-
tions in generalising about economic behavior. First, "the relations 
which have to be determined are extremely numerous.n13 Whereas in 
29. 
13, IBID, p. l:l. 
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physics or chemistry a few laws cover a significant range of their 
respective fields, the numb~r of laws is too many in economics. Secondly, 
experimental method is not feasible in economics, simply because its 
subject matter is living and free men, Thirdly, time is an important 
factor in economic behavior in so far as the constants undergo change 
through time. On the other hand, the laws of physics or chemistry are 
<i not influenced by time, The whole trend of this discussion suggests 
!i 
'I 
·, that economics is supposed to perform, though imperfectly (in so far 
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' as its laws cannot be put in strictly precise quantitative form) the 
task which experimental sciences perform, 
The other sense which is more releYant to his welfare ideas is 
evident when Pigou considers the study of economics as leading to social 
improvements, To serve this purpose, more than an explanaiion of pre-
vailing economic behavior seems to be necessary, Unacceptance of some 
• 
of the human motivations from the standpoint of welfare and substitu-
tion of some meaningful goals in their place and their impaet on other 
variables of the economic system become the subject matter of study. 
Pigou 1 s emphasis on the importance of ends is clear when he sey-so 
,! 'It is not wonder, but rather 'the social enthusiasm "hich 
fi revolts from the soonlu.- of mean streets and joylessness of 
:! withered leaves, that is the beginning of economic science. nl4 
li 
,1 The economist here emerges in the role of a reformer, 
In what sense, if BDW• can economies be regarded as a science 
of welfare? "Economics," according to Lionel Robbins. 11 is concerned 
with that aspect of behaviour which arises from the scarcity of means 
OP,_CIT,!_P• _5. 
jU, 
to given ends; that in so far as the achievement of any end is dependen~ 
LS 
on scarce means, it is germane to the preoccupations of the economist.•: 
As regards the question whether economists should pronounce upon the 
validity of ends, Robbins observes, 
"It does not seem logically possible to associate the two 
studies in any form but mere juxtaposition. Economics deals 
with ascertainable facts, ethics with valuations and obligations~ 
The two fields of enquiry are~tnthe same plane of discourse.nl 
Robbins is perfectly valid in distinguishing between positive 
economics and welfare economics on the ground that "There is no logical 
1'1 
connection between the two types of generalizations." Pigou seems 
to have inherited from his predecessors the notion of economics as a 
science of welfare. In so far as we restrict under the term welfare 
particular value judgments about which no generalizations can be made 
in the scientific sense, we necessarily narrow the field of economies. 
Evidently, different systems.can be built up on the basis of different 
value judgments and both comes under the :Purview of economics. Again 
many of the ends and human motivations may not have any usually 
accepted welfare connotations, but that does not preclude them from 
their being considered in an economic study so long as the essential 
criterion of scarce means is satisfied. 
Economics, then, is not a science of welfare unless the term 
welfare covers the whole universe of ends. This, however, does not 
15. Robbins, L., AN ESS.AI OF THE NATURE AND SIGNICANCE OF ECONOMIC 
SCIENCE, p. 124. 
16. IBID., p. 141:!. 
17. IBID. 
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imply that welfare economics is unatientific; it is normative and is, 
therefore, a branch of ethics. This idea is based on an extremely 
narrow view of the nature of science, 
"lt is a legitimate exercise of economic analysis to 
examine the consequences of various value judgments, whether 
or not they are shared by the theorist, just as the study 
of comparativeethics is itself like any other branch of 
anthropology ••••• It is only fair to point out, however, that 
the theorem enunciated under the heading of welfare economics 
are no~ meaningful propositions or hypothesis in the technical 
sense. For they represent the deductive implications of 
asm1mptions whifh are not themselves meaningful hypotheses 
about reality.• 8 
Welfare was intimately associated with positive economics in the 
minds of classicists. Much of modern welfare economics •merely makes 
explicit the criteria which were implicit in the works of classical 
economists ••••• 
!n making these criteria explicit, many vulgar and 
dogmatic prejud.ces, masquerading as the truths of economies 
have been exposed; and the consequent re-analysis have 
placed the findings of the science on a much sounder basis. 
Old dogmas of economic policy, presumably true fDD all times 
and places, have been shown tobe valid only under certain 
ctrcumstances.•l9 
Pigou 1 s discussion of the relationship between total welfare 
and economic welfare leaves a considerable room for doubt and contro-
versyl Evidently no scientific generalization claiming universal 
acceptance can be made and the universe of discourse hare is not 
strictlyapeaking economics, but largely ethics. Pigou admits the 
18, Samuelson, P. A,, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, Cambridge, 
p. 221. 
19. Reder, M., STUDIES IN WELFARE ECONOMICS, New York, Columbia 
University Press, p. 13. 
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dogmatic nature of his fundamental propositions about welfare and they 
can be regarded as BO more than convenient working hypothesis, the 
validity of which cannot be tested by scientific methods. Similar comments 
are applicable to Pigou' s analysis of desires and satisfactions. The 
field of discussion allows a good deal of difference ofopinion. The 
concepts of desires and satisfactions are somewhat vague, not amenable 
to quantitative study and the use of trcose terms as categories having 
a scientific connotation is highly dubious. Of course, an economist 
is perfectly free to express his own views on welfare and subjective 
satisfaction. Any scientific enquirer, however, should take account of 
the fact that when he proceeds from certain assumptions which cannot 
be proved to be true, he must make allowance for other assumptions and 
his system cannot be claimed to have an absolute validity. Pigou 
observes that there might be cases of divergence between desires and 
satisfactions but on the whole there is a good deal of correspondence. 
But this is only a compromise proceeding from an individualistic bias. 
One inclined towards soctalism and using the same categories of desires: 
and satisfactions m~ hold just the opposite view, namely, that in a 
large sector of free econOMT• desires and satisfactions are antithetical 
and state should intervene to bring about a correspondence between the 
two. Thus when Pigou generalises about the relation between desires 
and satisfactions, he does not really supply any meaningful proposition. 
which can be tested for its validity. Where subjective valuation 
creeps in, it creates field for disagreement of a kind which does not 
hold for a scientific proposition. 
4-----
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Pigou 1 s view about maldistribution of resources as a result of 
our defective telescopic faculty is not based on sound reasoning. We 
can compare present satisfaction only with the present estimate of 
future satisfaction. To say that satisfaction derived from a 
particular good is the same in the future as in the present is to 
assert that satisfaction is something which pertains to the thing 
itself. A priori, this seems to be an illogical approach, as 
satisfaction can be defined only when the subject is considered together 
with the object. 
In spite of his attempt at a subjective interpretation of welfare 
economics. Pigou's bias in favor of a physical level of analysis is 
evident. While he has been careful enough in stating the relation 
between genaral welfare and economic welfare, desires and satisfactions, 
his subse~ent analysis reveals a lack of awareness about the subjee-
tive import of national dividend. Several reasons may be adduced in 
support of this view: 
First, in his conception of national dividend, "all contractions in the 
money value of any parts of the capital stock that remain physically 
unaltered are irrelevant,• and "their occurrence is perfectly compatibl41 
20 
with the maintenance of capital intact.• When we deal with welfare 
in the subjective sense (rather than regarding it as proportional to 
the quantity of physical goods) the value of the capital should be 
derived from the expected value of inoome it will yield; the concept 
of capital intact merely by making good the physical wear and tear of 
:34. 
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Secondly, physical bias is introduced in using the classical net 
product definition of national dividend as an index of economic 
welfare. 21 It seems that Professor Fisher's definition of national 
dividend which includes only cur·c·ent consumption has more relevance 
as a measure of economic welfare. "It is only consumption which 
contributes directly to current welfare--the contribution made by 
22 
saving is at least of doubtful comparability.• Hicks has shown that 
the national dividend as a measure of productivity is a different 
thing from the national dividend as a measure of the subjective 
economic welfare, except under perfect competition where prices are 
equal to marginal costs. In the evaluation of economic welfare, prices • 
are used as the indices of marginal utilities, while in the calculation 
of productivity, they are used as the indices of marginal costs. So 
far as the measurement of productivity is concerned, consumption and 
investment goods are all on a par. Thus, Pigou's national dividend 
is an approximation of national productivity rather than economic 
w~lfare. Another important point may be noted in this connection. 
Pigou includes customs and excise duties in the calculation of 
I 
national dividend, but he does not seem to have recognised that this 
procedure has a particular significance in the context of welfare. 
National income at market prices which is anindex of economic welfare 
(to be precise, investment will have to be excluded) includes indirect 
21. It should be noted, however, in all fairness to Pigou that practical 
considerations are heavily weighted in favor of his decision to 
include capital goods under national dividend. Most of the 
economists agree on this point on strong grounds connected with the 
problem of statistical measurement of national dividend. 
22. Hicks, J.R., THE VALUATION OF SOCIAL INCOME, Economica. 1940 
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taxes and excludes subsidies. Reverse is the case with national income 
at factor cost which is a measure of productivity and,,therefore, 
includes those factors which enter into marginal cost. 
'i il Finally, ProUssor Pigou 1 s remarks about individual's irrational 
:I 
II ..  premium on present satisfactions and discount of future satisfactions 
i! 
,1 are, as we have noted above, indefensible except against the background 
!I 
![ of a physical level of analysis. 
r 
While there is a substratum of classical physical level of analysis 
in Pigou's treatment of economic welfare, this should not be 
exaggerated. Pigou is impelled by the very nature of the subject to 
lay strees on the practical bearing of his conclusions rather than on 
their logical foundations. The obje.ctive measurement of subjective 
welfare is impossible in the first place, and the question is really 
one of approximation anyway. Pigou makes this explicit in course of 
his discussion on national dividend. According to his line of 
reasoning, the IIIUPI>~iML of economic welfare in a given period involve$ 
definite relationships not only between consumption good but also 
between consumption goods on the one hand and investment goods on the 
other, produced in that period. On the basis of such an approach, 
income can be defined to include present values of future goods and 
service& (incomes) just as these "intermediate" goods can be excluded 
·I 
:I on other grounds. 
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CHAPTER !!l 
PIGOU'S WELFARE P.ROPOSI~IONS 
(I) 
In this chapter Pigou' s welfare propositions will be presented 
and in the next chapter some of the important problems raised by 
Pigou' s analyllts of ideal output will be elaborated and examined. 
Pigou offers two basic propositions on the maximiaation of 
economic welfare. First, value of the marginal social net products 
of resources must be equal in all uses. Secondly, income must be 
eqmally distributed among the members of the community whose welfare 
is under consideration. These propositions are not, however, without 
limitations. There are practical considerations which act as 
constraints on the general propositions. 
The discussion of welfare propositions is based on the 
assumption of fUll employment of resources. The concepts Pigou uses 
for his formulation of principles of welfare are basically two, the 
value of marginal private and the value of marginal social net 
product. When he deals with industries specifically, he defines 
three additional categories--equilibrium firm, supply price from the 
standpoint of the community and supply price from the standpoint of 
the industry. To begin with, it is convenient to explain the meaning 
,of these basic concepts. 
(1) Marginal private and marginal social net products: Marginal 
private net product is defined as the addition to marginal increment 
of resources in ~ given use or place, accruing to the person res-
--- ==""' 
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ponsible for the inve.stment of resources, Marginal social net product, 
on the other hand, is the aggregate net product from a marginal 
increment of resources. •no matter to whom any part of this product 
1 
may accrue." 
1t is important to note in this connection what Pigou precisely 
means by the marginal increment of resources, It does not refer to the 
difference between the products of two adjacent qnantities of resources, 
"The marginal net product of any flow of resources 
employed in any use or place is equal to the difference 
between the aggregate flow of product for which that flow 
of resources. when appropriately organised is responsible 
and the aggregate flow of product for which a flow of 
resources differing from that flow by a small increment, 
when appropriately organised would be responsible,n2 
The marginal unit, again, is not any particular unit; it is any (small); 
unit out of the aggregate of units• all exactly alike conceived as 
placed at the margin, 
(2) Supply price from the standpoint of the industry and supply price 
from the standpoint of the community: Supply price from the standpoint 
of the industry or supply price simpliciter, as Pigou calls it, is a 
function of technology and price of the factors used in production. 
Supply price from the standpoint_ of the community, on the other hand, 
is a function of technology only. Supply price from the standpoint 
of the community should reveal only the technical obstacles confronted ·: 
during production; change in factor prices is excluded on the ground 
that it constitutes only a transfer of income, Thus ii there is an 
;i increase in factor prices, supply price from the standpoint of the 
il 
jJ industry will rise whereas supply price from the standpoint of the 
)0, 
~~ 1, Pigou, A, C,, ECONOMICS OF WELF.ARE, 4th Ed,, London, 1932, p, 134~. 
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community will remain constant because "from the point of view of 
community as a whole, no extra expense per unit of output is incurred.") 
{3) Equilibrium firm: The definition of equilibrium firm is based on 
the biological notiGn of natural expansion, contraction, birth and dec~ 
of firms. Pigou accepts Marshall's conception that firas are like 
trees in a forest, When demand. and supply conditions are constant, 
industry will be in e~ilibrium in the sense that output produced by 
the industry as a whole will remain constant. But that does not imply 
that the firms themselves will be in equilibrium. Some of the firms 
may be expanding, some contracting but these tendencies to expand 
and to contract cancel one another so that output of the industry as a 
whole does not undergo any change. How to analyse the equilibrium of 
the industry in terms of the equilibrium of the individual firm when 
the,latter may be under the impaat of dynamic changes? Pigou finds a 
wq out of this tangle by means of his analytical concept of equilibrium 
firm. He observes that when the output of an industry as a whole is 
adjusted to the state of demand, expansion and contraction of firms 
are offsetting and under these circumstances, the notiGn of equilibrium 
firm is justifiable. 
"It implies that there can ezist some one firm, 
which, whenever the industry as a whole is in equilibrium, 
in the sense that it is producing a regular output y in 
response to a normal supply price p, will itself also 
individually be in equilibrium with a regular output. 
The conditions of the industry. are compatible with the 
existence of such a firm: and the implications about these 
conditions, which, whether it in fact exist4 or not, would 
hold good, if it did exist, must be valid.• 
II 
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Now that the necessary concepts have been defined, we can proceed 
to an analysis of Pigou's basic welfare propositions. National 
difidend and hence, economic welfare is maximised when the value of 
marginal social net product of resources is equal in all uses, pro-
vided there are no costs of movement. The validity of this proposition 
rests on the assumption of the principle of diminishing returns. When 
there is a divergence in the values of marginal social net product of 
any factor unit in any two uses, national dividend will rise if there 
is a transference of the factor from the use where its marginal product 
is lower to one where it is higher. Determinate equilibrium will ensue 
as a result of increased application ofany factor to those uses where 
its marginal product is high and its withdrf4wal from those uses where 
its marginal product is low. This will tend to narrow the gap between 
marginal product of the factor in different uses and in equilibrium 
the value of marginal social net products will be equalised throughout 
the economy. leaving no scope for further improvement. 
That equalis~tion of marginal social net product of resources in 
all uses will maximise welfare is an allocational proposition, relative 
to a particular distribution of purchasing power or income. Pigou 
deals with the bearing of income distribution on economic welfare and 
comes to the conclusion that so long as the national dividend does not 
aecrease, any increase within wide limits inthe real income of the 
poorer classes at the expense of an equal decrease in that enjoyed by 
the richer classes is practically certain to involve an addition to 
LKJ. 
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economic welfare. This proposition rigidly interpreted would imply 
the assumption that the marginal utility of money to different 
individuals is the same. Though Pigou does not explicitly state this 
assumption, he arrives at the same implicitly, reasoning on the Qasis 
of practical considerations. It is evident, he says, thatany transfer 
of. income from a relatively rich man to a relatively poor man of similar!, 
temperament will enable more intense wants to be satisfied at the 
expense of less intense wants and aost increase the aggregate gam of 
satisfaction. It might be said that a rich man, from the nature of 
his upbringing and training is capable of obtaining considerable more 
satisfaction from a given income than a poor man would be. Pigou 
observes that in the long run, differBnces of temperament and taste 
between rich and poor are overcome by the vary fact of transference of 
L I! income. He also consid.ers the bearing of interdependence of marginal 
' 
,· 
: 
I! 
j 
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utility of income on his distributional proposition. A large proportion:; 
of the satisfaction yielded by the incomes of the rich people comes 
from their relative father than from their absolute amount. If the 
incomes of all rich people are diminished together, the part of satis-
faction which depends on others income will not suffer any appreciable 
. 
dilllWlUtion to offset increased ,satisfaction of the p•o.o.&r group. 
(J.II) 
Thus, according to Pigou there are two fundamental welfare 
maximising propositions--one relating to allocation of resources and 
,, 
the other relating to distribution of income. The next problem that is 11 
raised concerns how far the activities of industries in a competit,ive 
il 
., 
i 
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econo~ conform to the principles of maximisation of welfare. This can 
I 
li be analysed in three parts: 
1: ll) Simple conpetition and welfare; 
l2) Simple monopoly and welfare; and 
lJ) Discriminating monopoly and welfare. 
We shall deal in this section with simple competition and welfare. 
The allocational proposition, we have seen, can be broken up into 
two distinct issues, first, the equalisation of marginal private net 
products of resources in different uses and second, the equalisation 
of marginal private net product and marginal social net product of 
resources in each of their uses. In a competitive econo~, self interes~ 
is a sufficient motive to bring about the equality in the values of 
marginal private net products. There is no necessity, however. in the 
nature of a competitive econo~ that marginal' private net product and 
marginal social net product will .be equ.al. whene'ter there is a 
divergence between these two sorts of marginal products, welfare is not 
That marginal private net products are equalised as a result of 
competitive forces, is subject to qu.alifications. There are many 
hindrances standing in the wey of supposed equality, which Pigou C.eals 
with at length. A potent obstacle to free movement of resources and 
hence to equality of marginal private net products comprises costs of 
movement and imperfection of knowledge. ln so far as these factors are 
controllable, welfare can be increased by ensuring approximation to 
equality between marginal net products. lmperfect knowledge results 
partly from the character of ~tiness accounts and partly from the 
p 
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general organisation of business finance, Rates of return obtainable 
on capital invested are not often made public by business firas, Again,, 
since the rates of return are in many cases spread over a considerable 
period, •even correct knowledge of the immediate past gives but 
imperfect guidance,n5 Seconnly, the tendency toward equality between 
marginal private net products is inhibited by imperfect divilibility 
of the units in terms of which transactions are conducted, In modern 
times the size of the unit in which transactions in respect of capital 
take place has been diminished in atwofold manner, partly with the help 
of stock exchange and partly by arrangements which the great growth of 
securities adapted to serve as collateral has facilitated, The device 
of dividing shares into several grades and the holding of them in their 
riskiest early S€e by financiers, who afterwards pass them on, work in 
the same direction, Pigou concludes that in general, in present 
conditions, imperfect divisibility in the units of transactions has 
but little effect. Finally, it may be noted that hindrances to equalit~· 
of returns also ensue as a result of relative variations in the demand ,: 
for productive resources in differant occupations and places. 
Let us now pass on to the more important part of the deviation 
from optimum, the divergence betl<een rnE.:rginal private and marginal 
social net products, The source of this divergence lies in the fact 
that in some occupations under conditions of simple competition. •a 
part of the product of a unit of resources consists of something, which,;! 
instead of coming in the first instance to the person who invests the 
4:3. 
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unit, comes instead in the first instance (i.e. prior to sale, if sale 
6 takes place) as a positive or negative item, to other people,• Pigou 
classifies these other people in three principal groups: 
(l) the owner of durable instruments of production; 
(2) persons who are not producers of the commodity in which the 
investor is investing; and 
(3) persons who are producers of this commodity. 
The separation between tenancy and ownership of certain durable 
instruments of production often leads to, depending on the terms of 
contract between lessor and lessee, to divergences between marginal 
private and marginal social net products. Thus prin.te net product 
of an assigned unit of investment will fall short of its social net 
product. if the tenant of durable goods had to return it to its owner 
at the end of the period of lease without reaping the full benefit of 
improvements made by him in the instrument. Similar case of divergsnce '' 
occurs when the plant of a concessionaire company passes ultimately 
without compensation into the hanas of the town chartering it. 
The essence of the second type of divergence is that transactions 
•: between a pair of persons affect third parties in the form of incident~' 
ii 
i services and disservices which are not generally neutralized by any I i! 
!! acheme of compensation, Numerous eltllll!ples may be cited. The benefits 
of a well-placed light house enjoyed by ships on which no toll can be 
levied, resources invested in private parks in cities, resources 
I 
devoted to afforestation, to the prevention of mabke from factory 
~· 6, l.BID., ..Po.l'/4. 
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chimneys, to the fundamental problems of scientific research done are 
some of the cases where marginal social net product of resources inveate~ 
is higher than their marginal private net product. On the other hand, 
building of a factory in a residential quarter destroying a great part 
of the amenities of the neighboring sites, resources devoted to the 
production and sale of intoxicants, work done by women in factories, 
particularly during the periods preceding and succeding confinement 
are a few illustrations of marginal, social net product falling short 
I' 
,, of marginal private net product. 
The third case of divergence concerns persons producing the 
same commodity and is closely associated with the nature of supply 
curves of the industries under consi4eration. As an expositional device~ 
Pigou introduces the concept of an archt.typal industry 'in which the 
values of the marginal private and marginal social net products of 
investment are both equal to one another and also stand at a sort of 
central level representative of industries in general. As a result 
of the competitive process value of the marginal net product of 
resources in all industries will tend to conform to the central value. 
Therefore, there will be a deviation from maximum welfare when there 
is a divergence between the value of the marginal social net product 
and that of .the marginal private net product of investment in any 
.industry. In the archetypal induf!try, both marginal private net 
product and marginal social net product are equal and since marginal 
private net product of resources in all industries equals marginal 
private net product in the archetypal industry, maximisation of 
'l!'elfare ip.volves th_e equality_ of _m~gin~ private net product and 
45. 
marginal social net product in each individual industry. 
welfare implications of equilibrium of industries under simple 
competition require a twofold analysis--the relation between the two 
types of supply curves {supply price simpliciter and supply price 
from the standpoint of the community) on the one hand and that between 
wupply price and marginal social net product on the other. What is · 
important on welfare grounds is supply price from the standpoint of 
the community. 
;: 
' Pigou analyses three possible types of supply price of an industry:: 
(~ constant supply price, (b) increasing supply price and (c) deaeeasing 
' i, 
supply price. It can be shown that in general, the rate of change from i, 
i 
the standpoint of the industry inthe supply price, as output increase$ 
is greater than or equal to the rate of change from the standpoint of 
the community in the supply price. lienee constant supply price 
simpliciter implies either a constant or falling supply price from 
the standpoint of the community. Decreasing supply price simpliciter 
also reflects decreasing supply price from the standpoint of the 
community. But increasing supply price simpliciter does not imply 
increasing supply price from the standpoint of the community. When 
the scale of an industry increases leading to imp~ovements in 
technique and organisation, both supply price simpliciter and supply 
price from the standpoint of the community are lowered. Increasing 
supply price from the standpoint of the industry is generally the 
result of a rise of a factor prices (Pigou considers external diseconotni:es 
to be highly unlikely) induced by an increase in the seale of output. 
d 
This does not involve ~ c~!Li!;L~l.y price from the standpoi_n_~ of~-.-
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the community. "In general,• Pigou observes, •an industry whose pur-
chases embrace only factors of production, cannot conform to the law of 
increasing supply price from the standpoint of the collllllU.l).ity. n7 An 
exception to this general case is provided by the increase in prices 
of imported articles used by home industries. Since there is no offset 
against this price by ~ of transfer within the country, increasing 
supply price from the standpoint of the industry also brings about an 
increase in the supply price from the standpoint of the community. 
; ~ 
i 
Pigou translates supply price of the industry into marginal private: 
and marginal social net products on the as~tion that small changes 
in output of a given industry do not involve variations in the prices 
i of any factor of production so that change in supply price is the invers~ 
ii 
of change in marginal net product. It has been observed before that 
Pigou analyses the e~ilibrium of industry in terms of the concept of 
equilibrium firm. 'fhe supply price of an industry is equal to both 
marginal and average costs of the equilibrium firm. The. marginal privet~ 
net product. of the e~ilibrium firm is e~al to its average net product 
per unit cost and is thus the reciprocal of the supply price for the 
product. The marginal social product, on the other hand, is the 
reciprocal of the marginal supply price of the product to the industry. 
From this we come to the important proposition that the difference 
between the marginal private and marginal social net product of invest-
ment in ~ industry varies inversely as the difference between supply 
price and marginal supply price to the industry. 
'l. IBID., p •. 220. j' 
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Now that we have stated the relationship between supply price 
simpliciter and supply price from the standpoint of the community and 
that between supply price and marginal net products, we can proceed 
to a discussion of the welfare implications of equilibrium of an 
industry. The equilibrium of an industry is given by the equation of ita 
supply price with the demand price for its product, When supply 
price simpliciter is identical with supply price from the standpoint 
of the community (i.e., when there are no variation~in factor prices) 
the value of marginal private net product of any unit of investment 
is greater than, equal to or less than the value of marginal social net 
product, according as the industry conforms to conditions of increasing~, 
constant, or decreasing supply price from the standpoint of the 
industry. When there are changes in factor price, what can we say 
abo~t the divergence between marginal private and marginal social net 
products simply by looking at the supply price simpliciter? We have 
already outlined the framework for such an approach. Since in general, 
increase in the scale of output of a commodity is not likely to lea4 
to a fall in factor price, decreasing supply price simpliciter will 
reflect in all probability improved technology and organisation and 
will thus indicate decreasing supply price from the standpoint of the 
community. On the other hand, when supply price of an industry is 
risi~, this is probably due to a rise in factor prices and therefore 
supply price from the standpOint of the community need not be 
i 
1, increasing. 
I. 
j: Several important conclusions mq now be drawn: 
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supply price will be lower than supply price and marginal social net 
product of resources invested there will, then, be greater than their 
marginal private net product. 
(2) At the point of equilibrium of an increasing cost industry, marginal 
supply price will be higher than the supply price from the standpoint 
of the industry, but not necessarily from the standpoint of the communi~. 
Therefore, conditions of increasing supply price do not imply that 
marginal private net product of investment in the industry exceeds 
marginal social net product; on the contrary, we ~ have the reverse 
case. 
(3) At the point of equilibrium of a constant cost industry marginal 
supply price and supply price are e~al and provided supply price 
simpliciter and supply price from the standpoint of the community are 
the same, marginal social and marginal private net products will be 
equal. 
Now propositions concerning simple competition and welfare can be , 
stated. Maximum welfare involves the production by all industries of 
a quantity of output at which marginal private and marginal social net 
product of investment are equal. These welfare mc:imising output and 
investment are termed ideal output and ideal investment respectively 
by Pigou. Under conditions of decreasing supply price, actual output 
is short of ideal output and maximisation of welfare implies an output 
exceeding that which is warranted by the free competitive process. 
Under conditions of increasing supply price, actual output may be more 
than, e~al to, or less than ideal output with corresponding welfare 
,, 
COllnl>tations. Under conditions of constant supply price, actual ~tpu\~-
i 
I 
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will probably be equal to ideal output and welfare will be at a 
maximum. 
(IV) 
welfare implications of monopoly and discriminating monopoly 
are analysed by wey of comparing them with simple competition. Pigou 
does not discuss the formal properties of monopoly itself and how they 
stand with respect to hie basic welfare propoSition. Hie monopoly is 
an exception to a system of simple competition. The deviation of 
monopoly output from ideal output is deduced by tracing the deviation 
of monopoly output from competitive output. For an effective comparison 
between monopoly and simple competition, the assumption is made that 
the economies and technique of production are the same under both. 
Pigou does not express explicitly the condition of monopoly 
' 
equilibrium. "When simple monopoly prevails,• he seys, "it is to the 
interest of the monopolist so to regulate his output as to make tae 
excess of his aggregate receipts over his aggregate costs (including 
earnings of management and so forth) as large as possible.•8 It 
follows from the properties of competitive equilibrium and monopoly 
equilibrium that monopoly output Will alweys be less than competitive 
l output. Hence, (1) in decreasing supply price industries, monopoly 
i 
u 
j; 
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output will be less than competitive output which is less than ideal 
output. Thus the gap between ideal output and actual output is enhanced 
when monopoly takes the place of simple competition. (2) In industries 1: 
with constant supply price, monopoly output will be less than competi-
8. IBID., P• 2'70. 
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tive output and thus less than ideal output. (3) In industries with 
increasing supply price from the standpoint of the community competitive 
output is more than ideal putput. Monopoly output in this case, since 
it falls short of competitive output, might be closer to ideal output. 
Let us consider now the effect of discriminating monopoly on 
welfare. Non-transferability of commodity or demand leads to succesri'ul', 
discrimination. Pigou distinguishes between three kinds of discriminati~g 
power which a monopolist m~ conceivably wield. 
ta) First degree or perfect discrimination is defined by the exaction 
of the full demand price for each unit by the monopolist, so that no 
consumer's snrplus is left to the buyer. 
(b) The second degreP. discrimination is characterised by the fixation 
of n separate prices of a commodity so that all units with a demand 
price greater than x were sold at a price x, all with a demand price les11 
than x and greater than y at a price y and so on. 
11 (c) The third degree discrimination would mean the classification of 
1: 
customers into different groups demarcated by some practicalbe mark 
and setting up separate monopoly prices for the members of each group. 
Illustrations are provided by doctors charging different fees for their 
rich and poor ,clients, imposition of different freight rates d8pending 
on the nature of article for transport etc. This is the most realistic 
of the three kinds of discrimination. 
Under perfect discrimination, it is always profitable for the 
,, 
II monopolist to produce the ideal output (a11suming that supply price 
li simpliciter and supply price from the standpoint of the community are 
!I 
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equal). At the point of intersection of. demand curve and marginal 
supply curve, monopolist's profits will be maximised. Finally, perfect 
discrimination 11mey bring about a considerable amount of socially 
desirable investment in an industry in which under a regime of simple 
competition, it would not have been to anybody 1 s interest to make any 
investment at all. u9 
When supply price simpli'citer and supply price from the standpoint : 
of the community are not identical, output under perfect discrimination 
will be less than ideal output. Under conditions of decreasing supply 
price, output under discrimination will be nearer to ideal output than 
output under simple coapetition. In industries with incrPasing supply 
price, output under discrimination is less than competitive output. The 
divergence between ideal output on the one hand and output under perfec~l 
discrimination and simple competition on the other will depend on the 
location and shape of the supply curve from the standpoint of the 
community> 
Discriminating monopoly of the second degree approaches perfect 
discrimination as the number of different prices increases. Output in 
this case is less than that under perfect discrimination, and therehre i. 
falls short of ideal output. 
·In case of discriminating monopoly of the third degree, there is 
a significant ~fference in the structure of markets in so far as the 
total demand at a certain price is not satisfied. Here "ideal output 
ceases to be a single output of the whole industry and becomes a number:. 
10 " 
of separate outputs sold in separate markets." Pigou distinguishes 
!)0 IBID. , P• 283 
10. IBID., p. 285 
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between three principal cases of this type of discrimination and 
attempts their evaluation by comparing them first, with conditions 
of simple monopoly and later with competitive conditions. First, if 
'' under simple monopoly the commodity Ulj:jier consideration would be consumed 
II 
I 
' in, say, markets A and B. there is no reason to infer that output under 
discrimination will differ in the upward or downward direction from 
that under monopoly. If demand and supply curves are straight lines, 
output will be the same ~der simple monopoly and discriminating monopoly. 
Secondly, supposing that under simple monopoly, some of the commodity 
would have been consumed in A, but none in B, it is impossible that 
discrimination should lead to diminution of output; on the contrary, 
output will be higher depending on the strength of demand in B. 
Finally, if under monopoly there would be no consumption of the commodity 
in either A or B, discrimination would obviously be an improvement. 
How does discriminatiing monopoly of the third degree stand with 
respect to simple competition? Under sonditions of constant and 
increasing supply price, output under discrimination will be less than 
competitive output. If decreasing supply price prevails, Pigou observe!~, 
monopoly plus discrimination of the third degree may raise output above 
the competitive amount andis more likely to do this the more numerou8 
are the markets between which discrimination can be made. 
The following eonclusions may be drawn regarding the extent to 
' 
which output under discriminating monopoly of the third degree approxim~tes 
ideal output. Generally speaking, the divergence between ideal output 
and output under this type of discrimination is likely to be less than 
that between id,eal output ;9.nd moM~C!ly output; but as comperf!d to ,. I' 
·' 
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competitive output. output under discrimination is not likely to be 
nearer to ideal output. When the conditions are such that there is 
an ideal output (other than a zero output), simple competitiOn yields 
no output and discriminating monopoly of the third degree yields some 
output, this output must be nearer to ideal output than no output under 
simple conpetition. Pigou makes an additional observation. Even when 
output under d.iscriminating monopoly conforms more nearly to ideal 
output, it does not follow that it will involve greater equality between 
the values of marginal social net products over industry as a whole. 
(V) 
The nature of the divergences between marginal private net 
products due to various hindrances and between private and social net 
products has been considered above. In this section, Pigou's 
recommendations about economic policy to enhance welfare will be taken 
up. This can be analysed in two parts; first measures geared to 
mitigate the effect of hindrances to equality of marginal private net 
products and secondly, measures prescribed to narrow the gap between 
marginal private and marginal social net products. 
Before proceeding with the discussion·of policies d.esigned to 
increase economic welfare, a few words in explanation of the theoretical 
issue involved, will be found helpful. The allocational proposition 
implies the equalisation of marginal social net products ot resources 
in different uses; it does not, in any way, directly relate to private 
net products. Optimum allocation does not require the identity of 
,; 
- :pzoivate a.nd aocial net Jll'Oducta. 
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the two types of net produets in alternative uses of resources is the 
same, the optimum allocation exists and no interference is called for. 
Pigou's policy recommendations, however, are based on the tacit 
assumption that in the main body of industries, the values of marginal 
private and marginal social net products are eq1.1al and therefore the 
equalisation of marginal private and marginal social net products serve!f 
as criterion of politcy, for the equality of social net products follows 
automatically, 
The important factors hin~eriBg equality of marginal private net 
products are costs of movement, imperfect knowledge, and imperfect 
dividibility of units. It may be expected that reduction of costs of 
movement will narrow. the gap between marginal returns and thus enhance 
economic welfare. But this statement is subject lD qualifications. 
So long as knowledge is imperfect, shifting of resources in response 
to reduction of costs of movement is not necessar~ly a movement toward 
the optimum, On theother hand, reduction inthe obstacles set up by 
ignorance affected without expense will always increase the national 
dividend, though it will not always do it by promoting equality among 
the values of marginal net products. It should be noted in this 
connection that reduction of obstacles to the movement of resources may 
sometimes modify the quantity of resources used and consequently 
11 national dividend, Ptgou considers it to be highly unlikely that a 
reductionin obstacles to movement will lead to a decrease in national 
dividend, Regarding the elimination of obstacles presented by imperfect 
11, IBID., p. 145 
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12 knowledge, Pigou advocates improvement in the matter of business 
publicity in which there is a lot of scope. He also believes that 
groWing specialisation in the field of investment, demarcation of the 
field between moneyed people among the public on the one hand and 
professional financiers, company promoters, businessman, etc, on the 
other, has been a step in the right direction so far as improvement of 
knowledge is concerned, Pigou1:3 suggests that banks can help directing·. 
resources into productive channels, by acting not only as promoting 
agents but also as an investigating body as the Raiffeisen banks in 
Germany. No specific suggestion is offered about mitigating hindrances 
14 due to imperfect of divisibility of units. Pigou does not consider 
it as important under present conditions and facilities offered by the 
development of stock exchange. 
For the equalisation of marginal private and marginal social net 
products a judicious employment of taxes and bounties is recommended. 
Divergences due to imperfect tenancy laws can be mitigated by a 
modification of the contractual relation between the parties involved, 
Divergences arising as a result of third party services or disservices 
may be sought to be remedied by a syst~m of taxes and bounties, Some 
illustrations are provided by the beneficial effects to be expected 
from taxes on the sale of alcoholic drinks, levy of petrol duty on 
motor car licence tax upon the users of motor .cars, the proceells of 
which are devoted to the services of the roads etc. Pigou believes 
that apart from fiscal measures, direct govennmental action may 
:l.l.. IBJl)., :P· ~j"o. 
1:3. !:BID., p. 1.55. 
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sometimes be iesirable. It is necessary 
•that an authority of wider reach sho"ld tackle the 
collective problems of beauty, of air and of light, as 
those other collective problems of gas and water have 
been tackled. nl5 
A system of taxes and bounties is also recommedned to mitigate 
divergences due to varying slopes of supply curves. The excess or 
defect of marginal social product over marginal private product calls 
for bounty or tax to produce the optimum effect. From what has been 
said above, it follows that there is a presumption in favor of state 
bounties to industries with decreasing supply price. Imposition of 
taxes on industries with increasing supply price from the standpotnt 
of the community but not necessarily on industries with increasing 
supply price (simpliciter) follows directly from the theoretical 
considerations set forth above. 
Pigou discusses in this connection the bearing of state regulation', 
of prices on welfare. We have seen that welfare is related through 
satisfactions and desires to demand prices which are conceptually 
different from any prices fixed by law. 11 The value of marginal net 
products of resources, which it is to the interest of the national 
dividend to make equal everywhere, consi~t in the marginal physical net ' 
products multiplied by the demand pr1ces.•16 Artificial reduction of 
,, 
prices in any sector of the economy does not lower the true value of the 
marginal net product and therefore, conditions existing before the 1m-
position of any restriction remains unaltered. Any external limitations. 
lEID., p. 195 
lEID. ,c p. 2J9 . 
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Pigou~ observes, imposed on the price of any article produced under 
1 competitive conditions must injure the notional dividend. In 
circumstences of war, however, there are reasons which justify price 
regulation. The state takes over the task of allocating resources 
in many departments of industry dnring war and since a major portion 
:,, of resourees has to be devoted to the production of war materials, 
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price control becomes inevitable. Regulations within limits, during 
war, Pigo~ concludes, is not injurious to nationS! dividend. 
Distortion of resources is much more under monopoly than under 
simple conpetition. 17 Pigou considers ~~ this connection the efficae,y 
of purchaser's associations and public control of monopoly. The 
essence of a purchaser's association consists in directing its policies 
to m~ximise aggregare purch~sers' benefit minus aggregate costs. This 
will make, if others except the purchasers of the commodity are no• 
affected by its production, the value of the m&xginal social net 
product of resources devoted to it equal to the value of the marginal 
social net product of resources in general. But no inference can be 
hazarded as to the effect on natillllal dividend or economic welfare, until 
the comparative advantages in respect of productive efficiency of 
purchasers' associations and ordinary commercial businesses have been 
ascertained. So far as managment is concerned, purchasers' associations 
are likely to be inferior to private business; initiati:ve for quick 
action and stimulus of personal possession will be lacking. On the 
other hand, purchasers' aesociations have ad~tages in production so 
17. IBID., Parlt II, CllaptEit: c:Jg:X 
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far as they save costs in competitive advertisement. They are 
exceptionally well~fitted to spread knowledge of the best methods of 
production among their members, and have exceptionally small need of 
bargaining and safeguard against fraud, Also loyalty of the mempers 
to co-operative concerns enable them to function steadily without the 
fluctuation to which ordinary business is subject; this advantage is 
likely to hold for purchasers• associations, In spite of these 
advantages, there are various reasons which restrict, to a great 
extant, the role of purchasers• associations. 
Government intervention has been practicable under modern conditio.s 
and the pros and cons of public control of monopoly are discussed by 
18 Pigou. Under modern conditions of monopoly, he observes, fiscal 
devices cease to be effective and more direct intervention of the state. 
becomes necessary. In the first place, the government may aim at 
preventing monopoly power from arising or if existent, at; destroying 
it, where some monopolistic power comes through the development of 
combinations. There are, however, serious objections to this general 
policy of trust prohibition and trust breaking, First, the policy 
is extremely difficult to enforce and combinations m~ emerge under 
different forms. Secondly, among many industrial combinations dissolu-
tion will probably leaa to a monopolistic than to simple competition, 
Thirdly, combinations are not unmixed evils; they yield incidental 
benefits in the form of certain economies of production. On the other 
hand, the introduction of collective responsibility and efficiency by 
.18. IBID, .t Part II., Ch~ter ,lCtL c 
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combinations may lead to relaxed energy and enterprise. Combination is 
likely. on the whole, Pigou concludes. to diminish output of the commo-
dity affected by it and to raise its price, ~ess the associated 
econOmies are so large that, had they been introduced without 
monopolisation they would have raised output to about double its 
former amount, A second line of policy for the state would be to 
prevent the exercise of monopoly power by trusts or cartels by 
conserving potential rather than actual competition. This is worked 
by penalising the clubbing devices of cut-throat competition, or of 
destructive dumping or of boycott. Legislation to prevent clubbing 
devices, even if successful in its immediate object would not serve 
completely to maintain potential competition. More direct methods 
are called for. The policy of encouraging the formation of rival 
combinations against existing trusts or cartels is not likely to be 
effective, The public authority is in a position to restrict the 
anti-social practices of powerful corporations by sufficient 
publicity. 
As many of the remedies dealt with above may prove inadequate, 
direct interference with the terms of sale may be necessary. Fixation 
of competitive price in an increasing cost industry is an i~perfect 
measure; for if the price is to be fised by the state at the level 
proper to competitive conditions, it will pay the monopolist to produce 
less than this output; output will be reduced to the level where 
monopoly gain is a maximum, Under conditions of canstant or decreasing. 
supply price, the monopolist will not find it profitable to reduce 
outpu.t below t)le competitive levf!llcand therefore con_trol .Oller price 
-- --:t 
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will serve its purpose. Control may be either negative--fortiidding 
unreasonable prices or positive--establishing maximum prices, Whatever 
method of regulation is followed, some sort of sanction to make the 
law effective must be proYided, 19 . Pigou examines at length the 
d1ffieult problem of settling the basis in accordance with which the 
reasonableness of prices ahall be determined, and methods designed to 
prevent or limit errors on the part of the price regulating authority, 
which we need not ela])orate here, It is evident tbat Pigou is in favor ; 
of control of monopoly, though he is fully conscious that control is 
necessarily cumbersome and expansive, 
Pigou does not advocate public operation of industries, apart from 
few special exceptions including monopoly, The public operation of 
industries may assume a number of different forms and from the view 
of technical efficiency it need not be inferior to private operation--
narticularly controlled private operation, But there are certain 
dangers in public operation. First, lhe state may resort to unfair 
extra commercial methods at the cost of rival enterprise capable of 
satisfying the same wants more cheaply, Secondly, under public 
operation, initiative for assuming risk and venture for experimentation:: 
are likely to suffer, Thirdly, the establishment of uneconomic units 
of management may Jeopardise efficiency. Apart from these general 
considerations, however, there are some special fields of industries 
in which~e state can profitably operate, and promote the cause of 
welfare; for instance, industries closely associated with the public 
health. There is a case for pgblic operation of industttes with large 
19, IBID,, p, 365 ff, 
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producing units tending tOYards monopoly, 
•The Case for it, as against the case tor public contr~l. 
is strongest in industries which have been reduced more or 
less to routine and in which~here is comparatiwely little 
scope for daring adventure.• 
PigoU observes that even when a heavy price has to be paid to vested 
interests, it may still be for the general good that public authority 
should buy up a private monopoly. in order to stop artificial restriction 
of output. 
21 
Regarding the distributional proposition, Pigou advocates 
gradualness in the transference of income from the rich to the poor, 
There are two reasons. In the first place, an once-for-all transference 
i~ income mS¥ not lead to a sufficient increase in the satisfaction of 
the poorer group to~fset a corresponding decrease in the satisfaction 
of the richer group, ~econdly, distribution of income is related to 
productive efficiency. A sudden large transference is likely to hamper 
business enterprise and thus decrease the national dividend, Pigou 
prefers indirect measures in the form of subsidies to wages, lowering 
of the prices of goods and servides consumed by the poor to direct 
redistribution of income. It is supposed that an indirect distribution· 
of income will be much less harmful in affecting entrepreneurial effi-
ciency. 
(VI) 
Several important conclusions can be derived from the above dis-
cussion of Pigou's welfare propositions, In the first place, instead 
20. IBID., p. 405. 
21. IBID., Part II, Chapter VIII, and Part IV, Chapter VIII, 
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of Marshail' s surplus analysis Pigou uses the marginal apparatus to 
analyse problems of welfare. Both the al.locational and distributional 
projroil1tiOns· tt.re considered incthe~light. of margiilal. analyses. Thus 
economic efficiency in the allocative sense requires the equalisation 
of the value of marginal social. products of resources in different usesl 
Distributive optimum involves the equality of marginal utility of income. 
derived by members of a community. Secondly, Pigou derives the conditions 
of optimum for the economic system as a. whole, instead of for 
particular sectors of the economy. The surplus analyses is particularlt 
suited to partial equilibrium approach, and it can better be used for 
partial welfare analysis rather than general welfare analysis. Pigou 
set out to derive general conditions of optimum which can best be 
tackled by the concept of the margin. Classicists and neo-classicists 
before Pigou considered welfare only partially and did not formulate 
any welfare proposition systematically. Pigou was the first neo-
classicist to apply the powerful tool of marginalism to deduce condi-
tions of maximum welfare. Thirdly, Pigou departs from the classicists' 
practice of treating free competition as a means to increasing productiVity 
and dynamic economic progress. He preceeds from the assumption of a 
f~ed quantity of resources and examines the role of free competition 
as a means to the allocation of resources. This is essentially a static 
problem which was also considered by Pareto. and Barone. Finally, 
Pigou first serious~y co~siders the possible sources of dishermo~ 
between private good and social good in a laissez fairs economy. Adam 
Smith was optimistic about the potentialities of free competition. 
Ricardo and Mal thus conad.:dwed the darker aspects in the light of 
:-!-
O.>o 
longrun dynamic considerations. According to Pigou, a competitive 
econo~, even in a stati& framework, does not necessarily lead to the 
best allocation of resources, He points out the important type of 
divergence which is caused by third party services or disserviees due to 
the application of resources in an7 particular use or place, Under 
modern industrial con41tiona. many of the social problems are the 
outcome of economic causes·a.nd the fMCing mechanism does not take 
account of many social costs. This results in a divergence between 
private and social good and state intervention is necessary for the 
correction of these maladjustments. 
Apart from these differences, however, Pigou's approach and views 
are in mapy respects neo-classical in nature, In the first place, 
Pigou uses the utility calculus. In regarding the size of marginal 
social product as the measure of the increase in subjective economic 
welfare, Pigou is obliged to assUiie two things: first, the marginal 
utility of money is the same for different individuals in the comm~ity. 
and secondly. prices of different commodities measures the absolute 
quantit' of satisfaction obtained by their consumers so that value of 
marginal social product is also a measure of economic welfare. Pigou 
has been attacked by later economists for makirig int~•personal coapari- , 
son of utility which is believed to be impossible. New welfare economics 
which is a development of the Paretian system has tried to avoid the 
stigma by abstracting from any consideration of the distribution, of 
income, It will be shown in course of our discussion that Pigbu's 
assumption on intllepersonal uUlity is one among a number llj value 
judgments which are necessary f .. or welfare economies. The critics •. whi.4 . _ 
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avoiding intropersonal comparison, ll8ve implicitly made other value 
judgments which cannot be scientifically proved for their validity. 
Secondly, Pigou's discusiion of welfare propositions. specially of his 
policy recommendations is in~QJed with a practical insight which is 
characteristic of Marshall and other classicists and neo-classisists. 
His concept of free competition is not derived from the logic of analylli;s 
as in the case of Pareto and Barone. It is the same as what classicists 
and neo-classicists believed to eiist in practice. lt has been noted 
above that even in cases of divergence between marginal private and 
social net products, Pigou 1 s advocacy of state intervention is not 
unqualified. He considers the possible deterioration in efficiency 
which witl injure the national dividend. He is in favor of the control 
of monopoly (in Pigou's treatment of the problem, monopolies are 
rather exceptions), though hebAiieves that control is necessarily 
cumbersome and expensive. Apart from some special fields Which are 
generally known as public utility industries, Pigou is against public 
operation of industriest All these considerations result from Pigbu's 
belief in the essential soundness of free enterprise. which is a part 
of his classical heritage. The com,petittve system which Pigou considers 
is not a frictionless system; ;.1\ coexists ·with variims types of hindrances 
like costs of movement, imperfect knowledge, imperfect divisibility of 
factors and also a certain degree of monopoly. It seems evident that 
Pigou is not satisfied with the mere formulation of abstract proposi-
tions. He considers the innumerable constraints which are faced in 
practice and after a discussion of their pros and cons. he gives his 
decision. This practical interest in again revealed in his recommends.- • 
ff ~ 
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tiona. about redistribution of income. Theoretically, he is in favor 
of an equ~litarian distribution of income. Eut the nature of 
transference of income from:. thl! rich to the poor is to him extremely 
important. As a believer in the efficacy of free enterprise, he 
pleais such transferences as will not harm productive efficiency. 
Finally, Pigou follows Marshall in assuming the equilibrium of 
industries, though lhe individual firms may not be in equilibrium. The 
concepts of equlibrium firm and archetypal industry are rather confusing 
in Pigou 1 s treatment of ideal output. His distinction between supply 
price simpliciter and supply price from the standpoint of the community 
also cannot be upheld on a subjective level of analysis. We shall 
proceed to an examination of Pigou1 s ideal output in the next chapter. 
CIW''l'l!IR 1!. 
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In this chapter, the aeeumptione on which Pigou's thesis of ideal 
output is baeed tiill be e:xamined, H will be seen that; the problem of 
ideal output in increasing coat industries was repeatedly revised by 
P:l.gou and he did not arrive at a eatiefactory conclusion, That :I.e due 
to an uneatiafactory treatment of the supply curve of industries, Under 
modern approach, the supply curve of an industry is derived from the 
cost curves of individual firma under competitive conditione, Thie has 
brought to light the generalised theory of rPnt, which extends beyond 
the Ricardian conception, Pigoule problem can be more satisfactorily 
solved when the concept of rent ie taken into consideration, The objec' 
of this chapter 1s mainly to review Pigou 1 e conclusions on ideal output 
under perfect competition and monopoly in the light of thie theory of 
rent. 
Pigou1 a welfare proposition on allocation of resources can be 
summed up in one simple aentence1 national dividend and hence economic 
welfare will be maxil!lllm when the llk"l.rginal aocid net products of reaouroes 
in different usee are equal. On the e.s!!UJllption that in a large sector 
of the economy, marginal private net product and marginal social net 
product are equal due to the prevalence of free competition, the baaic 
welfare propo111tion can· be stated as follows. Economic welfare will be 
maximum when marginal eocial net product end marginal private net pro-
ducts in different uses are e~ual. A critical stu~ of thia propoli_tio!J,, 
as applied to industries w1 th different types of eupply Clll'Ves pre-
supposes an examination of the validity of three principal concepts, 
namely, supply price simpliciter and supply price from the standpoint of 
the community, equilibrium firm and marginal private and marginal aocial 
net product, 
It will be generally agreed that an unqualified dietincticn between 
eupply price from the standpoint of the industry and supply price from 
the standpoint of the community is not valid on a subJective level of 
analyaie, Supply price is a function of two variables, technology and 
factor price. If p~eical productivity of factors is our obJect of 
study, we are required to eliminate the effect of change in factor 
prices from supply function and tbus reveal the operation of technical 
obstacles confronted during production. But change in !actor prices 
acquires significance in a study of welfare; it expresses foregone 
utilities or opportunity cost. This will be analysed in more detail 
below. 
Pigou'e concept of e~ilibrlum firm corresponds to Marnhall's notion 
of representative firm, It enviseges the equilibrium of an industry 
even when the constituent firma are not in equilibrium. Some firas are 
growing, some are decaying, leaving the total output of the industry 
unchanged, This concept hae been the subJect of attack from a group 
of economists, parUcnlarl7 L. Robbinri Tho118h IDan7 of these crttteiams 
are unwarranted, folloWing from a wrong understanding of the concept, 
it has not been accepted as an useful tool of analysis, even among 
Cambridge ecouomiste. According to eta\ic analysis. the equilibrium of 
an industry 1s the result of thA e~il1brlum of its individual firma. 
1. Ro'bblne, L., l!EPRESl!lll~'&'l!IW J'IRM. Economic Joarlia1• 1928, ~t-t . 
OJ. 
'l'bere oannot be any equilibrium of the industry unleBB the firms Bl'e in 
equ1U'b!'ium, We Bl'e mainly concerned in a static anslyeb with the 
properties of equil1bl'1Wil of indi?idusl fil'IIIB (eo far as the theory 
of value 1e concerned). On the other hand, a studT of the dynamics of 
industry will involve a stud7 of the processes reculting in a conver-
gence to or divergence from equilibrium. 'l'he concept of equlibrium·or 
regresentative firm does not logically belong to any of these two 
types of azu::.lyale, static or dynamic. It precupposes the equilibrium 
of the industry, though \he fil'llla Bl'e in a state of constant change, 
~oth static and dynamic elements are incorporated in the conceptr though 
it does not seem to belong to eith~r of those spheres, Marshall has 
called this biological approach which he believes to be true not only 
for living beings, but also economic units. Whatever ~ ba said in 
defence of this approach, it has not been properly developed, even in 
MBl'ahall' s and Pigau's writings. 
Non-acceptance of the concepts of equilibrium firm aad archetypal 
industry is not damaging to Pigou's welfare propositions. Under the 
mathematical static approach, equilibrium of the industry presupposes 
the e~ilibrium of individual firms, 'l'he properties which Pigou 
develops for hie equilibrium firm should be applicable to all firms 
according to modern analysis. 'l'hue Pigou observes that when the 1ndustty 
is in equilibrium, the average and marginal cost of theequil1br1um 
firm will be the name as the supply price for the industry. 'l'his 
property 1s extended to all individual firms when the concept of 
equilibrium or representative firm is abandoned. Archetypal induatry 
is a similar concept which Pigou employs to analyse deviations from 
69. 
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maximum welfare. Be conceivea the existence of some industry in which 
marginal private and marginal social net products are equal: the situa-
tion in all other industries is reviewed with reference to this central 
industry. Nov as Kahn points outo Pigou's conclusions are hurd to 
interpret unless by archetypal industry. he means the existence of a 
large number of induatriea where marginal private ;;no marginal social 
net products are equal, 
The marginal social product is a p~rtectly Justifiable theoretical 
concept 1 but its evaluation is likely to be extremely difficult in 
practice. According to Pigou'a definition, the value of the marginal 
social product is obtained by multiplying the main product and the 
incidental services >md dhservioea rendered by their respective me:rket 
prices. He does not incorporate any valuation made by society as a 
central organic unity in his concept. »ut Pigou does not anawer the 
real problem involved in the evaluation of marginal eocial product, 
Carried to ita logical concluaiono marginal aociF.J. product nowing from 
the application of resources in a particular use or place will involve 
a large number of services or disservices which do not come under the 
ordinary mHrket mechanism. This will be specially true of those types 
of services or dia•ervices which are essentially of a psychic nature. 
ln order to choose from this wide range which can conceivably be 
included under marginal social product. some value Judgments seem to 
be absolutely necessary. It appears \hat P1gou would include only those 
services and disservices which can be brought under the measuring rod 
of money. But this expression 1s extremely elastic, specially when 
there h .. no market for the 1nci_<!ental benefits or los"es. 
?O. 
I 
I 
1: 
For the determinateness of Pigovian optimum, it is necessary that 
the marginal social product curves have B negative slope• in the 
neighborhood of equilibrium. The law of non-proportional returns is 
not apc:lleable here. When Pigou speaks of a marginal unit of investment, 
he 1s not thinking of a merginal unit of the variable factor, assuming 
the quantity of other factors to be constant, 
"If the rth. increment of investment is to have a 
precise meaning,• he obeerves, •it mast be interpreted 
as the rth, (physical) increment of some one Aort of 
productive resourcea(e,g,, labor of a given quality)plue 
whatever additions to the quantities of the other ~orte 
groperll !2.l!.U!!. that increment, These qu&ntitiee are 
perfectly definite, being determined by the condition 
that, in respect of any given quantity of output, the 
various factors of production must be combined in such2 wise as to make their aggregQe money cost a lliaimum. • 
The marginal social product of resCQrces, as defined, need not be falling. 
Tms the falling marginal product carve in Pigou 1 a sense must be 
derived ultimately from the principle of diminishing marginal utility 
of the product itself, Pigou does not explain how according to hie 
definition marginal products of 6lfferent increments of reeomrces can 
be made comparable. For the rth unit of a particular factor combined 
properly with other factors will not usually be the same as the (r ~ h) 
th. unit ot the same factor (unless factor proportions are technically 
fixed), The different factor units (marginal) under Pigou•s definition 
can be made coooparable only it margiaal investment are interpreted in 
the monetary aense, Pigou is not at all clear on this point, 
(II) 
Pigou•s discussion of deviation from ideal output in the case of 
2. ptgua. lllOO!IOM:res' 9P lflllLJ'Amil. "~ l!ld, I p. 11J. 
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increasing and decreasing ccst industries is confuaing, though his 
concluaions are substantially correct. He advocatea throughout the 
disouasion vhat has now become known as marginal cost pricing. But he 
arrives at these concludone throu«h a chain of reasoning whtch h 
difficult to digest. There are four fUnctions on the supply side, 
supply price fron; the standpoint of the industry and marginal auppl:y 
price from the standpoint of the industry: supply price and marginal 
supply price from the standpoint of the community. We have already 
noted our objection against the definition of supply price from the 
standpoint of tt.e community. It does not sound reasona~e to exclude 
from total couts incr8111ent fn factor prices due to increasing opportunUy 
cost. Mrs. Robinson's) illuminating anal:yeie on rent has been a step 
forward in the study or cost curves and Pigou1 a diaouasion of 1ncreasinf 
and decreasing returns mey be convenientl:y reViewed in the light of 
that study. 
Pif;ou1 s ideas about supply ourYes and marginal social product in 
increasing ~a decreasing coet industries underweat considerable 
changes since he p11bl1shed his WEALTH .AJIL WELFARE in 1912. Though we 
have restricted nur studyto~elatest edition, it is interesting to note 
the eYOlution in his ideas in \his part1011lar case. In 'h'EALTH AJJD Wl!lL- , 
4 
FARE, Pigou rlrsw \\_•o poslt1Yely inol1ned auppl:y curves fl and s2 
whicb he termed suppl:y price and marginal supply price respectively 
and conoluded that the 1nteruetion ot ~ with demand curve Dll gaYs 
3. Robinson, J., ECONCNICS OF IMPERQCT COMPETITION, MacMillian & Co, 
Ltd, London 19)4, Book III, Chapter 8. 
P~~ A.C_.,I IQ:.U,l§,.~ l®LFWt l~acMilUan i Co a_ Ltdo London.l912* pp • .~,.,,_,'7• 
n. 
the competUive price and output, whereas ideal output waa given by the 
intersection of s2 with the demand ourve, In a review, Allyn loung5 
acclaimed Pigou's s2 curre as a new and a powerful tool of economic 
analysis specially as applied to monopol;y but denied .that it proved a 
divergence of competitive from ideal output. In the first edition cf 
ECONOMICS OF WELFARE, Pigou made some alterations in hie argument 
influenced by loung'a criticism, He observed, in support of Young's 
view, that "the excess of marginal supply price in 1ndustr1ea of 
diminishing returns over the corresponding sup?lY pri~e is merely a 
nominal excess of money paid, and not a real exces~ represented by 
resources employed.•6 He maintained that the competitive output, thougb 
not a deviation from ideal output in case of ria1ng transfer coAto was 
eo in the case of diminishing returne. 
"The reason w~ diminishing returns in terms of mon~ 
appear when they do appear ho. ingeneralo not that the 
money price of factors employed is increased, but that the 
proporUonah combination ot d!:tferent·factbrs, Which it 
is moat economical to employ when x unite are being pro-
duced, and the extra cost involved in the first is real, not 
merely nominal, For the'e reasonso Young's obJections, as 
a general reason fails.• 
Pigou fUrther revised his thesis 1n an article in the Jconomtc Jourpe] ,8 
admUUng t!lat hh ropl;y to YO'.lng was not adeq-.1ate. In the second 
edition of ECONOMICS OF WELFARE a revised statement vas given which was 
retained in later editions, The revision consisted, as we have seen, 
s. 
6. 
7. 
e. 
Young, A,A., PIGOU1 S WEALTH AND WEL.FARF., 9:uatterlz Jourpel !J.!. 
lllconomie,, August 1913. 
PigOilo ECONOMICS OF WELFARE, let Ed,, Macmillian & eo,, ltd, 
Londono 1920o P• 935, 
IBID,, p, 936. 
PS,¢11!h 001.f~UiN'l't )lcon0111is Jpnt] o March 1924. 
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in the abandonment of the general theais that under increasing cost. 
competitive output under consideration exceeds the ideal., and the 
adoption of tha vary limited proposition that divergence is likely to 
occur when increase in factor coat accrues to foreigners as price for 
imports. 
In retrospect. a better light can be thrown on the discussion, 
keeping in mind ~Irs. Robinson' e9 diatinction between four cost curves 
which are mE!l'g',nal. cost including rent (~, average cost including 
rent (:f'), margi11al cost excluding rent (T), and average cost excluding 
rent (8). Supply curve m~ be increasing in e.n industry due to (1) 
diminishing returns resulting from the existence of scarce factor or 
factors whose supply is fixed for the industry, (2) rise in factor 
prices following tr~ference from other uses or (3) combination of 
both (1) and (2). 
y ~ /d< 
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Competitive price under increasing cost is consistent With the 
conditions of ideal output. for at the competitive price. price is 
equal to marginal social costo or the value of marginal social product 
(in Pigoula terminology), Under condition• of perfect competition, suppl7 
price of an industry 1B the same as mare*nal coat of the indh'idual 
firm excluding rent and average cost of the firm including rent. In 
the above diagram, auppl7 curve ia given b,r ~.T and competitive price 
and output at Qll and ON respect1vel71 Marginal coat of the firm ex-
cluding rent (whether accruing to fixed factors or factors drawn from 
other usee) is the eame ae marginal social cost. Increase in cost 
due to diminishing returns or rising transfer cost results in a higher 
cost to aociety which is completel:r exhausted by a price covering the 
increment to cosh on marginal unih, Rents accruing to intra.marginal 
unite do not constitute social cost, s2 curve cannot be regarded as 
m<.rginal social cosli ourve. 'because renli is not an 1tem in social coati, 
s2 ourve 1B later replaced by Pigou b.r marginal auppl;r price from the 
standpoint of the co1111111111i t:r. In so far as this excludes a:trT rise ln 
factor prices, it does not reflect marginal social cost, ntee in 
transfer earnings should be included rnd renh excluded from the social 
cost function, Pigou does not distinguieh 'between theee two t;vpss of 
factor earninge and hie treatment of coat leo therefore, rather hazy, 
ln the final version. Plgou contemplates a diversion of competitive 
output from ideal output when increase in cost is due to the riee in 
price of imported articles used in the industr:v under consideration, 
~hie approach implies a consideration of welfare limited to the domestiC 
econom;y onl:r. 
•The qualifications required to allow of policies.• 
B. Ellis and w. Fellner obse~ve, "distinguishing between 
the interests of domestic IIUbjecta and foreign<>rs f"re 
much more extensive then would be suggeated b)' the llm1t-
at1ona of P1gou• s argument!lc to auch increase ln rente aa 
18 
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are included in the value of commodity importe, One would 
have to exclude from the aggregate to be maximbed all con-
sumers' surpluses accruing to foreigners. and all producers' 
surpluses accruing to foreicn 'i8ekholdera or other foreign 
owners of domeetic enterpriee,• 
Pigou' a thesh that in industries with increasing returne, actual 
output falls short of ideal output has been upheld by later economists, 
There is no symmetry between external economies sn<i external dtaeconomiee 
regarding their relation to marginal cost (nocial), The competitive 
aupplf curve with a positive slope 18, as we have seen, also the margin .. 
al social cost, On the other hand, a falling supply Cll.M'e for an in-
dustry enJoying external economies, whose intersection with demand 
Cll.M'e determines eqnilibrium price anct output does not represent tre 
Cll.M'e of llal'ginal social cost, 
To offer an explanation of thill &l!fmmetrf, we ehall briefly analyse 
the nature of external economies. A levering of coat curves of indivi-
dual firma in a particular 1nduatry following ita expansion mq be dna 
ll to a cheapening of factors or as Pierro Sraffa saggeets, a better 
rendering of services. In the first caee1 external econo117 in our 
industry is to be traced ultimately to the existence of internal 
economies in a subsidiary industry operating under imperfect competition. 
If the subaidiary industry caa ~ltit ita internal economies fully 
without Jeopardising perfect compeiit1on, cost curve will be rising 
at the point of equ1libr1ua and no external econo~ v111 originate from 
the expanaion of the main industry. If the outcome of internal economiee 
10. Ellis, H.s., 
u. SJ'aft'e.. p~· 
in the subsidiary industry is monopoly, cost will decline only if (1) 
U is operating in the downward range of its marginal cost and the 
elasticity of the new demand carTe .is not sufficiently smaller than 
was that of the old one to offset the downward elope of the marginal 
coat curve; or (2) if the new d81116Jld ro.rve is more elastic than w,,s 
the old one and the upward slope of the marginal cost curve in the 
relevant range is insufficient to offset this circumstance. Fall in 
the prices of factors due to inoreaae in the r.eale of output 1St according 
to P1gouo highly unlikely, He observes that increaaing returns ensue 
as a result of growing epecialieation with the expansion of the merket. 
The example of cotton industry in England is cited, where ther~ 1s not 
only the specialisation between the processes of spinning and weaving, 
but also the turther specialieation bet~~en firma spinning fine counts 
and those spinning course counts. 1 The increased specialieation of ita 
component firma made posaible ey an enlargement in an industry as a 
whole often involves a large redll.otion in costs. •12 To thh 1D!V be 
added, as the source of external economies, better ~endering of servicee 1 
viz,, the development of skilled labor fo~ce, the migration of a 
suitable labor, the appearance and progreu of profeastonal and trade 
aaaociationeo research institutions and the like leading to better 
dissemination of knowledge etc. 
These various faetors which give rise to external economies also 
account for social economy or a l'>wering of marginal t-ocial cost below 
the competitive supply curve. For a falling supply curve, a decline 
in the cost of. intramarginal unit.s of output is alao a deoreaee in 
.1.26'1 .1\g~t EQP.NOMICS OF WEIJ'Al!l£14th Ed.,. p. 219. 
social cost which is not reflected in the average curve. 
y 
:r~. 2. 
I~ fig. 2, the CIU'Te of marginal eupp'-7 price (or marginal aocial cost 
SS") is lower .than the competitive supply curve (sst) and actual out-
put (OQ.) 18 leas than ideal output (OR). National dividend will in-
crease 1f the state granh bounty to an industry with increasing re-
turns to cover costa of producing more than the most profitable output. 
The above treatment is baaed on the assumption that external 
economise are reverlible, that ss• curve is valid for both increasea 
and deeraai8B in the aeale of output, llu.to as Ell1s and Fellner1.3 
have shown, e:lt\E'rnal e(lonomiea mq also be irreversible in the sense 
that economies which result from an eXpansion of output pereiet if 
output subsequently contracts. In thia eaee, the contrast of a<drage 
and marginal coats canaot be uaed to indicate the competitive from 
aoeial cost in as much as the economies Almply cauae a downward shift 
ot average costs as a horizontal function up to 8ach realised output. 
The case of irreveraiblt economics can be diagrammatically presented 
13, 1111s and Fellner, OP.CIT, 
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In fig, J, ss• 1e the locue of successive cost curves which are 
horizontal to the x-a:ds e.t different ecalee of output, Thus once 
output. reachee Ao the avarage and marginal supply curve 1s given b:y 
AAII once output reaches P b:y ppt etc, Let T b:y the minimum point on 
the ss• signifying the disappearance of external economics at an out-
put au, If output expanda to au, the ne1o1 1111pply curve will be given 
by TT' which will persist even 1t the output declines aubae~ently, 
In that case the optimum output will be given by the point of inter-
section of TT 1 and DD'I SS' 1 here has no pperational significance, The 
true optimum OD is less ~han the apparent optimum OR which is determined 
' 
at the point of intersection of DD' with SS''• If the government has 
a properknowledge of the sources of external economies U can direcUy 
develop those sources and help industry reach the optimum output eD, 
This is specially true, if resources are relatively immobile and 
transference lnYolves a large amount o:f' cost, 
If e~ternel economies are also accompanied by a rise in :f'e.dPr 
prices, rent on 1ntramarginal unite should be excluded from the 
marginal social cost for the determination of the optimwa. 
We have implicitly aasumed in our above discussion that there is 
perfect correlation between external economies enjoyed by an industry 
and an e:r:paneion in the scale of Us output. This assumption 1a 
subJect to modifieation in two wave. In the first place, external 
economies originating in a particular industry need not be confined 
to that industry alone, but is likely to spread to other sectors of the 
14 
econOII\Y• Secondly, there seeme to be much truth in Sraffa' a 
observation that external economise are often the resultant of the 
deYelOpment of the economic 811tem as a whole. Economies which are 
internal to the industry but external to the !irma compoling it ere a 
rare phenomenon. Thls explains why some economists have plea&ed that 
external economise are enenti&lly 4Tru;mie and they cannot be usefully 
treated within the framework of a ataUe analysts. 
All these coneiderations abont external economies weaken Pigbn's 
case for subs1d1aing an industry with a falling supply curve. The 
economies may largely accrue to other industries rather than to the 
industry under review. It is only that part of external economies 
which ere enjoyed by one particular industry that is reflected in ite 
supply curve. What is relevant for the aocial optimum ia the sum total 
of economies which is obscured in Pigon's treatment of the problem, 
thbUgh his definitionof marginal social product makes allowance for it. 
We shall see in the next chapter that R. F. Ka.hn15 attempted a fUller 
14. Sratfa, OP.CIT. 
15, Kahn, R.F,, NOTES ON IDEAL OUTPUT, Economic Journal March, 1935. 
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treatment of external economies b,y slightly altering Pigou'• definition 
of marginal social product. SecoUly, economies in a. particular 
industry lllal' be lea$ in m&E:nUude than thoae which prevail on the 
aver&E:e in industry as a whole. eo that the industry under review is 
producing more and not leas than ita ideal output. :But this case 18 
excluded by Pigou•a assumptions. In hie ayetem, ideal output is attained 
by e. large eector of the econOJII7• barring a few exceptional oases. 
Thirdly, existence of economies m~ fall to be fully revealed in a 
falling supply curve owing to the exhhnoe of scarce factors. 
Therefore, if external economies spread from other industries, the 
supply curve of the first industry mq not indicate it due to external 
diseconomies. Finally, Pigou•s oaee forbounty on decreasing cost 
industries financed b.Y taxee on other industries holds good, if economies 
are the exeeption and not the rule. If economies are prevalent over 
a large sector of the econOJ117• all of them need not neceesarlly be 
subeidieed. The imposition of tax on other industries lllal' induce 
decreasing cost industries to expand; and lf this expansion would 
carey the 1nduetry1 s output beyond the ideal point, a tax and not 
bounty is called for. 
(III) 
P1gou1 s comparison of output under monopoly and discriminating 
monopoly With competitive output la enlightening and the d1eouagion 
has been carried one step further by Mrs. Robinson.16 P1gou' s state-
16. Robi;;.aon, OP,CIT. Book IV, Che. Xlo Xllo <.ad Jq:U, 
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ment that under simple monopoly, matput will alw~s, other things being 
equal, be lea~ than it would have been under simple competition, maT 
be reviewed and elaborated in the form of a diagrammatic a.nalysh, 
Comparison of monopoly output with competitive output h made on the 
aeswnption that demand and coat CIU'Yee which prevail under perfect 
competition are not changed due to int.roductlon of monopoly, several 
c~eee can, then, be distinguished, 
(1) There ;noe no scarce tactcre and no econoaiea of large scale el) 
that the cost curvetor the industey lUider reYiew is conatant, It h 
easy h see that in such a case, monopoly output will be hnlf (fig,4), 
less than half (fig.S), and more than half (fig.6), the competitive 
output according as the dagand carve is a straight line, conve~ and 
ccncave (with respect to the origin) respectively. 
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Under perfect. competition, price and output are determined at the 
point of intersection of the supply ourYe SS 1 and demand curve DDt, 
Under monopoly, price and output are determined at the point of inlier-
8!, 
section of marginal revenue curre M'!' and marginal coat curve fif,t. 
(2) There are scarce factors and no economies of scale so that the 
~pply curve for the industry has a posi,ive slope. In this case, a 
new factor emerges, namelyrent, Monopoly output will be different 
depending on whether the monopoliat p~s rent (in tull or in part) to 
the scarce factors or net, 
{a) Let us as~ that the monopolist pays fUll rent to the scarce 
factors. If the demand curve is a straight line, monopoly output will 
be halfe less than half or more than half the competitive output, 
according as the supply curve ia etraight line, concave or conve'l: 
respect1 vely. 
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~ 18 the average coat including rent or marginal cost excluding 
rent. Competitive output is given by the intersection of Dr;t and :tl• 
Since the monopolist pays full rent to the factors, the relevant 
marginal cost curve for him is ct (marginal cost including rent). The 
intersection of « and marginal revenue curve MM' gives monopoly price 
and output~ In Fig. 7, supply. curv• ie straight line and monopoly 
83. 
outp!lt OA.~ competitive outpu.t OJ, In :fig. 8, monouoly outpu.t OA1 ) i 
competitive output OB'• supply curve being convex, In fig. 9• monopoly 
output OA'' ( -lJ competitive outpllii OB''• the supply curve being conctave. 
In a similar wey, it can be shOwn that when the supply curve 1s a. 
straight line, monopoly output will be lees than half the competitive 
outp!lt for a convex demand curve and greater than half for a conc:::·ave 
demand curve. Convexity of demand curve and concavity of supply curve 
lead to a smaller proportion of monopoly output to 011mpet1t1ve output 
and conversely, In an:r actual case. output will depend on the curva\ure 
of both demand and suppl:r curves. But monopol:r output, on the al>ove 
assWilptione 1 can never exceed competitive outpUt, At most;, 1onopcly 
outpu.t can be equal to competitive outp-.tt in only few exCGptional 
C<\Aes requiring plil'Ucular shapes of demand or coat curves. 
(b) The monopolist ma:r not pay full rent to the scarce factore, If 
he hires landt the rent paid is likely to be somewhere in between fUll 
rent and transfer earnings, As regards labor, it will not be easy for 
the monopolist to avoid peying rent in so far as he cannot make 
separate bargains with individual workers. Rent of entrepreneurship 
will not be regarded as part of expenses of production, but , e part 
of monopoly profit, 
If the monopolist pays part of the rent to any factor but not the 
whole of it or if there are eome scarce factors for which he pa:r~ full 
rent and others for which he peys none, his m<~ginal cost will be 
aomewh&t greater than average cost to the competitive industr71 i.e., 
1 t will He between « (marginal coet including rent) and f1 (marginal 
cost. exc1u.U.ne; !:'ent or _e.verat;\1 c:Q.St 111cluding rent) curvea. If the 
•• 
monopolist does not p~ 8n7 rent to the nearoe factors, his marginal 
cost curve will be given by B and the intersection of ~ and marginal 
revenue curve M!-1• w•111 determine monopoly output, It the monopolist 
does not pay or pays only part of the rent to source factors his output 
will exceed the amount he will produce if he ha" to pu~ full rent, But 
in neith·•r of the cases 1ofill monopoly output exceed competitive output, 
{J) There E>..ra economies of scale resultlng in a decreasing cost CUJ'Te, 
It can be shown that the conclusions which hold for increasing cost 
industries, the monopolist paying fUll rent to the scarce factors, are 
also valid in this case, The relation between competitive output and 
monopoly output will be given t; the same formulas noted above, So 
long as the monopolist pays rent to \he scarce factors, his output 
will be lees than competitive output even if there are economies of 
scale, Becausefor 8n7 output greater than competitive output, 
monopolist's revenue will be necative, 
There is one case, however, where Pigou's general proposition has 
to be modified. If the fact of nonpa;vment of rent tu scarce factors 
is accompanied by economies of large scale industry, monopoly output 
may exceed, though notzecessarily, competitive output, This result is 
shown in the fig, 10. 
'( 
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The relevant cMt curve far the monopolist is given by r (marginal 
cost excluding rent), It lies below both :p (avernge coot including 
rent) and «. (marginal cost including rent), The intersection of Y with 
marginal revenue MM' determines monopol;y output <lB. If the demand 
curve is sufficiently elastic at the competitive output, monopoly out-
put (Oll) is likel;y to exceed competitive output (OA), 
Pigou•s appraisal of monopol;r on welfare grounds is based on the 
tacit ass~~ption of the prevalence of free co~etition over a l<~ge 
sector of the economw, The sense in which Pi~ou anal;rses d~viation 
from optimm ie changed if we Withdraw this restrictive assumpHon, 
Thh wUl be discussed in det&ll in the next ch~e:oter in connection 
with the welfare economics of R, H. Kahn c.nd t~rs, Joan Robinson, 
We shall end up the discussion of monopoly with a few comments 
on Pigou's observations on price control, If the c~mpetit1ve price 
is fixed under increasing cost conditions, the monopolist·will produce 
less than the competitive output, This is illustrated in the fig, 11. 
The co~petitive price end output are denoted by PA dnd OA respectively, 
If monopoly price is fexed at APo the ~poU.~' s avernge :revenue 
will be completely elastic up to the outpnt OA and then will decline 
along PD'. Marginal revenue cnrve will not be given b;y HM•, but b;y 
DPCM', The intersection of DPCM' and marginal cost" (it 1s assumed 
that the monopolists p~s fUll rent to the acarce factors) will 
determine monopol;y output OB, which is leas thron competitive output, 
!: 
M' 
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Fig. n. 
On examination, it is see~ that monopoly out:;mt under price 
control will oe higher th<~ unregulated m0nopoly out:rmt only if the 
ms.rginnl co"t curve (CI) cuts the old mr:rg'nal revenue curve MW to 
the right of E (the point of intersection of ll'l' and DP): it will depend 
on the curvature of both DD' and f• The imposed price which will 
evoke the gr~~&test. output (OR' fum the monopol1nt under rhing cost 
conditions is given by that which equalise~ the demar.d price and 
marginal cont. (QR). 
Pigou observes that when constant o:r, -Ae.oreas1ne; wpply prevails, 
it will not pay a monopolist, when price is fi~ed at the competitive 
level to reduce output below competitive output, for he would not secure 
any diminution in cost by doing this. The V!'~id1 ty of Pigou • ,, obser-
vat ions Can be eXplained with the help of dire.e,;rainB. 
., 
i: 
D' 
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Fig, 12, 
In fig, 12, the monopolist's marginal and average cost curve is 
given by ss•, If the competitive price PAis fixed, the monopoli~t 
will not gain by uroducing less than the competitive output and his 
equilibrium output will be given by OA (same as competitive output), 
'( 
~Q 
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Fig, lJ, 
In fig, lJ, OA is the competitive output 2.nd AP the competitive 
pries, OB is the uncontrolled monopoly output and RQ. the monopoly 
price, If price is :ft:ited at ~. monopolist's 11lll:'g1nal cost curve 2 
.. 
will cut the new marginal revenue CIU'Ve CPDM' between P end D• thus 
the monopolist will realize bis maximum net revenue at the competitive 
output, 'l'hus under conditione of falling cost, the competitive output 
can be evoked from the .onopoliet b,y fixing the competitive price ae 
a maxilllllD. 
(IV) 
We can dl•aw the following conclusions from the above analysis, 
In the first place, Pigou'e use of the concept of eqailibrium firm and 
archetypal indnat17 does not involTe any sharp break from the modern 
analysis so far as the conclusions are e~neerned., EYidently the 
attriblltea which Pigou'e equilibriWII firm poueMee t<re to be extended 
to all indiYidual tiras in equilibrium to bring the Pigovian system 
in line with the more recent approach, It will be eeen the next chapt«r 
that R, F, Kai>'\17 and Joan Ro'bineon18 developed some of the arguments 
of Pigou without deviating from him in fundamentals, 'l'he;r used the 
modern concept of the~quilibrium nf industry and individual firma, 
Secondly, Pigou'e treatment of ideal output is vitiated by the 
contusing d1sUr_cUo<:l between supply price from the standpoint of the 
community, He fails to take into account that part of rise in cost 
which is due to the foregoing of utilit1ee and as such enters into 
marg- nal social cost, Thirdl;rt Pigou 1 e practical insight 1e seen in 
his treatment of the evaluation of marginal social prodncte of resources 
in connection with the determi~tion of ideal output. Most of the 
economiata beloaging to the group of New Welfare Economica shunned the 
ili"Wlllian _o:t' the important 'n!" o:t' diver~ence betYten m<,r£inlll priTa\111" 
17. Kahn, OP.CIT, 18. Robinson, OP,CIT, 
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and 11Ull'g1nal social products which relate to what Pigou calls third 
party services ordieseJ'Tices. The evaluation of marginal social pro-
duct, we have noted above, is undoubtedly extremely difficult. Eut 
Pigou makes a ~>ractical compromise. Many, though not all. of the social 
coats which are not taken into account of by the pricing mechanism in 
a competitive economy can be evaluated and brought under the me:;auring 
rod ~ney. There is no reason for excluding them on the ground 
that other social coats which ebaild theoretically be taken into 
consideration cannot be evaluated. Fourthly, Pigoule recommendations 
about d.ecreasing cost industries are bc.ead on the a.esumptton that ex-
ternal economies are confined within the particular industry under re-
vie'·'· 'We have eeen thr.t decreasing supply curve in any industry is an 
imperfect guide to fiscal interfereace when external economies are 
defined in a broader sense. The results also substantially differ when 
external econo~1ee are not reversible. Fifthly, Pigou'a treatment of 
ideal outpu.t under monopoly is based on the assumption of the 
prevalence of simple competition in a large sector of the economy. 
Rie policy recommendations accordingly apply to ~he particular 
institutional situation which he conaiders, Kahnl9 generaliees 
Pigou'a system by extending it to the ease of aonopolistic competition, 
Finally, the use of modern firm analysis for the comparison of monopoly 
amd competitive output reinforces most of the views held by P1gou, 
Several distinct eases ae obtained under the hypotheses of varying 
cost and demand curvea, which are aot conaid~red by Pigou. It is also 
seen that rent plays an important part 1n determining monopoly output 
19 •. Kahn. OP.an. 
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CHAPTER!· 
POST-PIGOVIAN WELFARE ECONOMICS: I 
R. F. KAHN and JOAN ROBINSON 
li) 
In this and the next chapter, we shall attempt a brief presentation 
of Post-PigoYian welfare economics. A detailed examination of these 
later developments is be,yond the scope of this stu~ and the writer 
does not propose to take up that formidable task. It is worth while, 
however, to throw light on the basic postulates and conclusions of 
welfare economists who followed Pigou and see how they stand with respect 
to the Pigovian system, In this chapter. welfare propositions of R. F. 
Kahn and Joan Robinson are discussed in some detail on the ground that 
they are derived from a direct extension of Pigou1 s system with some 
conceptual refinements, In Chapter VI, new welfare economics to which 
J. R. Hicks, Abba P. Lerner, Oscar Lange, Harold Hotelling, Nicholas 
Kaldor, Abram Bergson, Tibor Scitovsky, Panl Samuelson, Melville Reder, 
and a few others have contributed in some way or other will be 
presented. 
R. F. Kahn 1 s1economics of welfare is Pigovian in fundamentals. 
His excellence lies in conceptual refinements and extension of Pigou•s 
system to the case of monopolistic competition. Kahn makes the follow-
ing three assumptions which are also made by Pigou: 
(1) Factors of production are always kept fully employed; 
1. Kahn, NOTES O!l IDEAL OOT1'!J',h Economic Journal, March, _19).5. 
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(2) Money can be employed as a measure of utility. It is based on the 
implicit assumption of an equalitarian distribution of income; 
(J) A given quantity of productive resources is being employed Once 
these assumptions are made, an increase in the size of national 
dividend will represent an increase in economic welfare. 
Kahn uses the concepts of marginal private and marginal social 
product as Pigou does. But his definition of these concepts gains in 
precision and validity. Pigou•s definition of marginal social net 
product is quite general; it refers to the aggregate of goods and 
services accruing from a marginal increment of a factor, no matter 
to whom they accrue. But when he elucidates the problem presented 
by increasing and decreasing supply price, he restricts the connotation 
of the term. Economies leadiag to decreasing supply price are 
supposed to result from an expansion of the industry under review. and 
thus a unique correspondence between the supply curve and the presence 
of economies or diseconomies in a particular industry is established. 
The fact that supply curve of an industry may be influenced by the 
existence of economies in a different industry is not taken into 
account. Once it is admitted that the effects of economies arising 
in any group of individual firms are not necessarily confined within 
any particular industry, it follows that there is no unique correlation 
between an industry's supply function and economies originating in it. 
ln view of these considerations, Kahn defines marginal private 
product and marginal social product expressedly with respect to 
individual firm. if an increase in the output of firm x has no effect ' 
" on the _efficiency of ~>ny given _()pm!lination offa.cto:rs out.si4e firm_lt, ,L- c __ 
9' 
the marginal social product is identical with the marginal private 
product. if the increase in output has a favorable effect on efficiency 
elsewhere, production is attended by external economies; marginal social 
product exceeds marginal private product, ln the converse case. when 
production is attended by external diseconomies, marginal social pro-
duct falls short of marginal private product. "The nature of the 
allocation of the external economies (or diseconomies) is not germane 
to our enquiry--their aggregate amount is all that matters.•2 The 
terms external economies and diseconomies should not be interpreted 
as accruing to other firms in the same industry. 
Pigou phrases his welfare propositions in terms of the distinction 
between supply price simpliciter and supply price from the standpoint 
of the community. Seconi!J.y, he uses the conceptual tool of an archetypal 
industry in wUcb tLe values of marginal private and marginal social 
products are equal, There is an underlying assumption of the 
prevalence of a competitive economy in which monopoly is an exception. 
Kahn rejects the perplexing distinction between supply price 
simpliciter and supply price from the standpoint of the community, and 
expresses welfare propositions in terms of external economies and 
diseconomies. No assumption as to the equality of marginal private 
and marginal social products in the generality of industries is made, 
On the basis of these changes, Kahn defines the ideal output of an 
industry as 11 that which causes the values of marginal social products 
of the mnrginal units of each factor to have the same ratios to the 
values of their marginal private products as they would in the industries 
2. Kahn, IBID., p. 5· 
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from which they would have to be drawn.•3 
In defining the criterion of policy under a system of perfect 
competition, Kahn follows Shove. 
"The national dividend would obviously be increased by 
transferring resources from industries where ••••• net external 
economies are small o~ negative to those where ••••• net external 
economies are large. 11 
It is not the nature of industries in any absolute sense, but their 
relative deviations form the average which provide a case for 
interfell.ence. 
External economies, Kahn observes, must usually take their 
ultimate origin in the internal economies of some subsidiary industry. 
This implies imperfect competition in the subsidiary industry. 
Accepting the hypothesis that external economies originate in 
subsidiary firms producing under conditions offalling cost. Kahn 
explores the practicability of his welfare solution. Instead of 
assessing the extent of external economies present in every industry, 
1t is easy to recognise indivisible units being worked below optimum 
capacity. In such cases, viz •• railways, public utilities, etc •• 
subsidy or bounty is recommended. Further, the proposition that in 
case of identical industries, no divession of resources is called for 
has to be modified. If economies take their origkn in subsidiary 
industries, the case for expanding these subsidiary industries holds 
good; diversion of resources vertically from lower to higher stages 
of production will increase national dividend. A similar point is 
illustrated by the case of smoke. If all industria• are equally 
IBID., 
Shove, G.F., i' VARYING OOS'l!S· AND .. MARGINAL NE'l' PRODUC'l!S, Ecanomic .... ,_ ... - · 
Journal, June 1928. 
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smoky, no horizontal diversion of resources is necessary. But legal 
restrictions on the emission of smoke and the encouragement of methods 
of preventing smoke would still have an important part to play. 
"Maximization of welfare involves both ideal quantity 
of output and ideal method of production. The national 
dividend is maximized only when the value of marginal 
social product of each separate marginal unit of a factor 
is equal in all uses, both potential and actual, n5 
It is seen that the existence of different degrees of external 
economies in the economy can be traced to the divergence between price 
and marginal cost to society. In all cases, Kahn observes, failure of 
laissez fai~e to achieve the best of all possible worlds may be fairly 
laid at the door of the imperfection of the pricing system. 
(II) 
6 7 Kahn and Mrs. Robinson extended Pigou's welfare proposition to 
the case of imperfect competition. Under conditions of imperfect 
competition, optimum allocation of resources is not attained due to 
the divergence between marginal cost and price (apart from the question 
of external economies.) With a less than perfectly elastic demand 
curve for the individual firm, marginal revenue is less than price. 
The motive for profit maximization leads to the equation of marginal 
cost and marginal revenue. Thus, under imperfect competition, marginal 
cost is also less than price, 
Three cases may be distinguished: 
(1) There is a perfect market for factors and an imperfect market for 
OP•CIT., p. 15, 
lBID., p, 19 ff. 
Robinson, Joan, OP,CIT •. ~Roks IX and X. 
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products. 
(2) There is an imperfect market for factors and a_perfect market for 
products. 
(3) Both the factor and product markets are imperfect. 
Case {1). Since factor market is perfect, marginal cost to the 
individual firm is equal to the price paid to the marginal factor. 
Marginal cost and marginal revenue being equal, the margin of transfer 
consists of units for which marginal physical product _ 
multiplie4 by marginal revenue is the same in different uses. Due to 
the divergence of marginal cost and marginal revenue from price, there 
is no necessity that marginal physical product times price will be 
equalized in alternative uses of a factor. Ideal output is not 
_because, 
marginal revenue (1) 
Price {1) 
/ marginal revenue (2) 
Price {2) 
etc. 
where, 1.2, •••• denote different firms or commodities. It is seen that 1! 
il 
the equation of the valuation of marginal product o£. a factor in li 
,, 
different uses involves that the above ratios marginal revenue/price J 1 
,, 
" must be equal: it does not require the condition of equation of marginaljj 
'i 
II 
revenue and price. 
We can analyse a step further. The ratio marginal revenue/price 
'I 
j: 
r! II 
is equal to 1-(1/e), where ~is the elasticity of demand for the 
product of the firm. It follows that the divergence between marginal 
revenue and price varies inversely as the elasticity of demand for the fi 
individual firm. "The elasticity of demand for the individual firm i 
can be employed as an inverse ordinal measure of imperfection of I 
97 
compet i t1 on," 8 
From the preceding analysis, the criterion of policy is derived, 
lt is socially desirable, Kahn observes, to expand those industries 
in which competition is more imperfect than the industries with which 
they compete for tneir factors of production and to contract those in 
i: 
!I 
I! 
·I li 
il 
i[ 
II 
II 
which the opposite condition prevails. 
.,I 
"It is not the absolute degree II 
II 
of imperfection but the deviation from the norm which determines the 
direction and the magnitude of the diviation from:ideal output.n9 It 
may be noted that the central proposition of optimum allocation is the 
same for both perfect and imperfect competition; the degree of imper-
faction of competition takes the place of the amount of external 
economies, 
II 
I II 
I 
I 
i 
II 
I I,
'I 
lt is assumed that the factor market is imperfect and tn ,I 
product market is perfect, Kahn did not discuss this problem, the 
Case (2). 
10 analysis that follows is due to Mrs. Robinson, Different degrees of 
imperfection in the factor market hamper optimum allocation of resource ~ 
Due to perfection of the product market, marginal physical product of I 
a factor D1Ul tiplied by marginal revenue is also equal to marginal ' 
physical product times price of the product, .But marginal physical li 
product multiplied by marginal revenue is not. in this case, the margin I! 
of transfer, Imperfection in the factor market leads to a divergence li 
between remuneration paid to factors and their corresponding marginal 
cost. If the ratio marginal factor cost/ factor price is not the same 
in different uses, there is no tendency toward equalization of the 
tl, Kahn, OP,CIT,. p. 20. 
9~ IBID,, P• 21 ff. 
II 
!I 
II 
! 
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value of marginal physical products and optimum allocation is not 
attained. The ratio marginal factor cost/ factor price is equal to 
1 ~ll/t) where ~ denote elasticity of supply of factor to the firm. 
Hence the difference between marginal factor cost and factor price 
varies inversely as the elasticity of supply of the factor under 
consideration. 
Case (J). Now we can combine the assumptions of imperfection of 
both product and factor markets and see how they affect allocation. 
It is seen that there is misallocation of resources if the application 
of anF factor to its different uses leads to different values of the 
ratio offactor price to the value of its marginal physical product. 
Now, 
Value of marginal physical product 
Factor price 
: Value of marginal ph. product X ! 
Marginal revenue product • 
Marginal revenue product 
Factor price 
Marginal factor cost 
Factor price :: 
- Value of marginal ph. product. )(. 
Marginal revenue product • 
_e":-- • 
e-1 
i+l 
E • I 
where e and e denote the elasticity of demand for product and elasticit~ 
of supply of factor respectively, By marginal revenue product we i 
mean marginal physical product times marginal revenue. The substitutio 
of marginal factor cost for marginal revenue product is justified on 
the ground that they are equal at the point of equilibrium. 
If the ratio {e/(e-1)) lCe~ 1)/~) is the same in different uses 
of a factor, values of l&'ginal physical products are equalised and 
there is no case for transference of resources. National dividend 
9! 
·-
,, 
:I 
will increase through reallocation when the ratios (e/(e-1)) .((! + 1)/~~ 
are not e~al. It ~ be seen that the divergence from optimum allocat~~n 
will vary inversely as the elasticity of demand for product and 
elasticity of supply of factor to the individual firm. 
(III) 
We have considered above the criteria, which, under different 
I 
!I 
1'1 
,, 
II 
1: 
II 
'I 
lj 
assumptions regarding imperfection, will improve the allocation of ['I 
resources among individual firms, Kahn11 considers the marginal produc,l 
of management and extends the ganeral welfare proposition to indicate li 
!I 
whether movement of entrepreneurship from nne industry to another I! ij 
or change in the number of firms will increase national dividend, A 
! 
' 
distinction is made between the hiring factor, the entrepreneur, and 
II 
the hired factors of production, The marginal physical product of an li 
i! 
entrepreneur is defined as the increment of outpu.t which society obtain~1 
as a result of the application of an additional entrepreneur to a 'j 
particular type of production, the nc.tural units of all other 
employed by industry as a whole remaining the same as before. 
factors 
1 In order , 
to relate marginal product of entrepreneurship to the maximum welfare 
proposition,two things are considered! first. the relation between the 
value of the marginal physical product of an entrepreneur and his wage 
and secondly. the relation between the value of his marginal physical 
product and his marginal social productivity. 
Under conditions of perfect competition. the entrepreneur of a 
100, 
firm which does not give rise to aDT external economies receives a 
reward equal to the value of his marginal product. The remuneration 
of an entrepreneur is given by the total value of the output he 
produces minus the outl~ on hired factors. lf a firm is. closed down 
and the factors it was employing are redistributed, output will be 
changed by an amount which is equal to the expenditure on the firm's 
output minus the value of the marginal product of hiredfactors when 
I 
i 
1: 
I' I 
li 
II, 
employed in other firms. This change in output measures the value li 
of marginal product of the entrepreneur, Since under perfect competitifr• 
the remuneration paid to the hired factors by other firms will be equal j 
to the value of their marginal physical product, it follows that the ' 
,I 
entrepreneur receives a re'll[ard which is equal to the value of his margit· 1 
product. lf external economies originate in a firm, the entrepreneur's II 
earnings will fall short of his marginal product (which is also equal lj 
I 
to the value of his marginal social product in this case) by the amount I 
I 
of economies to which he gives rise. ThUs there is perfect symmetry 
under condition of perfect competition between entrepreneur and hired II I! 
factors regarding the relationship of their earnings to their marginal ~~~ 
products. 1 
I! 
This symmetry does not hold when conditions of imperfect. competi- I 
tion operate. The hired factors receive less than the value of their 
marginal products by an amount which also measures the excess of 
entrepreneur's earnings over the value of his marginal product. This 
follows from the line of reasoning developed above. But here the 
distinction between marginal private product of the entrepreneur and 
his marginal social product is important. 
101 
Kahn takes account of two parameters to classify possible cases. 
One parameter depends on the extent to which the entrepreneur competes 
for his factors with similar entrepreneurs, working under the same 
' 
degree of imperfection as he is himself and on tbe extent, on the other 
hand, to which he competes for his factors with industry in general. 
The parameter involves the question whether and to what extent 
imperfection of competition is due to rational and irrational buyer's 
preference, This distinction is significant for welfare, 
"The imperfection of the market is purely irrational if it 
takes its origin in preferences which obtain no justificationl 
when they are satisfied, in actual enjoyment and the thwarting 
of which causes no loss of satisfaction.•? 
Irrational buyers preference is to a large extent due to ignorance, 
habit, tradition or inertia, Imperfection is purely rational if it 
takes its basis in preferences which correspond to real satisfaction. 
Imperfection as a result of cost of transport. natural conditions 
giving rise to monopoly are of the rational type, 
when imperfection of the narket is purely irrational, marginal 
private and marginal social net products ef entrepreneurship are equal. 
When the imperfection is rational, marginal social product of the 
entrepreneur exceeds the value of his marginal physical product, This 
can be further elaborated. !n case of irrational buyers• preference, 
the entrepreneur is one among many producing virtually identical 
commodities. His output represents only a small part of the total 
output of the commodity and the price for his output can be taken to 
measure the total value to socity of his output, When buyers' preferen e 
7, IBID., p. 25. 
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is rational. we are presented with the case of a single firm producing 
;I 
II 
I
ll'. 
,! 
the whole output of a single commodity. Consumers would be willing to fj 
pay a larger amount than they do for the whole output of a commod;tty ]1 
11 
rather than go without it altogether. The entrepreneur's marginal j, 
!, 
social product will be measured by his firm's physical output multiplie~ 
by its average utility (not marginal utility as in the other case) minu1i 
the value of the marginal product of hired factors. The excess of 
marginal social product over marginal physical product 
excess of the average over marginal utility of output, 
amount of output. 
is given b:r the 
multiplied by thl 
! 
if each entrepreneur competed for factors with other i entrepreneurs 11 
in the same industry and irrational Vu;1ers 1 preference exists, reward fl 
of the entrepreneur willexceed the value of his marginal social 
product (here value of marginal physical and marginal social product 
are equal) by an amount varying with the degree of imperfection of 
competition in than industry. To be more precise. marginal social iJ 
II product of an entrepreneur I; 
,, 
:his earnings- factor cost/(e-1), where e is in some sense the averagl', 
elasticity of demand for the individual firm in the particular industry 
i 
The divergence between an entrepreneur's marginal social product and ;I 
,, 
I 
his remuneration thus depends on the imperfection of competition given j· 
bye and also on the magnitude of the firm's outlay on factors, or sizei
1 I; 
and imperfection II of the firm. Apart from the nature of demand curve 
of the market, size of the firm is also influenced by technical 
conditions of production expressed by the cost curve. From the above 
anal sis, it is evident that national dividend can be increased by 
103. 
diverting entrepreneurs awa_y from any industry in which imperfection II 
of competition exceeds the average and by attracting them into any 
1 industry in which imperfection falls short of the average, The type II. 
of diversion which is called for where firms are naturally large is 
the same in direction as that which is called for where the 
imperfection of competition is great. 
Turning to the case, where imperfection is irrational and each 
entrepreneur competes for his factors of production with industry in 
general, we see that the above equation of marginal social productivi 
of the entrepreneur is still valid, when ~ implies the average 
elasticity of demand for the individual firms taken over industry as 
a whole, Since ~ is now the same in all uses, differences in 
marginal social productivity Will result from size of the firm, Once 
again, diversion of entrepreneurship from uses where firms are large 
to those where firms are small is calculated to increase national 
dividend, 
lt should not be supposed that entrepreneurs alwa_ys make a 
positive contribution to society, There ma.v be cases of redundancy 
of firms when a reduction in the number of entrepreneurs will be cond 
·iva to an increase in economic welfare, This will happen when m&rgi 
social product of an entrepreneur is negative, although his earnings 
are positive, If there are strong forces of internal economies in 
the generality of firms in any industry making for a falling average 
cost of hired factors, marginal social product of an entrepreneur in 
the industry is likely to be negative and optimum allocation requireti. 
a reduction in the number of firms in the industry. 
104. 
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Let us now take up the case of rational imperfection, Here 
8 
marginal social productivity equation is different and as Kahn puts 
it. 
marginal social product of an entrepreneur 
- his earnings - factor cost/(e-1) + addition to revenue 
caused by perfect discrimination, when ! is the elasticity of demand 
for the individual firms with which he competes for his factors of 
production, When !!. = o0 , i, e., the entrepreneur operates in a world 
of perfect competition, his marginal social product is the same as 
his total profit obtained b,y perfect discrimination, {because the 
second term on the right hand side of the above equation reduces to 
zero), lt is very unlikely, Kahn9 observes, that a firm eaening a 
positive profit will have negative marginal social product in case 
of rational imperfection. 
when each entrepreneur competes for his factors of production 
with similar entrepreneurs, it is possible that the excess of his 
marginal social productivity over his earnings will be greatest when 
competition is most imperfect, It is therefore socially desirable 
to divert entrepreneurs from subnormally imperfect industries to 
II 
abnormally imperfect ones, ln the case. whllae each entrepreneur l1 
competes for his factors with industry in general, the same conclusio~ 
holds good as indicated by different values of the third term on the 
right hand side of sooial productivity equation (~being constant), 
8, 
• 
IBID,, p. 33. 
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(IV) I 
The following significant conclusions are derived from the 
II 
aboveli 
In I analysis of R. F. Kahn's and Joan Robinson's welfare economics, 
the first place, the above writers make a significant contribution 
to welfare economics by extending Pigou1 s general welfare proposition 
to the case of imperfect competition, In doing so, they start from 
the same assumptions, including the measurability of utility and 
interpersonal comparison of utility, which Pigou makes, In Pigou's 
system of simple competition with an admixture of monopoly, the 
general welfare proposition that marginal social product of resources 
must be e~alised in all uses is reduced to the particular propoaitio 
that marginal private andmarginal social products must be equalised 
in every use, Guided by the practical interest which Pigou has, 
I 
I 
II 
I 
Robinson and Hahn consider that Pigou 1 s model does not fit with reali y; 
imperfect competition conforms more to actual practice, Perfect 
competition implies the e~ality of marginal cost and price; imperfec, 
competition in the product market, on the other hand, leads to a 
divergence between marginal cost and price. When the divergence 
between marginal cost and price is general due to imperfect coapetiti n, 
an attempt at their equalisation is not good economic policy andis 
also not a necessary condition for the maxim~ of welfare, The 
equalisation of marginal social products can be brought about by 
making the ratios between marginal prilvate and marginal social 
products equal, In other words, what is called fDr in a system of 
imperfect competition is not the equalisation of faetcCir price and 
106, 
value of marginal physical product of resources but of their ratioa 
in different uses (apart from external economies), When there are 
external economies or diseconomies, values of marginal private pro-
ducts and marginal social products Will not be the same and the 
relevant ratio which requires equalisation is then , given by that 
between factor price and value of marginal social product, We have 
seen that the divergence between factor price and value of marginal 
private product can aecu.e from two sources. imperfect competition 
in the product market and imperfect competition in the facotr market 
and the existence of any of these two types of im~erfection in 
une~el degrees in the economy results in a deviation from the 
optimum, One important point m~ be mentioned in this connection, 
Apart from the issue of dealing with imperfect competition, Kahn 
and Robinson give a more general interpretation of Pigou1 s welfare 
proposition than what Pigou himself does, The equality of factor 
I 
costs and value of marginal private products under perfect competitio 
can be regarded as a special case of the equality of the ratios 
between factor costs and values of their marginal social products. 
To take account of imperfect competi~ion, Kahn and Robinson do not 
restrict the value of elasticity of demand for product 0r for factor 
to infinity and thus their system gains in generality. 
Secondly, it is seen that ~igou's welfare proposition can be 
interpreted to yield many interesting results which Pigou does not 
discuss, Thus Kahn considers the marginal social product of 
entrepreneurship and develops the cr6terien of determining the 
107, 
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imperfect competition. Of course, the whole discussion revolves 
round the distinction between rational and irrational consumers' 
preferenee. 
1
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Thirdly, Kahn considers the possibility that economies originati~g 
F 
By broadening the '!
1 
in one industry may spread to other industries. 
definition of external economies and marginal social product, he 
includes the cases which are excluded from the Pigouvian system, 
In Kahn's analysis. firms rather than industries become the center 
importance. Marginal social product indluaes the total out!)llt due 
i 
I 
'I 
'I I I 
ofJ 
i 
to 1 
the application of sesources by any firm, no matter whether the out-
put accrues to the industry of which the firm is a member or not. 
I 
I 
I we have noticed that Pigou considers tha case of increasing and 
decreasing cost industries and suggests inter-industry transference I 
of resources for increasing the national dividend., Kahn•, emphasizing[/ 
on the role of firms, brings out the case for intra-industry movement I 
of resources, even when there is no justification for transference i 
of resources between industries. Thus when economies originate in 
a subsidiary industry, transference of factors vertically from the 
lower to higher stages of production in calculated to increase 
~ational income, even though nohorizontal diversion of resources is 
called for. 
Finally, while dealing with the realistic case of imperfect 
rl 
I) 
I 
I 
II 
l 
II 
11 
competition, Kahn does not offer any easy solution so far as practicat 
policy is concerned. HE" also advocates the fiscal devices of taxes II 
and bounties. But fiscal control geared to bring about the optimum 
allocation of resources when the degrees of monopoly power wiEI.laed 
II 
I 
by different industries vary within wide limits, is exceedingly 
difficult tooperate. The estimation of the divergence between factor 
cost and value of marginal social product and fixation lllf an optirum 
rate of tax or bounty are in fact baffling problems. Dealing with 
perfect competition, on the other hand, Kahn suggests an easier 
solution. He discovers that most of the external economies take 
place in subsidiary firms being worked below optimum capacity. 
In Pigou 1 s analysis, the nature and amount of tax or bounty depend 
on a comprehensive examination of the supply curve of industries from 
the standpoint of the community. This is rather vague and confusing 
for the reasons discussed above. Kahn'makes a @ore specific and 
clear-cut recommendation. He advocates bounties to lumpy investments 
being worked below optimum capacity, like railways, public utilities, 
eta. 
To sum up, Kahn and Robinson improve upon Pigou1 s thesis without 
making any assumption conflicting with Pigou 1 s. We shall now 
examine the eontribution made by new welfare economics. 
109. 
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(I) 
l61ch ot t.he contJ:'OYel'q after the publication ot Pi&OU t 1 olanio 
tre&tiH 0411lterld round the qtWation of t.he IRII&IIIl"ability of utility 
and intel'p81"10D&l 00lllp&l'i11011 ot utility. We have eeen that Pi&OU 
macle both the .. aalllllptiona. 1l"CCII the potltulate that lll&l'ginal utility , 
of inoou to different indiud.uall li't'ing in a oomraunit.;y b the aame, 
he derived hie pl'Opolition ot equal distr.l.bllt1on of ino01118 u a neoesa"". 
err c:oaalUrliiiiP ot the m•x1a!saticm ot welfare. 'l'he acceptance ot 
utility oaloulua enabled h1lll to regard the lin ot the li&J'ginal social . 
product as the me&IUl"e ot 1noreaN in eubjeot.i've economic welfare. 
'lhe attempt. that waa being JUde to tree the analTiia ot 'Value 
!rom the auumpt.ion of the 1118&111J'&bilit;y of utility had ita impact. on 
wlfare economic e. Robbins~ 1 llal'l1iQg that eoonomieta ahould keep &llq 
trora preeonptiona becauae intel'p81"11011al ooapariiJOil of utilit;y is not 
poasible appears to have had - etteot on hie contemporaries. a. F. 
Harrod, however, had a diasentient wice and in an addre .. published 
in the Eoc:l10llio JOUJ.'Ilal, he obefi' ••• 
•It the inoOIIIpU'abilit.;y ot utility to different. indin-
duale 1e etriot:cy preaeed, not onl7 are preecriptiona ot the 
wlfare aobool ruled out., but. all preiOl'iptiona llbateftr. 
'lh8 eccmom1at u an ad.naer is acaplete]¥ etult1tied and • • 
he had better be auppreaaed oomplet.eJ¥. Ho .. - IIOl"t. ot 
uo. 
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poetulate ot equality baa to be uw.cl. Jlll.t J.t llhould be 
c~ framed and uaed with great oaution. 
s~ af'tlerwards, H. Kaldor3 dlniaed a •tbod to cizootmmnt. the 
ditt1cul.t.y J"Hnted by the p1'0blea ot iutel'pea'eonal cCIIIIpiQ'iaon ot 
utility, 'l'bis ingenious deYice wu reedil,y ~ up by Hick8. The 
literature on veltare IICIOilOI!doe vbioh waa developed on the buil ot 
this retin011l81lt has been ca.lled lev Weltan Economice. lconoaiat.s 
belonging to this group, apart. .from 111nor dii'tlller.cea, have att81111ptecl1 
with a methodological rigol" charact.Gl'iatio of Panto, to prel«lt a 
scientitieall;y aceeptabla veltare econold.oa, tree trom the bleld.ah ot 
interpersonal oomperiaon of utilit.;r. They have defined the optimum 
and deri'ftd its propertiu. Bergson and Samuelson have toousaecl 
attention on the number and nature ot assumption11 involved in veltare 
economics, epeciall,y assumption about ends. At the same time they 
have proYided the framework ot a 110re generalized wel.t'are · economics. 
Old welfare eoonomics had bean e:xpoeed to a dual attack, on the 
ot utilit.7 as a cardinal number. New welfare economice has tried to 
awic:l both these pit.talle. It ill aeen that. a theory ot veltare eco-
nad.oe oan be oonlt.noted without. 8DJ' assw11.pt1on as to the aeUUZ'abili..; ,, 
t.7 ot utilit.y. fhie implies abaV&oUoD trom oonsiderat.iona ot incOIIB , 
distribution. Pract.icall,y epeald.na, 8DJ' chanp in auoc .. tional. etti-
ciCM~~T will inwlw change in incoae distribution. Hew welfare eco-
:; - -- ----- ----
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:: nomios bas llbo11111 ~ba~ ~bese ~'110 taoe\s o£ welfare can be Hgll'ep.ted 
;) 
ij and an 8COI1CIIIIist is in a position to prescribe about etfioienc7 ot the 
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eo0DC11171 without entering into distributin considerations. 
In the new s;rstem, utilit7 as an ordinal JII&&Dit'lllle replaces 
util1~7 as a cardinal measure. 'fbis 1e not nOWJ 1~ bas 'be«l seen tba~ · 
Pareto lllliPlo1ed the SIJRe dnice. 'fhe de!inition ot uUllt7 u a cardi-1 
nal number requires the speoitioation ot utillt7 units. !he ordinal 
de!inition implies that we sbwld be able to SllJ1 taet t.hat a &inn 
indi'fidual either prefers one ocabination o! cornmoditiea, x. to anot.hai 
coro1Wlat1on1 7t or praters 7 to x or that he is indifferent. between ~• 
two J seaond1 that preferences are tnneit.ift,; i.e. 1 it comlrlnation x 
1s preferred to eomldnation 7 and 7 ia preferred to a, then x ia pre-
tarred to 1, and third., that the aoale ot preterence is definite 1 i.e., 
no two inditterence curves have a COlillliOn point. 
The iaport.ance o£ now vel.t'are eoonOIIIioe lies in a definition o£ 
optiaua orp.nisation o£ the soonOIIic qatem which does not require 
interpersonal -pariaon o£ utility. Following Xaldor, Hicu defines 
a11 optiaua organization •u one in which every 1ndi'f1clual is u well 
:1 ott u he em be made, aubjeot to the oonditioll that no reorganisation 
ll i peJ'IIitt.ed shall make any individual worse otr•.4 This can be f'llrther 
i elaborated. According to the &bon definition, wl.t'are increaaea when . 
11 one or IIIOl"e 1ndi'fiduals becaae better ott and none 1111rae ott. But 1110A,, 
I! 
11 ot the economic policies are llkel¥ to better the conditiolls ot acme 
ii 
!l in4i'f1duals, wb1le cauaing injur;y to ot.hare. Hiolul introduces in this :, 
i! 
•! 
-· Hicks, J.R., "'the Foundations ot Weltare EconOIIic .. , Eeoom1o 
Jmwt•l' Deoeaaber 1939. 
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COlll'leotion the concept of aompenatioa. A tax or bounty l.nied upon 
or pa14 to an indiT.ldual is compenating when it leavee him in the 
nat of an eo01101111c reorganisation c the 1181118 incl1tfannca nrfaca, 
he voulcl bave been on had the reorganization not ocCUl"l'8d. With the 
aid of this deT.lce of canpeneation, & 1110re precise detinition of the 
optimum can be given. 
IJWelfare willbe increaeed, cleoreased or lett. unchanged 
by a given eoonomie reorganization dependins upon whether 
the algebraic sum of all GOmJ!IIIla&ting taxes and bounties is 
positive, negative or zero.•!' 
Therefore, an optimum organization is one in which the introduction 
of ~ cban&e in economic polley cannot lll&ke the sum of OCIIlpenaating 
taaa net of bounties po6it1Te. 
this detiLition of optimum, ae Hicks and others point out, ia not 
unambiguous. "There will be an indefinite number of difi'erent posaible 
optima, distinguished from one another by differences in the distribu- · 
tion o1' eocial wealt.h.•6 But this handicap is not decisi-ve, The concU.rr 
t.iODs of optimum can be derived trora ita dei'ini.Uon. If lilT part.i~ 
situu.tion is not in optimum, there is a definite sense in which i~ 
efi'ic18D07 can be incl'II&SodJ - individuals can be made better ott, 
without caueing ~- inj\l1'f to others. 
Hicks lllllkes the important distinot.ion botween three aeta of opti-
IIIIIDI conditions, l'lllll8~, (l) mar&inal oonditiona, (2) etabil!.ty condi-
tions, and (.3) total oond1tiona. the last two seta of comlit.iona are 
ae important ae the fil"'lt one. Theu cond1tiona have been ltated by 
3. m, K.W., St,nd2!f ill1li! :S'.Iu!lrz .Itt )If rye 13ru?rerlll•• Hew Iork, 
Columbia Univeraity Pieea, ~p-;I6t • 
6. Hioka,. Sb?.-&!1· 
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Hicks lllld reata~ed, both 11~ and u~h-~1call1'1 b7 a gou.p of 
econOIIIi.Re -uonecl abo'fe. we ehall brietl,y ata~e here ~hen ~· 
-"• of condit.iorle. 
(1) *tf1ne] !!t?P!!U.1ws 0: op~1=1 
(a) 'l'he lll&l'g;lnal rat.e ot llllbetJ.~ution be~wen 1117 ~wo oo•odU1ee 
IIUR be ~he .... tor •YIII"7 indi'ri.dlaal vho con~~~~~~~ts both. 
Allooa~ion ot aonnodi t.ies IIIIOCii aonauaere v1ll not. 'be opt.1lll&l. eo 
long u 1117 indi'Yidual can iapro'n hie poeit.ion b7 uchenp wi~h ot.h_,. 
'111\bou~ ulr1ng ~worn ott. 'l'hie oan be wr1t1ecl gecmeVioalq b;y 
~aldng ~he cue of ~wo 1ndi1'1duale A act B and a pair of OCID'IM)Q1t1ee 
X and I. 'l'he preference ~~~&ps of A and B are denoted b7 an inareamng 
aequenoe ot inditferenae ourvee I ,II ,III et.e. lllld I • ,II • ,m • ,et.e. 
reapect.iwq. Le~ ue ae~t~JM ~t. A and B each po ..... 80il8 of both 
couaocl1t.iee X lllld I. A con'hDieat ~ ot repreaen~ing We ei~uat.ion 
1n a dia&nm to find ou~ what the opt.imum would be to place the 
inditterence aap of A on t.hat. ot B with their oo--ordina~es rnersed, 
ao that. t.he pointe of int.ereect.ion of t.he co--ordinate axes of the two 
indii'terenoe qet.eu are ginn b;r '"'- total llliOUI1t. ot X and I poeeeSMdi 
~~~~~--~~+-~~ 
I 'A' 
Figure 14 '(' 
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OK IUid Cll are total qwmtitiea ot X IUid Y posaeaeed by A and B. 
I 
" 
The locua 00' ot the pointe ot tan&81107 ot the tw indittennce I)'Stelu• 
1e known as the oontraot 0\lrfto It il •atd.l¥ IINil that 8117 oolllbination 
ot o""""'Vlitie• which is not on the contract. CIUI'ft 11 not oonlillt.tlrlt 
with optimum and at leaat cae ot the individuale can 1mproTe hie poli• · 
tion without entailing aaoritioe on the other by mYing to a point on 
the oontzoact 0\lrft through a prooeu ot exchange. W Q repreeent the 
initial lituationJ it 1188111 that A poiHIHI OP ot I and. Ill ot Y and 11 , 
Al ot I aDd Jill ot r. Q liee on a point ot intereeotion ot t.w indittQ!i. 
ence 0\lrftl ot A and B1 which are lower than IV and. V' relpiOtiftl.T. 
Both 1ndi Yid.ual.a will be better ott by !lOVing to the point Q • on the 
contract OU1'ft which lie• on higher 1ndittereno1 CUl"'el tor bOth ot 
th•• to arrive at the new lituation1 A will have to emhange BS ot t ' 
'I 
j: tor PI' ot I. ~ anaqlil, it will be tound. that tor 8117 OCllllbination 
' 
,, ot CI(I!•'P"'ditiee on tbe oontraot CIUI'ft oo•, there are (lC!!!!b5nation• ot 
OQI!!!IOtU.tiee on the oont.net CIUI'ft which are optiaua in the llltllle d.efiDdi 
above. Thill it we oonllid.er the o-b'nation of ocaaod.itiea given by e 
in the above dia#•, A IUid B will reach the optiaua by ahitting 
through exchange to 8117 ot the oe.binationa ot OQI!!!!Od.itiu represented. 
by the eepent DE on the contract ...... At the eeae tille, it ia evi-
l dent that eo long as we abatraot fli'Cia d.ietributive oonlid.erationa, thelt 
I ii 11 no criterion tor cGmparison ot the d.itte.rent. optima given by oo•, 
II 
11 Each point on oo• 1a optimum in a relatin eeneeJ we han no guide 
I' 
1
: according to new weltare eooncmoa ot f1nd.5ng out the abeolute vxlmm., 
' The tan&eno7 ot the inditterenoe II,Vat.l ot A and B implies the 
1: 
-~- ........,., ..... ..,.....,_ ...... , ......................... t ..... :. 
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point of equillbr.LUIIl and our tirat. marg:l.nal. conditiorl. 1a vv.lfiecl. 
(b) The eeoaod marginal OODdit.ion of mmwm wltare we cm call the 
condition of opt1lllum allooatiorl. ot pl'Oduct.a UIOili tiru .. ,)ptiwua 
degee of tJpeOial.1.aatiorl.. It atatea that t.be mariin&l rate of trane-
to:rmation between Ill:¥ t110 pl'Oduota •at. be the aame . tor an:y pa;I.Jo of 
tiru which produce bot.h. 
to pl'Oft th1a anaqt.icalJ¥ aDCl diagraaat1cal.lT1 we &HUM the 
1: m~•;.ttf an;r t'IIO t1ru A• tiDd s•, both produeins o• ;clitia• x 
I! aDd. Y, ~ the IIIIIOUllt of the taotora eaoh tim uaea and of the other 
' products it producea are conlltarita The poallible OOilllbina\ion of o< 1 dS,.i. 
tiea t.h&t a firm can produce under the• conditione will be &i:nn 'bJ a 
transformation OUl'ft which, nnlib tile preference CIUZ"fte of the oon-
auaer• will he concan t.o the origiD. !hie 1a due t.o the rm u ar 
principle of d1m1n:lah1ng ntuma. All 1110re of cme product. 1a produced, 
t.ha IIIIIOUDt of the other pi'Oduot aaoritioed inonana. Here, apin, t.o 
find out optiwua, tranato:rmation 11J11ta of producer 8 1 1a COIIIpOUDdecl 
on that of producer A' with co-oi\Unatecl reTernd eo that po:l.nta ot 
interaect.iorl. of co-ordinate a:ua are giYen by the total 8110UDt of X 
and r produced by t'IIO firu. 
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In Figure 151 the two tl'allatormatian curves AB and CD haw bee 
eo 1111parilllpoaed that the total IIIIOUilt of X and Y pi'Oduced is danot.e4 
b7 C»1 (Cil b7 At {. RM b7 B') and <II (01' b7 At /> 'fl by Bt) reapeotiwq. 
It can be shown that. there ia no opt.1aum when the tl'allatOl'JI&t.ion OUJ."Yeer 
intersect. Let. us IIIO"N the tnnatormat.ian CUI"'e ot B' t.o the right 't.i.J. 
it ia tanput t.o the tl'allato&'lll.t.ion ovn of A'• In the nw situation · 
vhich is represented by the dotted linea, the pl'QdUCt1on of both 
oO!!!QOditiee X sncl I increases b7 an amount MM' and Nil' reapect.iwq. 
P is, hcnlewr, Gr1l¥ one ot the maD7 points where CD can be made tangent. 
t.o AB. It we locate the origin of the dotted aaa ott at ~point ill 
the area IO''Lt ~ cOIIliiiCil point of em and .AB ldll illvolw a &l'Rt.el' 
total outpo.t ot both X and Y, than 1t the origin wre at. o•. !he 
rneJ1mup looua lO"J. will evicltlrlt.q depenci upon what oombilla\ion ot 
oCI!"''d1t1ea t.he 1'1l"u were 1n1M al 17 pl"'duaillg. The opt.illla GOIIIbina-
tian ot out.Jlllh cannot be uni.quaq detel'lll1ned b'om thie d1agaa alGI'leJ 
it DICtZ'8l¥ illdioatee a nece88al'y oonditian of the optimup. this condi-
11 t.iGI'l 18 t.hat. outp11ta .lllll8t. be pl'Oduoed ill auoh combinaticme. that the 
1: 
11 lll.opea of the tnnatOl'lll&t.ion CIUI'ftll of ~ tMo tizu are equal. 
(o) A t.h1rd marginal oanditiGI'l ot 'M'Ci- welfare re~t.e• t.o opt1llll1 
allooatiGI'l of fact.ora. the second m&r'g1nal. cond1t1411l 8howa whether 
t.he l'8d.1.8tribut1on of tact.we !ltJdp t1ru ldll 1nu'eue welfare. '1'he ' 
t.h1rd marginal candit.ian ocmcema the poaaild.llty ot 1ncreae1na the 
output ot ~ part.ioul.a.r cGIIIIIOdit;r1 the quantity ot other pi'Oducta 
I' e1nina oonetaDt, through a rediaUo.liN.tiGI'l •• Ill tilu. the oondi ... , 
t.1on of opt.ism al.]l)cat.ion ot faot.ore ie that t.he lll&l"ginal teobn~ cal 
l"&t.e ot llllb.UtutiGI'l betwen 8117 pa1zo ot fact.o:n muat be the .... tor 
-~=-----=:...----_ -~-- -
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azq two t1ru using both to produc. the 1181118 product. 
A diagnmmatic presentation mq be gi.TIIIl by t.ald.ns the cue of 
two !iru At and B' using tw !acton X and I to produce a particular 
COJ!I!IIld1ty. It ie usumed that tacton other than X and I and the t.ot.a:L, 
quantity of X and Y a\'811able to the t.110 firma a.re oonet.ant. On thelle ' 
aaSUIIIpt.iona w can draw a ~ ot ieoproduot 0\II'Yel f~ the t.110 
firma which will be conve.x to the orisin• The fam' J' ar )a'Oeedul'o of 
!i 
1, Bitting one indifference syata on another with co-ordinate• J."'fftl'eed 
II 
:! is alao ueed here. The points of intersection of cOOl'dinate u.a 
denote the total quantity of taotora X and I available to the t.1IO t~ 
y ' 
-x:-..' <--+-- ·-,--..:;_--,4 
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In Figure 16, I,n,ni, ••• an ieoproduct ourTe~~ tor tim A' and 
i' 
I' I•,n•,m•, ••• tor tim B'• leopl'Oduot ourYee of higher ordere mean 
f: 
a lal'pr quantity of pl'Oduot.. '1'houah theN CIU"fte look like COiiiNIUI'e • 
indiffeNiloe OUI'fta, their import b totallT ditfeNilt. '1'he elope ot 
1adi!f8NI1Ce cunas lltiUU1"ee the IUbjeoti'ft mar&inal rata of subet.it.u- . 
t.ion between tw oOI!f!!O'U.tiea, whil.e the slope of iiiOpl'OCI.UCJt cunae 
relates to the lll&l"&inal teobnical nta of 111bat.itution aa det.and.nad 
by the tecbnique of production. It ie NeU.y eeen that the opt.ilaul 
116 
proportion of !actora between the two fil'lllS is gi van by the l.Dcus of 
the points of tansency of· iaopl'Oduct curvee. Corre.ponciing to 81J.Y 
allocation of factora gi'lell by a point l,y1ng outside the lDwe, then 
will be a. range of values on the lDcua llbich will increala the output 
of both firma or one of the f1ftu 1d.thout decreasing the output of the · 
other firm. Since the pointe of tangenoy denote the equaliu.tion of 
the marginal technical rate of aubltitution between f'1nla, the third 
'I li
1 
(d) The fourth marginal conditioa ~ be t81'1118C1 the optialm factor 
product nlationship. It atatee tbat the marginal rate of tranafOl'lll&- i 
tion between 81J.Y factor and 8A7 pNd.uGt la\lt be the flallle for 8ll.Y pair 
ot firma uaing the factor and procluo1na the product. 
:Let ue take the oue of tw f1:&'IIUI At and B 1 and a vari&ble factor 
X and a variable product Yo It il a .. •llll9d. that the total a1110unt. of 
pNd.uots other than Y produced by each f'il'm and t'aotora other than X 
uaed in each t.1rm are conatant. .&110 the total quantity of factor X ~ 
'( 
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In li'igure 171 the tranalormation curve of firm B1 ia lllperimpoaed ,· 
on that or firm A' with co-.ordinatee re'ferlled. 'fhe optilllum will be 
given b;y reading the larpllt qwmt.ity ot output on the Y...u::Le1 aub~ 
to the constraint of the quantity or factor limited to OP. Otm.ousJ,y 
at the point ot tangency oi t.he two \ranat'OZ'lllatian cunea, t.he l.Arpllt 
quantity ot X will be pl'Oduoecl lJIIIi8l' the given oonditiawl. fhua the 
fourth marg;lnaJ. condition of wltare is elltabliahed. 
(e) fhe optimula distribution of pi"'ductiant 1'he first -.rginal condi .. , 
tion 1mpliea that whatever ia pNcluoed ia diatributecl 8IIIOili coniUID81'8 
in the befit poellible 'll'q• The aeoond, thil'd aod !~h mars1naJ. condi-olr 
tiona apeaity that whatever ia pl'Oduoeclllllllt be pi.'Oduoed in the moat. 
efficient ~· 1'he tilth marliDal oGildit.ion ia a 8;Vlltheeia of lllb-
jective aod tecbnical opt.ima. 
It 
SUppolling that all tactora ot prOduction are allocated in IIQIUI 
detird.te ~ which alao determine the quantitiea o! 11al'ioua oOIIIIIOditiea 
produood, we 1111q ooneUuct. a ~ t mit7 t.ranatormatian CU1"'fe between all1!' 
pair of procluota I and IJ this OurYe P,vea tor arq quantit7 ot I, the 
ma:rlm• amo\lllt ot X that OAI'1 be pl"'ducecl1 given the amotmt ot other 
products aod the supplies or othcl' raot.on. The condition ot opt;ilua 
&eotion oi pi'OdUCJtion ia that t.he -.rp.nal rate or aubatitut.ion 
bet,wen arq pair of pl"'ducta tor 1¥117 person conenm1na both 11118\ be the • 
eame aa the marginal rate of \ranalGI'IIation tor the .._m1t7 betwen 
tba. 
In Ji'1&1U'e 181 AB ia the o• m1~ t.ranatormation CUl'ft• Suppoa1.na!, 
that fQ ot I aod OQ or X are bein& pJ.'Oduoed, thAt marg1Dal rate ot ~ 
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tol'll&tioll is given 'lq the alepe ot the kngent U'. It a oonauaer 
allocates hie reiiCIIU"Oee eo that. hie IIW"&inal rate ot ftbatitut.ion ot 
X tor I ia given by the alepe ot CD, he can improve hie poait.ion, 
without. mald.ns ot.hera wrae ott, 'lq aub.Ut.ut.ins X tor t at. a rate .. 
gi'ND by t.h11 elope ot EP. Whan the IIW"&inal rate ot aubat.it.ut.ion ot 
1117 oonlllllllel' ia equal t.o lll&l'&inal rate ot t.eolmical t.nnatol'll&tion to't' 
the oa-m1t.y1 there 1• 110 fW\her acope tor improv 1m. 
(t) fhe opt.iraua allocation ot a tact.or-wdt.'• t.iraea 'lhia reten t.o 
th11 allooat.ion ot time t.o wl'k and leiave. For veltare t.o be a IIIUi-
111111111 the lll&l'glnal rate ot aubat.it.utioll bat.w.1 t.he ..,unt. ot 1117 
prociuot· received tor ai41ns in ita production and the houra apent. in 
l'Clderins t.hia a14 lllUA be the ,_. tor each tact.or unit cnm.er u the 
IIU"glnal rate. ot tl'IUlatormation bat.'llll4111 the ~ ot hia taotor unit 
apent in aidins produot.ion and t.h11 pl'O(iuct. In other l!IOI'da, the 
" 
rward. (in teru ot nwaeraire) that ia paid t.o the cnm.er ot a tact.or 
unit lllUA be equal t.o the Talue (in t.eru ot nUII\eraire) ot the IIIAl'~ 
pi)Tiica!. product ot the tactQl' unit.. 
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In Figure 19 the CUl"Ye8 eoDftX to the x-axie :represent an inditt-t 
ence map, each CUl"Ye expreeeing the eomb1nat1on of houre spent by the 
factor unit in aiding production and the 81110\Ult of reward :recei'hd 
among vhich factor unit'• owner ie inditt~. I,II, etc. are a 
riein& sequeace of thie type of 1ndi!fe:rence curves. QA 18 the trana- ' 
formation CurYII between houre aper.r\ b;y the factor unit in the produc- ; 
t1G11 or ! and the quantity or t produced. Optiurum ie indicated b;y ttt. 
point of tengency of the tnne!G~~U.tion OUl'Ye and the indi!ference 
CurY11 of the owner of the tactol' unit (Q).. At R, the factor unit cn11~: 
v1ll find it profitable to put in a tw 11101'8 hours ot work and - to 
a higher inditterence CIIM't'Jt tor t.he reward it reoeivee per unit of 
U. 18 11101'8 than the reward it -u requil'e to compeneate tor an 
additional hour of work. S1m1 J er]¥1 the owner of ttt. factor unit, it 
initial17 confronting a aituation 9,ftll b7 81 can illlproTe ita pold.tion . 
by workin& lees hours and 1110-.ins to the o~ point Q. 
(g) Reder adde a aixt.h condition vhich nlatee to allocaticm at 
clUflll'Gt pointe of t.:!.me. Procluote and factor• at different pointe of l . 
. • O~-~ ~ can be l'eprded ae different produote arld :aot,C)r• and their eJJoe't 
" I I 
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li 
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tion .followe t.he ,_ principl .. aa deliCribed above. So tar aa 
reiJO\U'Cie cont&'ol (a lund o! n~) which can be ueed to purchaae 
goode aDd aerv:l.cee) is CQilOemed; the oondition tor ~imua can be 
atated. aa .follows. The ~~~&rginal. rate o! aubiJI:.itution bet.veen resource 
cont.l'ol. at 8IJ:T pair o! ~t• (1oi and. tj ) is t.he same for ewcy pair.· 
of individual or i'iru (including paire, one~ oi' which 1a a tift&' 
and the other &ll individual). In otheJ" WOZ'da, ii' individ.ual. A ia 
willing to lend $1.0 at t.illl8 to fOil' I 2.0 at time t.21 aDd B is vD Hng 
to bol:'l"'W t 1.0 at to !or 1110re thAD $ 2.0 at time t11 both lendw aDd 
borrower will benefit 'b7 o~U'1'71D& the t.renaaot.ione to the point where 
the IIIU'ginal. rate o! IIU'biJI:.it.ution between the lllliOUDt. of 11101187 lent. a\ 
to 8Dl! reoeiftd a\ t.1 tOll' the lender is the ._ aa the aar&inal rate 
of IIU'b.Ut.uUon bet- tbe ..,_t. of a:mq borrowed a\ to aDd pUll 
'baok at. t1 tor tbe borrower. 
(2) 8tf!J1Up; o91!dit.1op! ot p 1=J 'the 8bove lliT8I1 oencliUoa.e are 
D808Mal7 Oondit.iona of opt.iaula, bllt. not. auttioient. oondiu.n.. they 
oan aa 1lltll oeniJI:.itute oondit.lona tor Jdn1m1aat.ion of welfare unleq 
we preaoribe aou eeoond order OCIIIditiene 11bich relate t.o the ourw,.. 
ture of ditterent. indittmmce .,..... Puit.iona where IIIU'ginal. 
oondit.iCIIle are atiatiecl will incHoate aer!WJm welfare in that neigh. 
borhooci1 it and. onlT it tbe oonllliiU' inclitterenoe CN&"YM; 1~ 
C1U"tQ aDd taotor unit's inditteftDOe OUI'YII are convex t.o the Oltigin, 
1fhUe the t.ranatormation OIU:'fto ud -.rlinal produot11'it7 OUI'YII are 
cCIIloave to it.. .l lese etringerdl 00Dd1t.1on will be that all inditterenC~~~t 
auwa (1nclJMUng 1eoproduct CN&"YM) in the area be leu oonoave t.o t.h8 
--·-==·---.. +~-- .:---r.Sn ~~--U.* •neforr·*'m '""'' :-. flw.-IICI:lY!IldV ol omrmer-' :: 
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iru:!itterence cu.rvee denote tHm1n1ah1ng marginal. rate of IUbnitution 
.,. 
between cOIIIIIIOditiee, The conoa'1-t.Y of transformation cur'YQ is due 
t.o ~be aaumption that there ia a di"'iniehing marginal rate of tran ... 
C'l,O- ' 
fol'lll8.tion between any product and any t&ctor - or any pair ~ucts 
.... - . 
given the quantities of all other factor a used anc products produced 
ii by tile giYen tirDI, 
It (3) MpHg conditiontJ Tht. tunction of the total corulitiona is to 
r: 
!1 ine-Ul"81 H.icke observe•• t~t -:10 illlpro'ftlllent can be brought about by H 
' ----~-
1: 
the COlllplete abandonment of production or con8Uillption ot 8CCle one 
cOillmodity• either in one producin& or consuming unit or gener&ll,y; 
and that no improvement can be eeoured by the introduction of new 
cOllllllOditiee which would have been produced or conaUIIed eithll' part.iallt' 
or generally in the initial eit\l&tion• Similar conditions liWit. hold. 
for factora. The whole eet of ma:d•a conditione ma,;y be atated in 
tel'lll8 of total conditione. 
lllf welfare i_ll to be a "D_, it IIIU&t be impossible to 
increue it bf ~ the out.ptlt ot 8ll7 produot by 8117 t1a 
(including variationa t.rom H1'0)J by var,y1ng the a;no.mt of any 
~ conll:lllle4 b7 8117 con...., (1ncludillg ftriationa t:.. 
llllll'O)J or by varying the 81110111lt. of any factor unit uaec! tot' 
;,ield. d1Not. aenioe to 8117 il:ldi'fidual (including ftri&Uoru; 
fl'olll 1111'0). •7 
AD opthlua organ1Mtion of the ecCIIlCIIQ' will, thal'etore, in't'ol:n 
the atiltaotion of all three lilte of conditione. It can be eholln by 
a couple or illuatrationa that the• oonditions 111a7 not hold. a:IJ:IW.tan ... 
124. 
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In Figure 20, AB an<! CD are trw-ormation Cl.ll"Yel ot two ~. 
At the point P, the mar~al condition , 1a aatistied. But it ie not a 
stable positicl (the trans!ormation OIU'YV CD being convex to the ori-
gin) as can be eeen 'by any movement oi CD to the right which increuee • 
the output of both the ccmmodities X aru:l I. P does not a.lao fulfill 
total conditions as evident traD. the dotted linea. The quantities ot 
X and I pi'O<IUCJed will increue tn. what they are at P 1 it the firm 
Af concentratee on the production ot Y and B' on x. 
'( I ~---8,----:oq 
O' . 
I 
I 
~---~~~~--~~F-· -=-----+>x 
J'1&ure 21 
lJI F1&ure n, at the point Q, both marcinal and &tabil ity condi-
tiona are eatietied, but not. the total conditione. Fl'Olll the dotted 
OU1"N 0 tDI it is clear that output ot both X and Y will inCl'ftee if 
tlul til'll A' producee o~ X and the t1ra B' ~ Y. 
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(Il) 
The conditione of opt.imua han been atated wUbout. any refe1"811Ce 
t.c the prioe •;rat•• We ahall at.tept. here a brlit.t t.reat.r.:lt. of t.he 
bearing of t.he prioe 8fllt.• on the OODditione of uy1mm wel!an. It. 
ie found con'ftllient. to d.iacu .. thia 1d.t.hin the fft'l nel'k of JAmezo•J' 
achcaa, though eeeent.iallT llim11ar U... han been pzoeaentect b7 ot.he%' 
econon1 eta of nw wltan achool. x.mer pNaenta en errq of tin 
equat.ione which can be Wl'itt.en in the !ora, 
ub•liiJl•IIIJI'I'•IIJIO••·-· 
When, ll8b a llal'ginal aooial benefit, i.e., benefit t.o aociet;r baa a 
ii. pari.icular i.ncz'etmt of output of pill'Oltuot conaideredJ 
il 
I! 
.. 
'I 
:1 
" I' 
/! 
!, 
-:;:;:,.o_-t· 
'! 
111p : Yal.ue of the lii&Z"ginal pJ"'dut 1 
IIIJI'I' : IIU'pnal. private rll'fllllU81 i.e., the increaae in rennue race1'¥8Cl ; 
b7 t.he producer u a reeult of. produoina t>Dd nlllng an increaant of 
outplltJ 
11J10 c lll&l'pnal. private coet, i.e. 1 1ncl'8ue in cost inCUZ'l'ed b7 the 
preclucer e.e a reeult. of increasing the quant.it.;r of fe.ct.o:r he pul'Chaaea , 
to eraable him to pl'04uoe an incNBent. ot output J 
Wit a Yal.ue of the lll&l'gillal. fact.cr. !hie ie t.he pbTsi.cal i.ncz'eent 
ot the te.ct.or of produot.ion mult.iplj.ed b7 the price per' unit paid m 
it arid. 1:"8Ceiftd b;r the owner of the factorJ and 
uc : lll&l'&inal eocial coat, i.e., t.he eacntice t.c aociet;y baa ha'Yina 
tbe IIIU'pnal. tact.cr uaed up in the panioula:r uae under conaicleration, 
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so that it ie not available tor uu elsewhere. l'arginal eocial coat 
ot a factor in a particular uee ie, in other words, marginal eocial 
benefit accruing from it in other uaee and can be thus rezard.ed as 
social opportunity coat, 
It will be seen that under certain aaeumpt1ons1 the above five 
equation• are satietied and the7 are per!ect]Jr eoneiatent with the 
conditions of max!Jllum welfare. Lerner aleo uses the equation; to 
reveal criteria of policy under different. inetitutional cond1eratione01 
Thus in a complete]Jr centralized collectivist econoll\Y, the HL"lietr;y ot _ 
Economic Planning will direct]Jr equate msb a.nd msc by shitt.ing resourofl• 
from points where they are leas uaetul to others where the;y are IIIOI'e 
useful. In a decentralized collecti'l'iet econoll\Y characterized by a 
tree market tor consumption goode, the managere or production will be 
required to obey the rule vmp • Wit and this will maximise welfare 
provided consumption goods are ditt.ributed optimally. In a perteet]Jr 
competitive econOIIJ1 meb will be equalized to rase through market 
meobani1111. In this case, the whole array or tive equatione beoolll4! 
meaningful. It there is a perfect lll&l'ket in buying goode and the 
purohaaer of a good ill the only indi'f'idual. affected by t:.he purohde, 
IUIIb • IUC. The con8\llllers will take the pricu o.t' commoditiee u 
paraetere and max1m1~~e their eatie.t'Mtion by equalising the ll&l'ginal. 
rate or eubetitut.ion between 8117 Wo pl'Oduot.e to their relative prieee~: 
Since the pt:ioee of """"D"ditiee are the ... tor all ind1'Yidue.la1 theiJ,;! 
' 
ll&l'ginal. wbet.itutability between m:r two producte will be equal. in 
li equ.1:U.briUllle The second equat.iOD ..., • mpr is satiatied it there ie 
=~~---~:~~~~oapetit~ cin selling,~· ,_ .. Tile ave~~~Z'OV8mlll.cune ~~t ~00- -
I' 
the individual seller will in this case be infinitely elastic and 
I marginal revenue will, therefore, be equal to price. mpr ; mpc, it 
!I entrepreneurs maximize protits, u ie as8UIII8d for a tree enterprise 
\ eoonomy. 'l'he fourth equation mpc • wat will follow trom perfect 
[! competition in buying factors. When all thes':l four equations are satia-· 
,! 
11 tied in all alternativr. H&es of' a tact.or, msb is equated to llliCo '1'hua 
li I under the abstract conditions preiiUIIIed to hold for perf'act competit.ion1 i' 
market mechanimn will lead to a maxim:lza:tion of welfare. 
It is easy to see without turt.her elaboraUon that when the price11 
of' the products a.nd factors are taken as parameters by all buyers and 
sellers engaged in transactions, the marginal conditions or welfare 
are satisfied through the ope1•ation of thtJ p...""icing Sj'stem. 
Ckle i'urt.her point may be noted. It may be supposed that t.he 
proportionalit.y of marginal cost aad price (or vmt' a.nd vmp) rather t~i 
their equality is a suf'ticient condition tor lliBXimum welfare. Lemer9 · 
argues that eo long as conditiCI18 of' perfect competition exist in any 
sector of the economy, the equality condition is necee::a...-y for the 
optimum. Thus, according to him, labor unite are tree to choose 
between vork and leisure and they will eo allot their time that the 
wat of an hnur dnoted to liOJ'k will be equal to its vmp. (Thill ie 
~~atistied in the Bixt.h condition ot welfare.) This implies that. other 
vmpta and vmt 1a should be equal for optimum allocation of rei!OlU"Ces. 
·we ahall conclw:le this diecusaion with a short note on the appli- ' 
cability of pricing mechanis to a socialist economy. A gl"'Up of 
economists including F. Hayek, Von HL~e'JP argued that rational ~~ 
9. &f Cb. 9. 
1o. u C:li~t:7'~ist t.c.>;.•~' Pr;. .... , .. ;r ,· "': ;.."_ "">' .. ", u.. · 
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tion of re•ources is not feasible in a aocialiat econo~. because of 
the absence of a market for capital goods. 
11 Lange has shown that thls view depends on an extremely narrow 
notion of value, 'l'he value of a coamodity does not depend nn a money 
economy with the attendant facilities of exchange; it can be expressed 
li 
' 
it 
'I 
in terms of the alternatives sacrificed eo long as the commodity h I! 
I' 
scarce. Scarcity.ia essential for a co~odity to possess some value, no~~ 
the existence of the fact of actual exchan~e. Lange further ahova that I 
' 
' 
in a socialist econoay, the parametric function of price can be retained!, 
and right quantity of goods can be produced by the method of trial and 
8'1'ror. 
(III) 
12 1) 
Bergson and Samuelson have probed deeper into the baaio 
assumptions of welfare economics. In dealing with the question of 
welfare in its totality, Bergson introduces a social welfare function, 
the value of which iR understood to depend on all the variables that 
might be conaidered ae affecting welfarel The amount of each and 
every kind of good consumed by and service performed by each and every 
hnuaehold, the amount of each and every kind of capital investment 
undertaken and alan the various l.nsUtutional factors. '!'hl.B h an 
extremely general proposition which together with the transformation 
I' 
II I, 
I 
i 
fUnction, i.e., the technolo~ical.relation between input and output, i 
II 11. Lange, 0, "On the Economic 'l'heoey of Socialism", in On the 1; 
Bconoaic 'l'heov. of SociaUaa, B. Lippincott, ed., Minneapolis, 1938~ 
129, 
12. Bergson, A., A Reformulation of Certain Aepecta of Welfare Economi •" 
~rterly Journal of Economics, ll'eb, 1938. See alao Bergson, ' 
'Socialist Economics,• in A Sur!!Y of Contemporarz Economic•. H. s.
1
'i 
lll.Us, llld., 'l'he Blairhton iiompalll', Philadelphia, lci48. -===-----~~r~~~~~~amuiijier1~so~n~.~P~.~A~.~~·~ll'~oun~d&~t~1~~~n~a~o~~o~n~o~m~cf]~~~.r,.~~a~rv~a~ra~un~i~vnenra~i~y~~~=-=-~~ 
Preae, C&JBbridge, 1948. Part I." Ch. VIII, 
11 
I 
;yields ee"Yeral welfare max1m1dng propositions. AM1t1onal propositions t 
are deducible on the basis of additional sets of assumptions. Without I 
going into the details of welfare at the extremely abstract level, we i I' 
II 
shall anal;ree the nature of the deciaiona on ends Which are inherent in I 
an;r study of welfare economies. 
One of the deoiaions on ends turns on whether and to what extent 
consWiers 1 preferences will be respected, 
"If one underetande welfare to mean that consumers are sovereign, 
ot course, the question is already decided when it is decided to 
.aximise welfare: but obYloual;r nothing is gained b;y this t;ype 
of implicit theorising in Which many economists seem to engage. 
Whether b.r def4nition or otherwise, a decision on en~s must be 
introduced. n 
! 
I 
j, 
I ~ 
II lj 
li 
li 
Alternatives to consumers' sovereignty are likely to be overlonked I 
in a democratic form of government, emept in periods of crisis, but I 
I 
they are too obvious in an authoritarian set up. Thus a sooialist 
I 
system with a Central Planning Board 1118:r choose to ignore consumers' I 
preferences and work on the basis of ita own evaluation of what is good I 
tor the society. Staunch advocates Df individualism again would not II 
:::::::a:::::s::::e::~vi:li::::::::e:f a:::::r:~ :::e:~:;ut ~~ 
1a held in doubt when we conaider how shaky l.ndividual preferences ars. 
Individual tastes and wants are, to a large extent, socially conditione 
b;y advertising and custom so that the;y can hardly be said to belong to 
him in any ultimate sense. Variants of consumers' sovereignty aa 
important considerations in a socialist s;rstem have been the subject 
ot serious discussion by a group of economists. 
14. Bergson, A,, •socialist •nomic a•, in ~ Survq ,2! Contemporarz 
Economics, P. 417. 
It aay be menti~ned in this connection that once a decision has 
been made in favor of consumers' sovereignty, a further assumption has 
to be made v:l.th respect to the structure of tastes of different parsons 
or households. The welfare analysis, as it is usually formulated, 
assumes that individual preferences are independent of one another! 
or in other words. an individual's preference depends upon what he con-
auaea and. not upon what othars cnnsWIIe, But consueption 1a motivated 
to a great extent by conspicuous expend:!. ture, "keeping up vi th the 
Jonesea•, snob appeal, maintenance of face, etc, 
'Phs aeconrl of the coeplex dec:l.ef.on on ends required in all,7' welfare [! 
study relates to the proble111 of distribution of income. A rational jj 
formulation of the principle depends upon the feaaibiltty of inter- I' 
,I 
personal coeparison of utility. That utilitiea are incommensurable is 
no more than an acknowledgement of the fact "that hare too a decieion 
ii p 
II 
on ends ia involved. • • l!hds are eaaent1ally principles for the enlua- I 
5 'i Uon of alternatives that otherwiBe are incommensurable.l Once some [1 
principle of income distribution is hit upon, alternative means of 
allocating resources are evaluated in the light of that principle. 
A more controversial value Judgment characteristic of auch 
modern thought, Sa~~~ualaon points out 1a that "the welfare function 
is completely (or vary nearly) ayametrical with respect to the con-
16 
sueption of all individ·~~als. • In other vorda,·the comparative 
aar~nal welfare per unit of aoney for different persons or households 
would not be altered by all,7' change in the composition elf their budgeta 
15. 
16. 
Ibid. P• 418 
SIUIIU81aon , _Q£. £!!., p. 224 
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[I 
ii 
ji 
li 
I! 
! 
for which ~heir own total u\ilit1ea are unchanged. It may be seen 
tha~ striking differences in the preference patterns of individual a 
will 1n~lidate this assumption, 
~om the standpoint of this approach to welfare economics, the 
new welfare economics is not a snbstitute for the old. "It is an 
attempt to derive necessr,ry conditions vhnae validity is independent 
of value judgments as between individuals or more accurately vhnae 
~11dity depends only upon lees restrictive end leas vall defined 
Talue Judgments than hed previously been assuaed. It in.,.olves the 
implications that more goods are 1better1 than leas gncds; (2) indi-
?!dual tastes are to count in the sense that it is better if all 
17 individuals are 'better off1 ." 
(IT) 
The above discussion of new welfare economics enables us to make 
a few important obaer...ations. It is seen, in the first place, that 
I. ,, 
:1 
I! 
I' 
fll 
li ,, 
,, 
,, 
i! 
II 
li 
li 
!I 
l1 
I ], 
li 
II 
il 
I' 
both Pigou ·and new welfare econoaiste provide a general welfare analTS11~ 
,: 
&& dht1:ngu1ahed from Marshall's pnrtial welfare an&lJ'81s, baaed on the 11 
,, 
concept of maximum welfare for the economic system as a whole. Secondly~ 
both use th!il marginal aJJP&ratus to derive the cnnditions of genera.l II 
optimum. ji 
il 
Apart from these elmilari ties, there is dU'ference in approach. l1 
The new welfare economics is methodologically more stringent and logical~ 
aore satisfying than Pigou's welfare economics, The rigid definition II 
17. Samuelson, •JUrther Co~~entar,r 
l!lconomic Renew, Sept, l94J, 
on Welfare Economics,• American 
I, 
i,ll 
I 
'I 
lJ2 
of the opti.um, distinction between necessary, sufficient and total 
II 
1: 
II 
absent in Pigou' a anal7'11h, Pir;ou1 a vel fare prop oai t i one, it hae been 11 
noted above, are expl1c1t'-7 two, one relating to allocation of reaource•JI 
and the other to distribution of income. That consumers reach their 1: 
conditione of welfare undoubtedly indicate a logical rigor which is 
optt.um b7 equating the marginal utilities of goods to their pricee 11 
implicit and n8'17er explicitly stated. Similar 17 the condition a of 
optieum effioiency in production which the new welfare economists dis-
ouaa in great detail do not receive much of the attention of P1gon. 
!hose are implied in the assumption of free competition, According to 
II 
I' 
:lr 
I 
Pi gnu, the free PlaT of self interest equates the value of the marginal I· 
(l private product of resources in different uses. Thia is due to the 
,[ 
equation of factor price and the 'f'&lue of ita urginal product as a li 
'I 
reeuH of competition which also ensures the fulfillment of the efficient 
,, 
I 
II 
conditione of production. 
I 
The analye1e of welfare conditione, apart from the price ayst8111 1e 
an important contri butt on of new welfare economics. !here Are two atage1 
in the treatment of the problem. J'iret, on the aaBUIIIption that preferen1• 
ayat11111 of indh'itluals, technological relation between input and output, ji 
:I 
dhtribution and income an~. quanti-ty of ultimate fac11ora of production i1 
I! are given, the conditione of maxilftiJII welfare are derived. 'l'hose condi- " 
li 
Uona determine \he optiiiUIII proportion of different goode to be produced j 
the opttmum proporUon of fACtors to be used and the opUIIIUIII di.Btr!.butio 
of final gn<'d& u••ng cnnsumera. Secondly, the price system h introduce 
Jnd it 1a aeen that when certain auumpt1on subsumed under the hearl of 
p8rfect competition !ll'ft made, the marginal conditions of welfare are 
i 
I! 
' 
! 
price system, Kahn and Robinson, While extending Pigou's proposition 
to imperfect competition, use the same concepte. II New Wel ~are economics :1 
II 
l: provide a set of perfectlT general propoa1t1nns which are not a:!'fech~. 
II 
i! 
by the 1nat1 tut1onal conR1derat1one which underlie the <l.houadon of 
Pigou and his followers. The significance of this contribution ia 
real bed when it is seen that condi ti. tllls of 1118X111111111 vel fare dn not depen~ 
for their validity on tho existence of a competitiVe 179tem with the 
attendant facilities of exchange. tn m socialist econo~, where the 
state mB7 have control over ultimate ~ctore of prn~uotion, optimum 
conditions are obtained on the imposition of a set of rulea to be fol-
lowed by managers of production aa guides. 
While the new welfare eoonoaiata are logioall,y rigorous, Pigon h 
II 
1: 
I! 
! 
il 
li 
II 
.I 
i! 
II 
I 
I
I 
more interested in the practical bearing of his conclusions. He builds 1 
up a framework w1 th a lltaaer degree of abstraction end which h auppoaedll 
I to apply to the conditions of the raal world. Thus the connotation of il 
!I 
perfect coapeti tion is not the same with Pigou and the new welfare /i 
economists. Pigou'a idea nf simple competition 1a clasatoal in eeeence,l[ 
i! 
He admits the existence of var!lllls types of hindrances and frictional 11 
I 
He 1s 1! elements and anme degree of monopoly in his competitive system. 
also an advocnte of free COI!IJletitlon in the claaaicll.l eense of free [I 
enterprise. Initiative, a&BURiption of risk, venture for experimentat11! 
which :!'low from private enterpriae are valuad by :Pignu, lfe have seen i,l 
connection with hie polic;r recommendations that he is reluctant to sup- .\ 
II 
port aJIT measure which cnul~ Jeopardise those vnlues of free compeUt1o~'r· 
Perfect competition of the new wel~are economies, on the ether hand, h /, 
a logical construct, apart from ite existence in practice. It should, I! 
I 
134, 
:i 
,, 
howeTer, be noted in this connection that free enterprise of Pignu'• i1 
j, 
conception does not also conform to reaU t;r. DeT!ation from the optiiiWII il 
,, 
i: is larger than he imatdned due to imperfect competition, as shown by '' 
R. F, Kahn. II 
:: 
!n the ideal cnndi tiona of perfect competition nf Paretian and new J: 
welfare economics with perfect mobility of resnurces, perfect knowledge I( 
I' and the absence of BII,Y external economies, maximum welfare 1a attained. I 
'I 
In Pigou'" system, on the nther hand, various types of hindrances, [, 
'I 
external economies an~ diseconomies, third pnrty services or 1Usaeniceaj' 
lead to deTiat!on from optimum even in a system oJ' si~~~ple competition, II 
1: Yinally, an important rli fferenca between Pigou anrt new weH'are 'I 
economist& concerns the interperaonal comparison of utility. 'l.'he latter '1 
! 
croup does not offer BII.Y propos! tion relating to distribution of income 1\ 
1: 
on the gr~d that no valid comperiaon between interpersonal utility 
,, 
i! jl 
I 
can be ma<'e, Pi gnu's reply to the critics expressed in a recant erticlaii 
II 
ia instructive in this respeot. !!'e o'l!aerTesl 
•tr we take up random groupe of people of the same race and 
brought up in the aama country, we find that in many features 
II 
li 
,, 
lj 
' that are comparable by obJective testa, they are on the &Te:ooage j,,• 
pretty much alike and indeed for fundamental characters, we need 1 
not lilllit llllrselTea to people of the B!lll8 race and country. On 1.1 
this basis, we are entitled, I submit, to infer b.r analogy that I 
they are probably prett;r IIIUCh alika in other respects also, In ,j 
all practical affaire, we act on that supposition. We cannot i! 
prOT& that 1 t iB true. Nobody ::an prove that an;ybod;y besides if 
hhleelf e::dsta, but, n&Tertheleu eTeryhody 1s quite sure o" it, 
1 
We do not, in short, start fro~ a tabula rasa, building ourselv~ I 
to h
1
told ever,r
1 
opinion whie
1
h the natur~ man entertains tohbe ' , 
gui y un\1 1 t is prOTed nnocent. ""e burden 5.8 the "t er way. I! 
To deny this 1B tn wreck, not merel;r welfare economics but the II 
whole apparatus of practical thought. On the basis n~ nnalogy, 1 
obael"T!ltion and intercourse, interpersonal comparieon can, I [', 
think properl;y be IIR.de; and moreover, unless we haTe a special 'ji 
reason to believe the contrary, a giTen a11ount of stuff lllaT be ' 
presume.d to yield a BimilfU' !llllount of aat1 a faction, not indeed ~I' 
ae bl·~aen any one man and any other, but as between repreaentatiT 
135 
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ma111bere of groupe of ind.1Yidual.s,, •• ,This is all that "'faneed 
to allow this branch of welfare economics to fUnction.• 
This eipif'icanUy ez:preues Pigou 1 a approach to welfare economics, He • 
states that there are mBD7 propositions which cannot be proved, 
Nevertheless, there are valid. reasons tor accepting them, The new 
welfare economics is concerned wzclueively with allocation of resources, 
It cannot compare the different optima rapreeanting different income 
diatribuUone, 
'1'0 Pigou, this position h untenable, with the practical interest 
he has in welfare economice, He believe• that there are grounds for 
comparing the utiHUee of different individuals and tor pronouncing 
Judgment on the distribution of income, 
Use ofuUlity aa a cardinal number, however, is not eaAential to 
19 
system, What Pigou regards important 1e the comparhon of 
utility both intrapersonally and interpersonally, Both these purposes 
are tulfillP.d 1t uUlity ia regarded as a vector quantity <·nd not as 
a ac!llar quantU:y. 
The olaim that new welfare economics 4oea not involve value 
judgmenta·ts not justified, Bergson and Samuelson show, as we noted 
above, that several decili~ne on ends e:-e inherent in any studT r-t 
welfare eoonomice, The 11aaiity ot oonBUmera' preference ie one among 
a number o:f' value judgments which new welfare ec~nomice makes, 
On the other hand, it should be pointed out that the uae of 
utility calcalue doea not really dispense with the necessity of value 
1:36. 
judgments. There is a tone of factual ~lidity in Pigoule treatment 
or welfare which mar sometimes be misleading. We have oeen in 
connection With analyeing Pigout s concept of welfare that his carei'ul 
analysis of the relationship between utility, desires and aatiefactione 
imply value judgments and not tactual truths. The utility ce.lculus, 
in a similar WBF• obscure the underlying value judgments~ 
"While the introduction of utility calculus does not 
dispense with thqneed of value judgments, the manner in 
which these value judgaenta are introduc-d 1s a misleading 
one. Statements as to the aggregate character of total 
welfare, or as to the e~alit7 of marginal utilities when 
ther.; is an unequal distribu.tion of eharea, provided 
telllperaments are about the same, do have the ring of factual 
proposiiiona and are likely to obscure the valuation• 
implied.•20 
Bergson, A.,•A Reformation of Certain A~pecte of Walfare_Economice•l .. 
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CHAPTER lli.. 
CONCLUSION 
(I) 
Pigou's welfare economics signifies the culmination of the neo-
classical tradition and at the same time a departure from it. He set 
out writing his treatise as a time when the meiginal analysis was 
pretty much established, though not fully developed. Pigou evidently 
eould not accept the hypothesis which was implicit in much of the 
writings of English classical economists that utility or satisfaction 
derived from a commodity was roughly proportional to the quantity 
possessed by any individual. This basic postulate, which though never I 
expressly stated explains the preoccupation of the classical economists 11 
with the dynamic problem of economic pregress rather than the static 
problem of allocation. We have seen that free competition for the 
~ssicists was a means to widening of the economy, though in >11 fairnes 
to them, it should be observed that some of them discussed free 
competition as a means to a tightening of the economic process. 
Neo-classicists inherited from the English classical tradition 
this physical level of ~proach and never abandoned it altogether. The 
continental economists like Pareto, ~lalras, Barone, and others were 
interested in the allocative function of free competition on the 
assu~tion of given wants, a fixed quantity of resources and a given 
state of the arts. While they regarded those elements as exogenous 
factors, the English classicists and neo-classicists delved into a 
discussion of institutional, technolo ical and other eonsiderations 
II 
1
,,' 
il 
I 
I 
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whieh have a bearing on those elements and tried to find out, though 
not too successfully the determinants of supply of labor, capital, etc. 
I 
Thus in the neo-classicists is found a mixture of both the subjecti e 
level of analysis characteristic of continental economists and the 
classical physical level of analysis. This was to some extent reflected 
in Pigou's ideas on welfare economics. We have noted above that though 
Pigbu defined welfare in a strictly subjective sense. and analyzed the 
effects of distribution of resources on'·welfare on the assumption of 
full employment of a fixed quantity of resaurces, there are instances 
where he does not carry the subjective level of analysis to its 
logical conclusion. Those instances m~ be restated here. In the first 
! 
place, in dealing with the problem of maintenance of capital, Pigou 
lays an undue stress onthe constancy of its physical content and does 
not offer any satisfactory treatment of the factor of obsolescence l·thich 
is a very important phenomenon. Secondly, on strictly theoretical 
considerations, aggregate national dividend consisting of consu~tion 
goods and investment goods cannot properly be regarded as an index of 
economic welfare in the framework of a subjective level of analysis. 
The relationship between consumption goods and economic welfare as 
revealed in subjective satisfaction is direct, On the other hand, 
investment goods affect economic welfare through the potentiality of 
their turning out consumption goods which will eventually be placed in 
the hands of ultimate consumers. An implicit acceptance of these two 
sorts of relationships as identical by Pigou prevents him from 
recognising their difference which is important fur a proper formulatio 
of the ro bl em. osition that consumers derive the 
1J9 
1 14 
[! 
II 
II 
same amount of satisfaction from a given q_uantity of> goods in the fu:t:urel( 
as in the present and they do not distribute resources rationally l1 
through time, is also characteristic of physical bias. Finally, Pigou [ 
'"""'" ,,,. <ho Gb,jooU•• lml of uol"" by "''"'"'''""" ~wlT ~~ 
prices (supply price simpliciter and supply price from the standpoint 1] 
:By omitting II of the community) on the basis of an imperfect criterion. 
any rise in factor prices from community supply price, Pigou overlooka 
the importance of rise ~ transfer earnings which enter into social 
II 
II 
cost and affect economic welfare. Only rent which does not involve any I, 
cost from the point of view of society should be excluded. I 
Apart from this physical substratum in Pigbu 1 s welfare analysis, 
,I 
some of his ideas are definitely Marshallian in character. In the 
first place, he takes over from Marshall the convention of draWing 
a boundary line between the economic and gener>al. welfare by the measur- 11 
ing rod of money. While admitting this boundl;try line, both Marshall 11 
'I and Pigou have analysed the interdependence of general and economic 
welfare. the bearing of institutional factors on economic
5
we
00
elnfardl:,anthde ,I, 
the effects of economic causes on non-economic welfare. ~ 
definition of economics as a science of welfare is evidently an outcome li 
of the classical tradition. Attempt to establish economics on a sound j'l 
scientific basis by avoiding implicit theorising, making basi~ postulate> 
as explicit as possible and abstracting from factors, ethical, institu- j 
tional ar otherwise about which no valid generalisation can be made is I 
comparatively recent in the history of economic thought. Of course, 
the seeds for this type of approach were sown by mathematical economists 
The claseicists and neo-classicists, while scientific 
did not satisfy themselves with the formulation of logically rigonous 
propositions. Many of their conalusions are speculative in character, 
Iii 
I 
based on a :priori reasoning and broad psychological and socialogical ~~ 
considerations. Pigou had this practical approaCh. as is to be expecte~ 
of one educated and brought up in the c~sical tradition. Thirdly, the], 
li 
use of the concept of equilibrium firm and archetypal industry is ,! 
Both 
1
11 similar to Marshall's use of the concept of reuresentative firm. 
are based on a biological notion of the growth and dec~ of industries. 
I 
Finally, utility calculus which Pigou uses is a neo-classical device. 
He, like M~rshall, assumes that the marginal utility of money is the 
same for different individuals. 
we can now pass on to Pigou 1 s departure from the neo-classical 
tradition, In the firstcplace, instead of Marshallian surplus analysis 
to analyse problems of welfare, Pigou used the marginal apparatus. 
While surplus analysis takes account of the total utility enjoyed or 
sacrificed by individualzdue to the possession or non-possession of a 
finite quantity of goods, marginal analysis is concerned with balancing 
the advantages and disadvantages of very small variations in output 
in different industries. I Pigou observes that for eraluation of welfare , 
II 
from different combinations of goods, aggregation of consumers' surplus 11 
is necessary. But as this is not a practicable proposition, he haa 1: 
i[ 
By this means, Pigou deviates from [I recourse to the marginal anal)'!sis. 
Marshall's method of analysing the gain or loss of satisfaction due to 11 
different types of fhce:l policy by tracing the variation of the area o~~ 
consumers' sUllplus under a hypothetical demand curve. lie argues that 
our knowledge of the demand curve is limited to an extremely narrow 
141 
range of output differing from the existing one by a very small variatio 
on either side. In this case, evidently marginal analysis which is 
concerned with small deviations from the existing price-quantity 
situation promises more f1'111t than the surplus analysis. Secondly. 
Pigou derives conditions of optimum for the economic system as a whole 
instead of for particular sectors of the economy. While Marshall dealt 
with problems of welfare in the framework of a partial analysis, Pigou 
built up a systematic general wel~Bre analysis centered round the 
concept of ideal output or optimum which requires the equality of 
II I 
i'i 
i 
I 
I 
II 
I 
II I 
marginal social product of resources in all uses throughout the economic! 
I 
system. Dealing with specific industries, Pigou is concerned with a 
few cases, where the automatic working of free competition does not 
II 
operate t0ward maximum welfare. This is very similar to Marshall's 
partial analysis with respect to increasing and decreasing returns 
industries. Pigou 1 s general approach is obscured by the assumption of 
I 
the attainment of ideal output in a large body of industries due to the 
I operation of the competitive system. The need for state interference 
is felt only in a few exceptional cases. The potentialities of Pigou's 
approach are realised in the welfare economies of Kahn and Mrs. Robinson 
Kahn's analysis does not have any vestige of partial analysis; his 
welfare propositions are perfectly general, applicable to conditions of 
both perfect and monopolistic competition. The marginal apparatus of 
Pigou is fully developed in Mrs. Robinson's treataeut of individual 
firms in different market situations. She studies in detail the 
relation between the output under monopoly, perfect competition, 
imperfect competition and discriminating mono ol , which were outlined 
142 
" 
by Pigou. Marginal revenue and marginal cost are the key tools of that 
analysis. Pigou's conclusions gain in precision in Mrs. Robinson's 
analysis. 
We shell end up the discussion of Pigou's vis-a-vis the classical 
I 
jl 
li ,, 
and the neo-classical system by ashort note on the conclusions derived r·, 
il 
from theoretical analysis. Divergences between private and social il 
II interest were considered in neo-classical economics; it was left to i! 
Pigou to incorporate them as ])articular ceses in a general theory .of th+1 
optimum. Thus Marshall dealt with the welfare implications of increasi 
I 
and decreasing cost industries. But it was Pigou who seriously consider~~ 
the divergence bet\<een pl·ivate ""'" social products arising from various 11 
possible sources. He first lay emphasis on the impDrtant type of 1, 
divergence which is caused by third party services or disservices C:ue 
to the application of resources in any particular use or place. The 
priatng mechanism under competition does not make allowance for these 
types of benefits or losses accruing to third pc•rties. Pigou shows 
by ample illustrations that under modern industrial conditions, these 
I 
I 
I! 
II 
I divergences can assume serious proportions and unless the state attemptsj 
the correction of these maladjustments, maximum welfare, even under i 
conditions of perfect competition will never be attained. Tnus Pigou i 
vras probably the first econ~ist to propound the economic justification I 
for a moderate degree of socialism in a competitive system. li· II 
I 
(II) 
We shall now discuss the relation between P:lgou' s welfare economics 
and the general theory of optimum developed by Pareto and the new welfar 9 
14, 
school. The Paretian and Pigovian systems have two com~on features. 
In the first place, both provide a general welfare analysis based on 
the concept of maximum welfare for the economic system as a whole. 
Secondly, both use the marginal apparatus to derive the conditions of 
general optimum. 
Apart from these similarities. there is difference in approach. 
Pigou is more interested in the practical import of his welfare 
propositions than on their logical foundations. Throughout his 
writings, he maintains a practical interest which leaves its impact 
on his whole system. The Paretian and new welfare economics, on the 
! 
I. 
I! 
!I 
I' 
,I 
I ,, 
I, 
other hand, is methodOlogically more stringent, while lacking in factual 
details. Pigou says that "it is
1 
the promise of fruit and not of light t 
that chiefly merits our regard.• With Pareto, and new welfare shhool, 
1
, 
the formal structure of the system is moPe important than the'promise 
of fruit'. 
The new welfare economies, we have noted above, seeks to base 
welfare economics on scientific foundations, free from ethical bias. 
Thus it re#ects the utility calculus and interpersonal comparison of 
utility and derives optimum conditions fron an apparently acceptable 
·r 
'I I. 
II 
II 
'I 
I 
hypothesis as to the meaning of optimum. The 
competition to maximum welfare is established 
correspondence of perfect I 
on the basis of an unuaual 
degree of abstraction regarding the meaning of perfect competition. 
Ideal conditions of pure competition aae assumed with perfect mobility 
and divisibility of factors and perfect knowledge. It may be said that 
the characteristics of perfect competition, pertaining to the general 
1. Pigau, ECONOMICS OF ~~FARE, 4th Ed, • 4. 
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theory of optimum as develOped by Pareto, Hicks and others are in the 
nature of deductions from the conditions of maximum welfare, rather than 
from observable facts. 
This concept of competition is quite different from that of Pigou 
and other English classicists. To the calssical economists. competition 
meant freedom of private enterprise which would prevail in real life, 
if there were no state interference. Free competition in this sBBse 
was meant to promote economic activity by providing sufficient incentive 
1: 
and initiative to produce and to experiment and by widening the area 
of the market by division of labor, thus absorbing new resources and 
technical possibilities into the economic system. Pigou does not deal 
1: 
I' 
with free competition as a widening mechanism, in the manner of the 
English classicists. He assumes the existence of a fixed quantity of 
resuarces and discusses the static problem of allocatioa. His idea of 
simple competition, however, is classical in essence. He admits the 
existence of various types of hindrances like costs of movement, 
1~erfect knowledge, imperfect divisibility of factors and also a 
certain degree of monopoly in his competitive system. Pigou's world 
of competition is not an idealsystem; it is believed to exist in fact 
Pigou is an advocate of free competition in the classical sense of 
free enterprise. Even though he would pleai for an equAlitarian 
distribution of income, he wants gradualnessin the transference of 
income from the rich to the poor and rejects any drastic measure which 
will prejudice private enterprise. Again, he supports indirect forms 
of transference in the form of lower prices of goods consumed by the 
poor and similar measures, so that the distributionof income does not 
145. 
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~feet the spirit of free competition. While Pigou establishes the cas~ 
for interference to mitigate divergences between marginal private and 
social net products, he argues that any policy adopted by the state 
should not hamper the smooth operation of the system of free 
enterprise. For this reason. most of his policy recommendations are 
confined to fiscal control, 
Doubt may be raised about the optimum character of competition 
as defined by Pigou. In a system of private enterprise, imperfect 
competition has been recognised to be widely prevalent and the theory 
of value accordingly reoriented. In a world where imperfection 
i' 
competition is a rule rather than an exception, and cannot be eliminated!• 
merely by abolishing the institutional restraints: on the free play of 
self-interest, Professor Pigou' s model is unrealistic. Pigou 1 s welfare i 
system, as we noted above, has been extended by Kahn and Mrs. Robinson 
to the case of monopolistic competition. While this is theoretically 
satisfying, the remedies suggested for the correction of maladjustments 
in a world of monopolistic competition become more complicated, In 
Pigou1 s system, external economies or diseconomies are in the nature 
of exceptions, and the same is also true of monopoly. Therefore, 
correction of maladjustments is necessary only in a few exceptional 
cases. When we take account of imperfect competition, on the other 
hand, divergences between private and social net products occur in 
the whole economic system and the scope for government interference 
widens. It is not at all easy to find out the average degree of monopolt 
i' 
and the average capacity of industries to create external economies and !I 
a Qf,)Qp1 et 1 ?P of the opti"'W rats 'f tese Cll" 1HHlft'i3 fo:r-t:Ae sc::ccLlon 
of maladjustments in a system of monopolistic competition. 
An important difference between Pigou and new welfare economists 
consists in their treatment of interpersonal comparison of utility. 
Pigou made the assumption that the marginal utility of money is the 
same to different individuals living in similar circumstances, This 
assumption, in a sense, provides another instance of Pigou•s interest 
in the practical bearing of welfare economics. Economists are prevente~ 
from making a large number of prescriptions, if they abstract from dis- 1: 
tributive considerations, Thus according to Pareto and new welfare 
economics, there are multiple positions of optimum and there is no. 
basis for comparing those different positions. Kaldor and Hicks apply 
the device of compensation to the notion of Paretian optimum, and 
extends comparability through the mechanism of compensating losers and 
taxing gainers, Once the status quo in the distribution of real 
income is attained, net gain in taxes will indicate an increase in 
welfare. But this really does not provide a valid criterion for 
practical policy, No comparison is possible between any two points 
on the generalised contract locus on the basis of the criterion of 
compensation. Pigou is primarily interested in the practical 
importance of his conclusions and not on their logical Eigor, Inorder 
to compare different tncome situations, he formulates the distrioutional 
proposition which together with the allocational proposition determine 
the conditions of maximum welfare, 
lt has been said in favor of Paretian and new welfare economics 
that by rejecting in,erpersonal comparis•n of utility, it attains a 
scientific objectivity which is absent in the classical and inthe 
147. 
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Pigovian system, Closer examination will reveal that this claim is ,_ 
highly dubious, Bergson's and &amueleon 1 s study have made it clear 
that several decisions on ends are inherent in any study in welfare 
economics. ln accepting the preference patterns of individuals, the nell! 
welfare economics implicitly accepts the value of consumers• sovereignt;!J'• 
Apart from consumers' sovereignty, there are other value propositions 
in new welfare economics, though it abstracts from the principle of 
2 income distribution, 
Therefore, the criticism that Pigou deviates from the disciplines 
of science by introducing value Judgment misses the mark, On the other i 
hand, it is important to note that conditions of maximum welfare do 
not re~ire for their derivation either utility calculus or interperson~ 
comparison of utility, They only obscure the underlying value judgment •• 
The new welfare economics is undoubtedly methodologically more 
stringent and logically more satisfying than Pigou•s system, While 
', 
many of Pigou•s welfare ideas are implicit and never explicitly stated,' 
the new welfare economics offers a set of general propositions which 
are rigorously deduced from underlying assumptions, In doing so, it 
also provide* a framework whose validity extends beyond price econo~. 
;; 
Apart from this important contribution, however, there is not any 
I' ,,
substantial difference between the conelusions of Pigou and new welfare !: 
economists, As Bergson3 says, no shapp break is involved in the 
transition from Pigou' s economics of welfare to new welfare economics; 11 
II j, 
both are parts of the same process of developQtltlnt, 
2, See Bergson, A REFORMULATION OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF WELFARE ECONOMI~S. ======~~==~J~·'==dl,!:Bl,!l,,JDb·=Q.u=ar=t=erly Journal ~Economics, Feb, 1938. ~ 
n 
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I 
In Chapter I, the object of the study is outlined, followed b,y 11 
a discussion of Pre-Pigovian welfare economics. The purpose of our 
1
. 
study consists in a critical analysis of Professor Pigou 1 s welfare , 
II 
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:::e:u::;;::::: g:::::i:::~anw::::~e1:;::::i::a::i:::::i::t:sunder I· 
possible, These groups are English classical economists (A. Smith. 
d, B. Say, D. Ricardo, and others), continental classical economists 
(V. Pareto, L. Walras, E. Barone) andneo-claseical economists (H. 
Sidgwick, A. Marshall, and others), It is shown that the English 
classical economists regarded free competition as a means to the 
widening of the economw rather than to a rational allocation of 
resources, The continental economists, Pareto and Barone formulated 
the concept of subjective optimum anddealt with the problem of 
allocation in the static sense. The neo-classical economists made 
a compromise. While accepting the doctrine of marginal utility, they 
were not preoccupied with the static problem of allocation. In the 
manner of the English clasoicists, they discussed the forces which 
govern the supply of ultimate factors of production and human wants. 
A typical feature of neo-classical economics is Marshall's partial 
surplus analysis. 
In Chapter II, Pigou 1 s concept of welfare and the problem of 
measurement of national dividend as an index of welfare are taken 
up, It is seen that Pigou arrived at the concept of national dividaa 
vii 
In Chapter VII, the conclusions of the thesis are presented. The 
similarities and contrasts between Pigou 1 s welfare economics on the 
one hand and classical and neo-classical economics on the other are 
discussed in the first section. Points of agreement and dif'erence 
between Pigou and new welfare economiscs are dealt with in the 
concluding section. It is seen that Pigou stands in between the 
classicists and new welfare economists. He has a practical approach 
characteristic of classical and neo-classical economists. On the other • 
hand, his treatment of the concept of welfare is different from his 
predecessors. New welfare economics is more rigorous tnan Pigou's and 
is also more abstract. No sharp break, however, is involved in the 
transition from Pigovian welfare economics to new welfare economics. 
II ,, 
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